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ABSTRACT 
GREGORY JOSEPH BOYER: Medicaid Home- and Community-Based Long-Term 
Care Services in the Age of Olmstead 
(Under the direction of Jonathan B. Oberlander, PhD) 
Medicaid home- and community-based services (HCBS) provide formal long-
term care to people who would otherwise be served in institutions. HCBS include home 
health, personal care, and waiver services. The 1999 Olmstead vs L.C. ruling mandates 
states to serve Medicaid long-term care recipients in the least restrictive setting possible. 
The three studies in this mixed-methods dissertation seek to understand the political, 
socio-demographic, economic, policy, and supply influences on HCBS, the effect of 
greater HCBS spending on institutional expenditures, and challenges to HCBS expansion 
since the Olmstead ruling. 
 HCBS spending and utilization are related to several key variables. Economic and 
supply factors have a robust relationship with HCBS expansion. Socio-demographic 
factors, notably state populations of racial and ethnic minorities, affect HCBS. However, 
these effects differ among home- and community-based programs. There is no consistent 
partisan influence on state HCBS spending and utilization.   
 Greater state investment in 1915(c) waiver programs appears to have, at best, a 
neutral relationship or, at worst, a weak positive relationship with state institutional 
Medicaid long-term care spending. Thus, the results do not support prior work indicating 
that HCBS programs reduce institutional spending. In addition, supply and policy factors 
both have a robust relationship with institutional spending.  
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 Drawing on interviews with state Medicaid officials, this study identifies both 
barriers and catalysts to HCBS growth since Olmstead. Barriers to HCBS expansion 
include both financial, such as funding crises, as well as non-financial factors, such as 
administrative burdens. However, informants said that HCBS programs enjoy broad, 
bipartisan support from state policy makers as well as support from advocacy groups.  
 This study provides a new contribution to understanding influences on state 
HCBS spending, the effects of HCBS on institutional care, and the barriers and catalysts 
to HCBS expansion since Olmstead. Given the implementation of the 2010 Patient 
Protection and Affordable Care Act, the population aging, and ongoing state fiscal crises, 
these findings will help guide future research in Medicaid HCBS.  
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Preface 
Consistent with the three-paper option, chapter one provides the introduction and specific 
aims. Chapter 2 provides the background and new contribution. Chapter 3 provides the 
data and methods used. Chapters 4, 5, and 6 are each a manuscript exploring a specific 
aim. Since these chapters are to be submitted for publication, there are redundancies 
across chapters as well as differences in formatting.  Chapter 7 concludes the dissertation 
and provides a discussion about future research, policy implications, and limitations.  
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Chapter 1: Introduction and Specific Aims 
Long-term care (LTC) services are for persons requiring assistance with Activities 
of Daily Living (ADL) (e.g. bathing and dressing) and/or Instrumental Activities of Daily 
Living (IADL) (e.g. shopping or doing housework) (RA Kane, Kane, & Ladd, 1998). 
Medicaid pays for long-term care in two settings: institutional care and home-and 
community-based services (HCBS) (Howard, Ng, & Harrington, 2011). HCBS are 
services provided to persons who would otherwise be served in institutions and include 
home health, personal care, and waiver services (Center for Personal Assistance Services, 
2012).  Approximately 12 million Americans need assistance with ADLs or IADLs. 
Since approximately 1.5-1.8 million Americans receive nursing home care, roughly 10 
million people in the community require long-term care services. Half of the people 
needing long-term care in the community are elderly (Kaye, Harrington, & LaPlante, 
2010). Even though seniors are not the only group that uses long-term care, demand for 
long-term care will increase as the population over age 65 grows from 44 million in 2010 
to 72 million by 2030 (Vincent & Velkoff, 2010).   
Over the last thirteen years, the federal government has played a critical role in 
the expansion of HCBS. In 1999, the United States Supreme Court ruled in Olmstead vs. 
L.C. that states must provide Medicaid long-term care in the least-restrictive setting 
possible (Rosenbaum, 2000). In the years following Olmstead, the federal government 
has enacted several initiatives to encourage state HCBS investment. These actions 
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include the 2001 New Freedom Initiative, new HCBS programs under the Deficit 
Reduction Act of 2005, and, most recently, new incentives for states to expand HCBS 
under the 2010 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010 (Carlson & Coffey, 
2010; Harrington, Ng, Laplante, & Kaye, 2012; New Freedom Initiative, 2003). Thus, 
HCBS programs are an integral, and increasingly prominent, component of the long-term 
infrastructure. 
This mixed-methods study examines interstate variation in HCBS programs, the 
impact of HCBS programs on institutional expenditures, and the challenges states 
confront in expanding HCBS.  First, a longitudinal analysis explores the political, 
economic, socio-demographic, supply, and policy influences on Medicaid HCBS 
expenditures during 1996-2008. In addition, I examine Medicaid HCBS recipients, and 
expenditures per recipient during 1999-2008 (Aim 1). Second, I analyze the effect of 
Medicaid 1915(c) waiver expenditures on Medicaid institutional long-term care 
expenditures for years 1996-2008 (Aim 2). Third, I conduct semi-structured interviews of 
state Medicaid officials and perform a qualitative analysis of challenges to HCBS 
expansion since 1999 (Aim 3). This dissertation addresses the following specific aims: 
 
1.1. Specific Aim 1:  To study the political, economic, socio-demographic, supply, and 
policy influences on HCBS utilization and expenditures. 
 
Longitudinal trend analyses examine HCBS utilization and expenditures. I define 
utilization as Medicaid HCBS recipients per 1000 state population and expenditures as 
expenditures per 1000 state population (per capita) and/or per recipient. I regress the 
dependent variables on political, socio-demographic, economic, policy, and supply 
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variables influencing HCBS. This aim studies years 1999-2008 for recipients and 
expenditures per recipient and years 1996-2008 for expenditures per capita 
 
1.2. Specific Aim 2: To study the effect of Medicaid 1915(c) waiver expenditures on 
Medicaid institutional expenditures. 
 
In a second longitudinal analysis, I regress institutional Medicaid expenditures on 
1915(c) waiver expenditures using the same economic, socio-demographic, supply and 
policy control variables in aim 1. I explore several models including pooled OLS, 
instrumental variable regression, fixed effect analyses and instrumental variable 
regression with fixed effects. This aim studies years 1996-2008. 
 
1.3. Aim 3: To explore challenges to HCBS expansion since the Olmstead decision. 
For the qualitative component to this mixed methods dissertation, I investigate the 
administrative, socio-demographic, economic, policy, and political challenges to HCBS 
expansion since the Olmstead ruling. I use semi-structured, topical interviews and 
thematic analysis of 18 Medicaid officials, each from a different state.   
 This study has important policy implications. It provides information about the 
factors influencing HCBS expenditures and recipients. Further, studying the effect of 
HCBS spending on institutional long-term care spending clarifies how much these 
programs can save state Medicaid budgets. Finally, identifying challenges to HCBS 
expansion helps illuminate the issues that states must grapple with as efforts continue to 
rebalance long-term care.  
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Chapter 2: Background and Significance  
 
2.1 Overview 
 
 The growing elderly population is driving the demand for long-term care and 
those in need of care often want to receive it in the home. While institutional care is 
required for some persons, home- and community-based care is more appropriate for 
many and preferred by most.  In addition, a legal mandate from the Olmstead ruling and 
the passage of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA) make this study 
very timely. In 1999, the United States Supreme Court ruled that states that provide long-
term care must do so in the least restrictive environment possible. Additionally, new 
incentives for states to expand their HCBS programs through the ACA highlight the 
ongoing importance of Medicaid HCBS.  Findings from past studies indicate that HCBS 
programs show promise in addressing these trends and challenges, but these studies do 
not describe such programs in depth in recent years, analyze their effect on institutional 
expenditures, or identify challenges to HCBS expansion in the years following the 
Olmstead ruling. 
 
2.2 An Increasing Need for Long-Term Care and Consumer Preferences   
Long-term care need is defined as people requiring help with Activities of Daily 
Living (ADL), such as bathing or dressing, and with Instrumental Activities of Daily 
Living that include shopping or doing housework (IADL).  Most long-term care is 
informal care provided by family members. Formal long-term care includes all care that 
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is paid for and provided by a variety of people including nurse aides, nursing assistants, 
home health aides, and practical nurses (RA Kane, et al., 1998).  Formal long-term care 
delivery encompasses both institutional (nursing home) care and HCBS. Approximately 
12 million Americans, or 4 percent of the population, need assistance with ADLs or 
IADLs. Since approximately 1.5-1.8 million Americans receive nursing home care, 
roughly 10 million people in the community, half of whom are elderly, are in need of 
long-term care services (Kaye, et al., 2010). Even though seniors are not the only group 
that uses long-term care, demand for long-term care will increase as those aged over 65 
will grow from 44 million in 2010 to 72 million by 2030 (Vincent & Velkoff, 2010). 
Scholars and policy analysts have examined attitudes towards long-term care 
delivery. A 2000 AARP study found that 71 percent of Americans over age 45 want to 
stay in their homes as long as possible. Sixty-three percent believed that their current 
home will be where they will always live. Furthermore, if they needed help 82 percent 
would prefer not to move away from their home. A small minority, nine percent, 
preferred to move to a formal long-term care facility (Bayer & Harper, 2000). 
In a study of Virginians aged 60 or older, McCauley and Blieszner (1985) found 
similar results for long-term care preferences. Seventy percent of respondents had 
positive attitudes toward receiving paid in-home care.  Only 28 percent of those asked 
were inclined to seek long-term care in a nursing home (McAuley & Blieszner, 1985).  
Similarly, Eckert et al. (2004) surveyed over 1500 Marylanders aged 40-70 years and 
found that most prefer to receive long-term care at home or in the community. Like 
McCauley and Blieszner, few respondents preferred nursing homes.  Using state reports, 
site visits and interviews with officials, Mollica (2003) reported similar findings, with 
7	  
older people again preferring to receive services where they reside rather than in a 
nursing home.  
 These preferences are noteworthy as many baby-boomers enter retirement 
without adequate savings.  Baby-boomers are different than previous retirees because 
they are more likely to live alone in old age due to divorce, they have higher incomes, 
and they have lower numbers of adult offspring (Easterlin, Schaeffer, & Macunovich, 
1993; Macunovich, Easterlin, Schaeffer, & Crimmins, 1995). However, most adults 
currently have little saved. Seventy-five percent of U.S. adults aged 50-64 have less than 
$30,000 saved for retirement (Schwartz Center for Economic Policy Analysis, 2012). 
These trends suggest that many boomers will have limited resources for informal care, 
coupled with an inability to pay for formal long-term care.  
 
2.3 Origins of the Three Largest Medicaid HCBS Programs: Home Health, 1915(c)  
Waivers, and Personal Care Services 
 The Social Security Act of 1935 provided cash assistance to those outside of 
public facilities such as almshouses. This law created a new type of consumer. The 
advent of Social Security provided a measure of financial independence to seniors to 
purchase long-term care. In time, private and public facilities would also receive public 
monies to provide long-term care (Vladeck, 1980). 
 This relationship strengthened with the passage of the Medicare and Medicaid in 
1965.  The Johnson administration sought to avoid the inclusion of nursing home care in 
Medicare. However, with the addition of Medicaid the government became responsible 
for a significant portion of long-term care expenditures in the United States (Vladeck, 
1980). While at the time it was “the sleeper” or an “afterthought” Medicaid has emerged 
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as the predominant payer for long-term care in the United States (RA Kane, et al., 1998; 
Kaye,  et al, 2010; Vladeck, 1980). 
 
1915(c) Medicaid Waivers  
 By the 1970s, Medicaid costs were straining state budgets. In an effort to reduce 
nursing home care costs, states initiated demonstration projects, which are today known 
as 1915(c) waivers. State-wideness and certain Medicaid eligibility requirements were 
“waived” in order to study possible cost savings from these demonstration projects. The 
anticipated cost savings from these demonstration projects were not realized. However, 
these HCBS demonstration projects became a permanent fixture in the Medicaid program 
in the form of 1915(c) waivers (RA Kane, et al., 1998; Weissert, 2008). Populations 
currently served with 1915(c) waivers include the elderly, disabled, mentally 
retarded/developmentally disabled, children, persons with HIV/AIDS, and people with 
traumatic brain injuries/spinal cord injuries. In 2008, over 1.2 million people received 
home care services through 1915(c) waivers in forty-eight states, an increased from just 
over 687,000 recipients 1999 (Howard, et al., 2011). 
 
Medicaid Personal Care Services Benefit 
 Since 1975, states have had the option of offering the PCS benefit through 
Medicaid Title XIX to expand their long-term care services. These services have several 
names such as personal attendant services, personal assistance services, and attendant 
care services.  PCS are provided to people with disabilities of all ages in need of help 
with ADLs or IADLs (LeBlanc, Tonner, & Harrington, 2001).  In addition, to help with 
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ADLs and IADLs, services provided under the PCS include but are not limited to the 
following: medical and non-medical transportation; “cuing” services to assist persons 
with cognitive impairments so they can perform tasks themselves; animal assistance; 
emergency support; and case management (Kitchener, Ng, & Harrington, 2007). PCS 
programs and served over 900,000 Americans in 2008, up from 528,000 recipients in 
1999 (Howard, et al., 2011).    
 
Medicaid Home Health Benefit 
 States have been required to provide home health services through their respective 
Medicaid programs since 1970 (Smith, O'Keefe, Carepenter, Doty, & Kennedy, 2000). 
Thus, these services are unlike 1915(c) waiver programs or PCS that are optional services 
(Kitchener et al., 2007). States must provide services to those who are eligible to receive 
nursing home care, however one does not have to require an institutional level of care to 
receive the home health benefit.  By law, states must provide the following services with 
their home health programs: nursing, home health aids, medical supplies and equipment, 
and necessary appliances for home care (Smith, et al., 2000). Similar to the other two 
areas of HCBS, home health services have expanded significantly. Medicaid home health 
served over 900,000 in 2008, up from 680,000 in 1999 (Howard, et al., 2011). 
 
Assisted Living Services and HCBS 
 States use their assisted living programs to provide HCBS. However, “assisted 
living” covers a variety of services carrying various definitions across states. The term 
“assisted living”, or residential care, describes a range of services that typically comprise 
10	  
two categories of state-licensed facilities. First, states license adult foster care or family 
care facilities that typically serve up to five residents in the provider’s home. In addition, 
states license group resident care facilities that typically serve more than six people in a 
continuum of settings, encompassing residential homes and more commercialized 
settings that resemble nursing homes. This latter type of residential care is known by 
many names including board and care homes, rest homes, adult care homes, domiciliary 
care homes, and assisted living (Mollica, Sims-Kastelein, & O'Keefe, 2007).  
States pay for their assisted living services in a variety of ways in relation to 
HCBS: through Medicaid 1915(c) waivers or 1115 waivers, the state’s Medicaid plan, 
and/or general state funds.  As of 2007, 35 states use Medicaid waivers to pay for assisted 
living services, 13 use their state Medicaid plan, and seven use other state funds (Mollica, 
et al., 2007). Appendix A shows state payment methods for Assisted Living in 2007.   
 
2.4 Olmstead vs. L.C. and Post Olmstead Medicaid HCBS Developments   
In 1999, the United States Supreme Court ruled in Olmstead vs. L.C. that states 
must provide services to Medicaid recipients outside of institutions if recipients can be 
served in the community.  The plaintiffs in Olmstead were two mentally ill women who 
were institutionalized even though they had been deemed able to live in the community 
(Rosenbaum, 2000). 
The case concerned the General Prohibitions of Against Discrimination of the 
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). The law requires public entities to “administer 
programs and activities in the most integrated setting appropriate to the needs of qualified 
handicapped persons” and make “reasonable modification to avoid discrimination on the 
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basis of disability unless the public entity can demonstrate that making modifications 
would fundamentally alter the nature of the service, program or activity” (ADA, 1990).  
The court ruled that the “unjustified isolation” of people with disabilities is 
discrimination under the ADA.  While the states’ responsibilities are “not boundless” 
they must have a comprehensive, working plan to address this ruling in place and a wait 
list that moves at a reasonable pace (Rosenbaum, 2000). 
 
Executive and Legislative Medicaid Actions Since 1999 
Following the Olmstead ruling the Clinton administration, and later the George 
W. Bush and Obama administrations, issued a series of letters to the states to provide 
guidelines for Medicaid HCBS programs. The first letter, dated January 14, 2000, 
provided guidelines for developing “effectively working plans” for moving people from 
institutions to the community” which later become known as “Olmstead plans.” The 
federal government “strongly recommended” that states adopt the principles provided in 
the first letter as would serve as guidelines for the HHS Office for Civil Rights to 
investigate ADA compliance (Carlson & Coffey, 2010; Rosenbaum & Teitelbaum, 
2004). Table 2.1 lists subsequent advisement letters (known as “Olmstead Letters”) from 
CMS to state Medicaid directors concerning HCBS.  
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Table 2.1 “Olmstead Letters” From the CMS to State Medicaid Directors 
Letter Date Advisement Found in Letter 
 
July 25, 2000 
 
States cannot condition Medicaid home health services based on a 
person being “home bound.” 1 
 
July 25, 2000 States may make retainer payments to personal care providers when 
an enrollee is moved to an institution to ensure consistent income for 
providers. 1 
 
July 25, 2000 States can cover case management services up to 180 days prior to 
placement in the community from the nursing home. Furthermore, 
home modifications can be made while a person is residing in the 
institution in preparation for transition. 1 
 
January 10, 2001 States may not limit the number of 1915(c) waiver enrollees that 
receive coverage for a particular service within a waiver. 2 
 
January 10, 2001 States must require that waiver services are sufficient as a safe 
alternative to institutional care.1 
 
January 10, 2001 A reduction in the state’s enrollment limit may not negatively impact 
any person already receiving services. 1 
 
January 10, 2001 States may use income deductions to allow medically needy 
Medicaid eligibility more accessible. 1 
 
May 9, 2002 Sates may use HCBS Waivers to cover one-time expenses of moving 
people from institutions to the community. 1 
 
July 14, 2003 States may pay for medical equipment for people transferring form 
institutions to the community through Medicaid home health, HCBS 
waivers, or other programs.1 
 
May 20, 2010 CMS may provide technical assistance so that state Medicaid 
programs can operate in to make living in the community more 
feasible.1 
 
May 20, 2010 HHS and the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development 
have partnered to make housing more accessible for individuals with 
low-income and/or disabilities. 1 
 
1.Carlson & Coffey, 2010 2. Federal Policy Guidance, 2012, Rosenbaum & Teitelbaum, 2004 
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Real Choice Systems Change Grants 
In 2000, Congress approved the Real Choice Systems Change Grants for 
Community Living program. These grants were intended to improve infrastructure for 
states to provide HCBS. The initial grants provided incentives to provide greater 
consumer-directed care, which included more consumer involvement and single-point-of-
entry system to those needing long-term care. As of 2009, CMS had awarded 352 Real 
Choice Grants totaling over $280 million. While this program has ended, these grants 
funded improvements to the long-term care infrastructure in effort to provide “a more 
balanced long term care system” (Carlson & Coffey, 2010; Real Choice Systems Change 
Grant Program (RCSC), 2012). 
 
New Freedom Initiative 
In light of the Olmstead ruling, President George W. Bush issued Executive Order 
13217 on June 18, 2001, as part of the New Freedom Initiative (NFI). The initiative’s 
intent is to remove barriers to live in the community for people with disabilities. 
Specifically this act provides resources for states to move from institution-based care by 
improving community-based care infrastructure (New Freedom Initiative, 2003). 
However, states have been struggling to meet the goals of the NFI given rising deficits 
and greater institutional spending (Kitchener, Ng, Miller, & Harrington, 2005) 
 
The Deficit Reduction Act of 2005 
The Deficit Reduction Act of 2005 (DRA) brought in a new wave of innovations 
to long-term care provision in the United States, including the Money Follows the Person 
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Program (MFP). With this program, the money “follows” the person as they transition 
from institutional care to community-based care. States receive increased reimbursement 
for every person transitioned to the community for the first 12 months (Carlson & 
Coffey, 2010). Currently, forty-three states and the District of Columbia have MFP grants 
accounting for just under 12,000 people being transitioned to the community from 
institutional settings (Irvin, et al., 2011).   
The DRA authorizes the Medicaid HCBS State Plan Benefit, which is the section 
1915(i) benefit. This program allows states to provide HCBS to beneficiaries who are not 
enrolled in Medicaid waivers.  Clinical eligibility standards are less restrictive than 
standards used for nursing home services and states are not limited to spending caps for 
this program (Carlson & Coffey, 2010;Deficit Reduction Act of 2005; Kitchener, et al., 
2005; Weissert, 2008).   
The DRA also increased “self-directed personal assistance services.” This 
program allows enrollees to hire, fire, supervise, and mange service providers that may 
include family members. States may place limits on the number of enrollees in this 
program and restrict this program to particular areas of their respective states (Carlson & 
Coffey, 2010; Deficit Reduction Act of 2005).          
 
The Older Americans Act Renewal  
In 2006, Congress reauthorized the Older Americans Act, first passed in 1965, 
continuing support for HCBS.  A key feature of the reauthorization is the Community 
Living Program, which enables individuals to avoid nursing home placement. These 
grants allow for more state flexibility and consumer direction for those most at-risk of 
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nursing home placement (HHS Announces $8.8 Million For New Community Living 
Programs Grants Help Seniors Maintain Independence, 2009). Grants from this program 
have been awarded to 16 states for amounts up to $1,000,000 (Carlson & Coffey, 2010). 
The Administration on Aging and CMS created the Aging and Disability 
Resource Centers in 2003. These agencies’ intent is to be “one-stop shops” for consumers 
and to avoid nursing home placement in favor of receiving care in the community. As of 
2009, 200 of these centers operate in 54 states and territories (Carlson & Coffey, 2010; 
Federal Policy Guidance, 2012).  
 
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010 
The 2010 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA), signed into law by 
President Barack Obama on March 23, 2010, will shape long-term delivery in the coming 
years. Under the ACA, states are encouraged to rebalance their state long-term care 
systems. Via the State Balancing Incentive Payments Program states that are spending 
below 50% of total Medicaid long-term care monies on HCBS may be chosen to receive 
a higher federal funding match for their state’s HCBS during the “balancing incentive 
period” to occur October 1, 2011 through September 30, 2015. These states must reach 
50 percent by October 1, 2015 and will receive an increase of two percentage points in 
their FMAP if they achieve the 50 percent threshold. States that devote less than 50 
percent of their long-term care resources to HCBS in 2009, must achieve this threshold 
by October 1, 2015. If chosen to participate in the State Balancing Incentive Payments 
Program, these states will receive an increase of five percentage points in their respective 
Federal Medical Assistance Percentages (FMAP) for the HCBS they provide during the 
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“balancing incentive period” (until October 1, 2015).  States are required to use the 
additional funds for HCBS, and HCBS eligibility restrictions must be the same as those 
in place on December 31, 2010. Congress appropriated three billion dollars for this 
program (ACA, 2010;Carlson & Coffey, 2010).  
The ACA allows for the HCBS Attendant Service Option, also known as the 
Community-First Choice Option. This policy adds a new Medicaid service for those in 
need of long-term care where recipients receive coverage for attendant services necessary 
to help perform ADLs or IADLs. Recipients must have the authority to select manage 
and fire providers who may be family members. Training is available to recipients to 
acquire these skills.  This benefit must be available statewide, and wait lists for this 
option are prohibited. States that adopt this option receive a six-percentage point increase 
in the FMAP for service covered under the benefit (ACA, 2010; Carlson & Coffey, 2010) 
Money Follows the Person programs were expanded and improved under the 
ACA. New five-year grants will be allowed to original grantee states and those states not 
already participating in the program. Initially, only Medicaid recipients in institutional 
care for 180 days were eligible, but the threshold is now 90 days under the ACA.  Other 
improvements include the increased access to the State Plan Benefit. An income limit is 
still in place for the program, but the “spend-down” requirement has been lifted for states 
that have a Medically Needy program (ACA, 2010;Carlson & Coffey, 2010).  
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Judicial Activity Since Olmstead 
In the last decade, several court cases have addressed the application of the ADA 
and the implications of the Olmstead ruling.  It is important to note that decisions made 
by federal district courts and circuit courts are binding in those respective districts and/or 
circuits (Carlson & Coffey, 2010). Table 2.2 shows court rulings in regards to general 
matters such as creating Olmstead plans and defining a “fundamental alteration” to a state 
Medicaid program. Following table 2.2, I discuss litigation involving the “reasonable 
pace” definition in Olmstead and liberty and coverage assessment litigation. 1 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Please refer to “Olmstead and Olmstead Related Lawsuits” page 
(http://www.pascenter.org/olmstead/olmsteadcases.php) at the UCSF Center for Personal 
Assistance Services for the most up-to-date information regarding litigation concerning 
the Olmstead ruling.   
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Table 2.2 General District and Appellate Rulings Following the Olmstead Ruling  
 
Case 
 
Court 
 
Ruling 
 
Preventing Institutionalization and Notification of HCBS Availability 
Fisher v. 
Oklahoma  
United States Court 
of Appeals for the 
Tenth Circuit 
Those living the community and those already receiving 
institutionalized care, can bring claims against the state. 
If possible, states must both keep people in the community and 
move those form nursing homes to the community. 1 
Messier v. 
Southbury 
Training School 
United States 
District Court for 
the District of 
Connecticut 
The state has an obligation to develop community-based 
alternative and these alternatives must be made know to the 
public.2 
 
Clarification of “Fundamental Alteration” Language in Olmstead 
Townsend v. 
Quasim 
United States Court 
of Appeals for the 
Ninth Circuit 
While states are not required to make “fundamental alterations” 
to their Medicaid programs, the loosening of income standards 
(so they are equivalent for HCBS and nursing home services 
does not constitute an alteration of state’s policies.3  
Grooms v. Maram Northern District 
of Illinois 
The expansion of clinical eligibility standards was not 
“fundamental alteration” of a Medicaid program.4  
 
Claims from States that Costs of HCBS Expansion Are Too Prohibitive  
Cota v. Maxwell-
Jolly 
District Court for 
Northern California 
The state cannot deny HCBS due to budgetary constraints.5  
Disability 
Advocates v. 
Patterson 
United States 
District Court for 
the Eastern District 
of New York. 
The court ruled that the “dependency-based” model of nursing 
home care would be more costly in the long-term for the state.6  
 
Rulings Concerning Olmstead Plans  
Frederick L. v. 
Department of 
Welfare of PA 
United States Court 
of Appeals for the 
Third Circuit 
The court ruled that state Olmstead plans must specify a time 
frame for placement in a community setting, the estimated 
number of people to place, the eligibility standards for HCBS, 
and a description of how relevant agencies will collaborate.   
The state’s plan is not adequate if it provides just assessments 
of whether those in institutional care continue to require the 
same level of care.7  
Sanchez v. 
Johnson 
United States Court 
of Appeals for the 
Ninth Circuit 
The court provides the state with more flexibility in creating an 
Olmstead plan compared to Frederick L. v. Department of 
Welfare of PA. -The court ruled that “a comprehensive 
deinstitutionalization scheme” that was effective in light of 
budgetary constraints and the requirement to provide other 
services is sufficient for a state’s Olmstead plan.8 
Disability 
Advocates v. 
Patterson 
United States 
District Court for 
the Eastern District 
of New York.  
The court ruled that the state’s expansion of programs was 
insufficient evidence of a plan to move people out of 
institutional settings.   
The court ruled that residents of adult homes must be educated 
about their choices to understand the types of services 
available.6 
 
1. Fisher v. Oklahoma,2003; Carlson & Coffey, 2010 2. Messier v. Southbury Training School, 2008; Carlson & Coffey, 2010. 3. 
Townsend v. Quasim, 2003; Carlson & Coffey, 2010 4. Grooms, v. Maram, 2008; Carlson & Coffey, 2010 5. Cota v. Maxwell-Jolly, 
2010; Carlson & Coffey, 2010 6. Disability Advocates, Inc. v. Paterson, 2009; Carlson & Coffey, 2010 7. Frederick L v. Department 
of Public Welfare of Pennsylvania, 2005; Carlson & Coffey, 2010 8. Sanchez v. Johnson, 2005; Carlson & Coffey, 2010   
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Litigation Regarding  “Reasonable Pace” Definition  
Several court cases since the Olmstead ruling involve the “reasonable pace” 
clause of the Olmstead ruling. Courts are guided by three aspects of the law in defining 
“reasonable pace”: the Olmstead ruling and the ADA; federal Medicaid law; and previous 
court cases. Federal law mandates that Medicaid services should be provided by state 
agencies “promptly to recipient without any delay caused be the agency’s administrative 
procedures.”2 In subsequent rulings, courts have tended to use this “reasonable 
promptness” provision (Rosenbaum & Teitelbaum, 2004).  
The courts have ruled that insufficient funding for state services is not a defense 
for failing to provide HCBS with reasonable promptness. In Benjamin v. Ohl, the U.S. 
District Court for Southern District of West Virginia ruled that “the defendant cannot 
escape liability by a conclusory declaration that no more money will be provided to meet 
the States’ obligation under the Medicaid Act of the ADA.” (Benjamin v. Ohl, 1999; 
Rosenbaum & Teitelbaum, 2004) 
 
Liberty and Coverage Assessments Litigation 
A critical piece of the Olmstead decision centers on integrating Medicaid 
recipients into the community.  The Supreme Court set the standard for state conduct on 
this matter: 
“[Community integration] is in order when the state’s treatment professionals have 
determined that the community placement is appropriate, the transfer from the 
institutional care to a less restrictive setting is not opposed by the affected individual, and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 42 C.F.R. § 435.930 
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the placement can be reasonably accommodated, taking into account the resources 
available to the state and the needs of others with mental disabilities.” 3 
 
However, the Supreme Court was not clear about the individual assessment of how to 
determine an individual’s eligibility for community integration. Courts and states must 
address two forms of assessments: “liberty” assessments concerning an individual 
residing in an institution where the state seeks to move the individual to the community 
and “coverage” assessments, which involve an individual making a claim for benefits and 
services necessary to live in the community (Rosenbaum & Teitelbaum, 2004). 
Liberty assessments must satisfy both the ADA and basic due process 
considerations. The courts have identified specific criteria for a fair threshold assessment 
process, including one that is accessible to the individual and can be sought out and not 
solely based on the judgment of the state. In addition, a liberty assessment must utilize a 
qualified professional with the appropriate training and skills (Rosenbaum & Teitelbaum, 
2004).  
The alternative forms of assessments, “coverage assessments”, utilize 
individualized evaluation processes concerning resources to live in the community. These 
assessments determine whether the state can provide resources with reasonable 
modification and how to provide these services.  The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third 
Circuit ruled in Easley v. Snyder that states may reject requests for more personal support 
services required to help those with disabilities perform tasks that Medicaid recipient of 
HCBS waiver services could perform on their own (Easley v. Snyder, 1994). The 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 Olmstead v. L.C. 527 U.S. 587 (1999). 
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rationale is that people applying for these services must perform, as a prerequisite, certain 
tasks without the assistance of a personal aide (Rosenbaum & Teitelbaum, 2004).  
  
Consumer Preferences for Long-Term Care and Ongoing Challenges   
 Despite consumer preferences and the expansion of HCBS programs over the last 
decade, state Medicaid long-term care systems still rely heavily on nursing home care 
(Howard, et al., 2011).  This reliance is known as the “institutional bias”, which is the 
tendency to place people in nursing homes, no matter their level of need (Bishop, 1999; 
Blaser, 2008).  
 Kane and colleagues categorize the challenges of overcoming the institutional 
bias and other barriers to HCBS expansion into political, logistical and philosophical 
barriers (RA Kane, et al., 1998). Politics influence state long-term care systems. State 
legislators are not overly concerned with long-term care, but do listen to those that have 
access to the political process including industry, professional, and senior groups (RA 
Kane, et al., 1998). The influence of the nursing home lobby is not surprising given that 
Medicaid is the dominant payer of nursing home services (Kaye, et al., 2010). In 
addition, home health agencies and nursing organizations tend to oppose the delivery of 
formal long-term care not provided by a nurse or a licensed professional. Thus, these 
groups can limit the amount of formal home care provided in their respective states. 
Groups representing seniors can also resist changes in social programs if they believe that 
changes will lead to reduced services (RA Kane, et al., 1998).    
 Logistical obstacles also reinforce the tendency of states to rely heavily on 
institutional care.  These challenges are mostly financial in nature, encompassing a state’s 
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matching rate and/or a state not having sufficient funds to start new programs (RA Kane, 
et al., 1998). All states except for Vermont must balance their budgets (State Balanced 
Budget Provisions, 2012). States must continue to support expansive institutional long-
term care systems even if they choose to enlarge their HCBS programs. Financial 
dynamics make it difficult to devote public monies for new programs. In addition to the 
burden of paying for new services, deciding what new services to provide and what 
agencies will govern these programs create logistical problems. For example, the 
determination of which government agency has jurisdiction can create challenges in 
states with stronger counties (RA Kane, et al., 1998).  
 Furthermore, states use cost controls such as restricting eligibility standards, 
limiting enrollment, and establishing wait lists to limit Medicaid HCBS expenditures.  As 
of 2010, 26 percent of Medicaid waiver programs (approximately 77 waivers out of 293 
programs) use more restrictive financial eligibly standards for HCBS waiver programs 
than for nursing homes.  The average length of time spent on waiting list ranges from 6 
months for a mental health waiver placement to 36 months for a Mentally 
Retarded/Developmentally Disabled waiver placement.  Over half of states that have PCS 
programs use service limitations to control program costs. Nineteen states use 
expenditure controls or service restrictions to control home health costs (Howard, et al., 
2011). 
 Finally, Kane and colleagues argue that philosophical barriers prevent HCBS 
expansion (1998). These barriers include the beliefs that: HCBS care is more expensive 
than institutional care; case loads will rise dramatically with subsidized HCBS care (this 
is known as the “woodwork effect”); and elderly people with long-term care needs 
23	  
require nursing home care and not care in general (RA Kane, et al., 1998).  This last point 
reaffirms the “medical-centric” philosophical underpinnings shaping long-term care 
delivery in the United States. As Mary O’Neil Mundinger (1983) notes “it was 
mistakenly believed that the care for the elderly would be more acute care whereas their 
needs are for more support services”(p.41). In short, the predisposition towards 
institutional care delivery impedes HCBS expansion. 
 
2.5 HCBS Literature 
The literature on HCBS addresses descriptive differences between state programs; 
the impact of state spending on HCBS; one-state or multi-state analyses on the costs and 
benefits of HCBS; and limited longitudinal or cross-sectional analyses. Since the 
Olmstead ruling, few studies account for state-to-state variation of HCBS programs, the 
impact of HCBS programs on nursing home expenditures, or the ongoing challenges to 
HCBS expansion.  
 Several studies found interstate differences in HCBS programs.  These included 
wide differences in participants per capita for 1915(c) waiver programs (Harrington, 
Leblanc, Wood, Satten, & Tonner, 2002; Kitchener, et al., 2005; Kitchener, Ng, Miller, & 
Harrington, 2007) and PCS program expenditures (LeBlanc, Tonner, & Harrington, 
2000). Furthermore, studies have shown an inadequate number of waiver slots  
(Harrington, Leblanc, Wood, Satten, & Tonner, 2002) and an unequal distribution of 
resources across target groups (e.g. aged recipients or mentally retarded/developmentally 
disabled waiver recipients) (Harrington, Carrillo, Wellin, Norwood, & Miller, 2001).  
More than half of the states have used financial caps to control waiver expenditures 
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(Kitchener, Ng, & Harrington, 2004) and one-third use more restrictive eligibility criteria 
than institutional services (Chen & Thompson, 2010; Tonner & Harrington, 2004). 
Several limited studies have identified additional obstacles to waiver and/or PCS 
programs including inadequate supply of providers, limited state legislative support, 
federal regulatory burdens (Harrington, et al., 2002; Kitchener, et al., 2007), waitlists 
(Kitchener, et al., 2007) and lengthy application procedures (Chen & Thompson, 2010).  
A second focus in the literature concerns the potential benefits of state HCBS 
investment. HCBS programs reduce the number of elderly who go without care (Kemper, 
Weaver, Short, Shea, & Kang, 2008). In addition, states with more HCBS spending have 
a higher likelihood of seniors using HCBS services; more informal care (Muramatsu & 
Campbell, 2002); lower end-of-life nursing home relocation (Muramatsu, Hoyem, Yin, & 
Campbell, 2008); and lower risk of nursing home admission for childless seniors. 
Murumatsu and colleagues (2008) found that doubling HCBS expenditures per person 
over age 65 reduces nursing home admission by 35 percent. Similarly, Hahn and 
colleagues (2011) concluded that investment in HCBS waiver programs resulted in a 
reduction in the population of low-needs nursing home residents. 
Some scholars argue that more HCBS spending will lead to greater public 
spending (Greene, Lovely, & Ondrich, 1993; Kemper, 1988; Weissert, 1985, 1986, 1993; 
Weissert, Cready, & Pawelak, 1988; Wiener & Stevenson, 1998) and that HCBS 
programs fail to achieve cost savings compared to nursing home care (Weissert, 2008). 
Weissert (1986) notes that while those in the community need care and are at a high risk 
to be institutionalized, HCBS programs do not save public funds because “they cost extra 
money simply because it gives more care to more people (p. 480).” Put simply, “if you 
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spend too much, it’s hard to save money” (Weissert, 1993, p. SS119). An examination of 
The National Channeling Project showed that channeling increases costs. In fact, the new 
costs of case management and community services with channeling were not offset by 
savings from preventing nursing home use (Kemper, 1988). Greene and his colleagues 
(1993) extend this argument, writing “community service programs require rigorous and 
systematic management of the resource allocation process if they are to achieve their 
potential for efficiency (p.187).”  
Other studies of HCBS have, in contrast, found that these programs decrease 
public expenditures. Two studies from the mid-1990s concluded that expansion of HCBS 
programs was a cost-effective alternative to institutional long-term care (Alecxih, Lutzky, 
& Corea, 1998; Scanlon, et al., 1994). A more recent study concludes that HCBS waivers 
saved approximately $44,000 per participant in comparison to institutional care. 
Multiplying these savings to all waiver recipients in 2002 yields a prediction of estimated 
savings ranging from $2 billion to $40 billion (Kitchener, Ng, Miller, & Harrington, 
2006). Furthermore, states that spend more on HCBS programs have experienced lower 
overall Medicaid expenditures (Kaye, LaPlante, & Harrington, 2009) and Medicaid long-
term care expenditures (Kaye, 2012). The term “savings” in this context are savings for  
the state.  Institutional expenses go towards care and housing, while HCBS are funds 
spent mostly on care. Thus, these comparisons are to be interpreted as state dollars saved 
as spent per recipient.  
Several studies have examined individual state HCBS programs. Seniors in 
Florida most in need use HCBS or nursing home care (Borrayo, Salmon, Polivka, & 
Dunlop, 2002) and HCBS waiver programs reduced nursing home use (Mitchell, Salmon, 
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Polivka, & Soberon-Ferrer, 2006). Analyses in Michigan show decreased HCBS 
resources lead to more adverse outcomes including hospitalization, emergency room use, 
and/or permanent nursing home placement (D'souza, James, Szafara, & Fries, 2009); 
strong associations between caregiver dissatisfaction; and greater likelihood of elderly 
hospitalization (Shugarman, Buttar, Fries, Moore, & Blaum, 2002). Similarly, seniors in 
Missouri that live in the community experience better clinical outcomes than those in a 
nursing home (Marek, et al., 2005). 
Several additional studies have used a single state to examine how HCBS 
expenditures affected public spending.  Arizona’s HCBS long-term care program has 
saved significant amounts of money on nursing home care (Weissert, Musliner, Lesnick, 
& Foley, 1997). Dementia patients in Indiana who received HCBS services have higher 
inpatient use, but had lower overall health care expenditures (Sands, et al., 2008).  A 
Maryland study showed HCBS in “lower doses” can be more cost-effective than “higher 
doses”. Higher doses of HCBS included the use of case management, personal care, 
assisted living, respite care, environmental adaptation, personal emergency response 
systems, and/or home-delivered meals. Lower doses included PCS and case management 
(Smith & Frick, 2008). 
Many cross-sectional and longitudinal studies have examined HCBS drivers and 
trends. Older studies show mixed results with socio-demographic drivers of HCBS 
expenditures and utilization. A study using 1992 CMS data for all 50 states showed little 
correlation between HCBS expenditures and socio-demographic measures. The socio-
demographic factors that were not statistically significant in HCBS expenditures included 
the percentage of a state’s minority population over the age of 65, the percentage of a 
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(Miller, Harrington, Ramsland, & Goldstein, 2002) state’s over 65 population living 
alone, or the percentage of a state’s population aged 18-64 that are severely disabled (RL 
Kane, Kane, Veazie, & Ladd, 1998). However, an analysis of the 1996 Longitudinal 
Study of the Aged identified racial disparities in use of community-based long-term care 
(Johnson & Wolinsky, 1996). More recent analyses examine socio-demographic and 
economic measures influences on HCBS expenditures and/or utilization. Greater HCBS 
spending is associated with having a greater proportion of people aged over 85 
(Harrington, Carrillo, Wellin, Miller, & LeBlanc, 2000; Kitchener, Carrillo, & 
Harrington, 2004; Miller, Harrington, & Goldstein, 2002; Miller, Harrington, Ramsland, 
et al., 2002); more women in the workforce (Kitchener, Carrillo, & Harrington, 2004; 
Miller, Harrington, Ramsland, et al., 2002); a larger minority population and metropolitan 
population ( Kitchener, et al., 2004); greater personal income per capita (Harrington, et 
al., 2000; Kitchener, et al., 2004; Miller, Harrington, & Goldstein, 2002; Miller, 
Harrington, Ramsland, et al., 2002; Miller, Ramsland, Goldstein, & Harrington, 2001); 
and the percentage of Medicaid investment not devoted to long-term care (Lockhart, 
Giles-Sims, & Klopfenstein, 2008).  
In addition, these studies show the influence of policy and health services supply 
on HCBS expenditures and/or utilization. HCBS provision is influenced by Certificate of 
Need laws for nursing homes (Miller, Harrington, & Goldstein, 2002; Miller, Harrington, 
Ramsland, et al., 2002) and home health agencies ( Kitchener, et al., 2004); and the 
supply of nursing home and residential care beds (Harrington, et al., 2000; Kitchener, et 
al., 2004; Miller, Harrington, & Goldstein, 2002; Miller, Harrington, Ramsland, et al., 
2002; Miller, et al., 2001). Several studies controlled for political effects on HCBS 
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utilization and/or expenditures, but the results were inconclusive (Harrington, et al., 
2000; Kitchener, et al., 2004; Miller, Harrington, & Goldstein, 2002; Miller, Harrington, 
Ramsland, et al., 2002; Miller, et al., 2001). 
 
2.6 Summary and New Contribution  
Given state fiscal pressures and the aging population, long-term care delivery is 
now and will continue to be a critical issue for state Medicaid programs. Furthermore, the 
Olmstead ruling requires states to move beyond the traditional “institutional bias” to 
home- and community-based care. The literature presents descriptive studies of state 
HCBS programs, promising research on public expenditures, and older analyses of HCBS 
programs.  However, since the Olmstead ruling, few studies account for the changing, 
growing elderly population and its influences on state Medicaid HCBS programs; how 
HCBS programs influence institutional expenditures; or the state-specific challenges to 
HCBS expansion.  
I address these gaps in three ways. In chapter 4, I study the interstate variation in 
drivers of HCBS. Next, in chapter 5, I examine the impact of HCBS program expansion 
and its effect on institutional long-term care expenditures. Last, in chapter 6, I investigate 
the administrative, socio-demographic, economic, policy and political challenges to 
HCBS expansion since the Olmstead ruling.  This dissertation aims to provide a fuller 
understanding of Medicaid home- and community-based long-term care.   
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Chapter 3:  Methods 
3.1 Overview  
I use a mixed methods approach to study influences on state Medicaid long-term 
care HCBS expenditures, recipients, and expenditures per recipient (aim 1), the impact of 
these programs on institutional expenditures (aim 2), and the challenges to balancing 
long-term care systems (aim 3). I employ the mixed-method, sequential explanatory 
strategy, starting with quantitative analysis that then informs the qualitative analysis 
(Creswell, 2009).   
Figure 3.1 presents my theoretical framework for the quantitative analyses, aims 1 
and 2. These studies draw upon the long-term care literature that categorizes exogenous 
influences on HCBS into three subsets: political; socio-demographic and economic; and 
policy and supply influences (Kane, Kane, Veazie, & Ladd, 1998; Kitchener, Carrillo, & 
Harrington, 2004; Lockhart, Giles-Sims, & Klopfenstein, 2008; Miller, Harrington, & 
Goldstein, 2002; Miller, Harrington, Ramsland, & Goldstein, 2002; Miller, Ramsland, 
Goldstein, & Harrington, 2001). For aim 1, I study the above influences on HCBS 
programs by examining HCBS expenditures and utilization. The time frame to study total 
HCBS utilization (home health, 1915(c) waivers, and PCS recipients per capita) is a ten 
year panel from 1999-2008. The time frame to study HCBS expenditures is a thirteen 
year panel from 1996-2008. See table 3.2 for the time frames for the aim 1 analyses. The 
solid black arrows in figure 3.1 represent the analysis for aim 1.  
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Figure 3.1-Theoretical Framework For Quantitative Analysis   
 
 
For aim 2, I study the effect of HCBS expenditures on institutional expenditures. I 
employ both fixed effect and instrumental variable analyses using a political instrument 
to control for endogeneity. The aim 2 analysis controls for the effects of socio-
demographic, economic, policy, and supply influences on state Medicaid institutional 
long-term care expenditures. The time frame for this analysis is 1996-2008. The dotted 
arrows in figure 3.1 indicate this analysis for aim 2. The dashed arrow pointing to 
political variables to Medicaid HCBS expenditures indicates the instrumental variable.  
I perform a qualitative analysis to complete aim 3. I conduct semi-structured 
interviews of state Medicaid officials to understand state long-term care systems and to 
identify the challenges to expanding HCBS expansion since the 1999 Olmstead ruling.  
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In the following sections, I first present the appropriate data, measures, and 
analytical techniques for the two quantitative aims. I then describe the qualitative 
analysis.   
 
3.2 Quantitative Data Sources 
Medicaid Forms 64 and 372  
State Medicaid programs use two forms to report expenditure data.  States use 
Form 64 to claim reimbursement for Medicaid care. Alternatively, states use Form 372 to 
declare cost neutrality for HCBS. For the spending per capita analysis for aims 1 and 2, I 
use the Form 64 data, since more years are available and other state-level HCBS studies 
use these data. These data are collected by Eiken and colleagues (2011) and housed on 
www.hcbs.org.4 Please refer to table 3.1 for a full list of the quantitative measures.  
Form 372 data providing HCBS recipient and expenditure data are publicly 
available from the University of California San Francisco Center for Personal Assistance 
Services (UCSF PAS). Researchers at UCSF PAS collect the data yearly via telephone 
interviews with state Medicaid officials. The data are housed on the Kaiser Family 
Foundation website. UCSF researchers collect expenditure and recipient data for all three 
types (home health, PCS, and waiver) of Medicaid long-term care HCBS programs 
(Howard, et al., 2011). I use form 372 data for the recipients per capita and spending per 
recipient analysis in aim 1. Form 372 is the only source of recipient data. I use the 
expenditure data provided by this form, not data from Form 64, to create the expenditures 
per recipient variable as it would be unwise to use data from two different sources to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4	   I am incredibly thankful to Steve Kaye for sharing his reformatted Form 64 data with 
me.	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create such a variable. I have permission to use these data for years 1999-2008. I adjusted 
all expenditure these data for inflation using the Consumer Price Index (CPI) available 
from the Bureau of Labor Statistics.5  
 
Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services  
 Data for home health users are from the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid 
services (CMS). The home health user data were divided by each state’s population to 
obtain the users per 1000 state population proportion (Centers of Medicare and Medicaid 
Services (CMS) "Medicare and Medicaid Statistical Supplement, 2012). Data for the 
Federal Medical Assistance Percentages (FMAP) are from CMS through the CMS 
website (ASPE, 2012).    
 
State Political Ideology Data 
 Political scientist William Berry collects and makes available political ideology 
data (Berry, Ringquist, Fording, and Hanson, 1998). The citizen ideology variable is 
computed by adding the product of the Congressional incumbent’s ideology and the vote 
share he or she received in the last election to the product of his or her challenger’s 
ideology and vote share in the last election.6 The ideology of the incumbent is measured 
by the Americans for Democratic Action (AFDA). The ideology of the challenger is 
assumed to be equal to the average ideology score of all the incumbents in the state for 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 I use the regional medical care services CPI calculation found at: 
http://www.bls.gov/cpi/ 
 
6 Citizen Ideology=(Incumbent Ideology)(Incumbent Vote Share)+(Challenger 
Ideology)(Challenger Vote Share) 
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the same party. This measure is then complied for a state-wide measure. The ideology 
ranges from 0-100 with 100 being the most liberal. These data are publicly available from 
Professor Richard Fording’s website (Fording, 2012).   
 
Book of the States 
 The Book of the States, a yearly state almanac, provide state-level political data 
for party control of state governorships and state legislatures (Book of the States, 1995, 
1997, 1999, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008). These measures are 
indicator variables that identify which party controls the governorship and legislature for 
each year. 
 
United States Census Bureau 
 The Statistical Abstract, a yearly publication of state-level characteristics, provide 
data on economic and socio-demographic data (US Census Bureau The 2012 Statistical 
Abstract: Earlier Editions, 2012). The population of each state over 85 years old, each 
state’s African American population, and each state’s Hispanic population are divided by 
the state’s respective total population for each year and multiplied by 100 to create a 
percentage. Each state’s per capita income is adjusted for CPI, as are the expenditure 
variables. Each state’s female labor force participation rate is available from the yearly 
statistical abstract as a percentage.  The poverty rate variable is available through the 
Small Area Income and Poverty Estimates for each state. These measures are yearly 
percentages (Small Area Income and Poverty Estimates, 2012). The measure for each 
state’s metropolitan population was calculated from the measure from the Office of 
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Management and Budget and the Census Bureau. The state percentages were calculated 
using the following procedure: the population of the metropolitan counties were tabulated 
and then divided over the total population for each state (Metropolitan and Micropolitan, 
2012). The data for state population over age 65 with a self-care limitation are from the 
American Community Survey kept by the Minnesota Population Center (Minnesota 
Population Center-Home of the IPUMS and other Data Projects, 2012).   
 
Online Survey Certification And Reporting (OSCAR) 
 OSCAR data were used to obtain nursing home bed censes.  These data are 
reported in the serial publication Health, United States (2012).  The numbers of beds per 
state were divided by the state population to create the nursing home beds per 1,000 state 
population statistic. 
 
Area Resource File (ARF) 
 The ARF provides home health agency information (Health Resouces and 
Services Administration, 2010). The number of home health agencies was divided by the 
state’s population to provide the agencies per 100,000 state population variable.  
 
Medicaid Nursing Home Reimbursement Rate Data 
 Nursing home reimbursement data were obtained from the authors of previous 
work (Grabowski & Gruber, 2007) and were adjusted using medical care CPI. These data 
are only available for years prior to 2004. 
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Bureau of Labor Statistics  
The United States Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) holds data for average wages 
for states for the past several years. I use the Occupational Employment Statistics Query 
System to include a home health aide wage variable (code 31101) in the quantitative 
analysis (Occupational Employment Statistics Query System, 2012). The state 
unionization variable is a percentage obtained from the Bureau of Labor Statistics (Union 
Affiliation of Employed Wage and Salary Workers by State, Annual Averages 2011).  
 
Center For American Women And Politics  
The Center for American Women and Politics holds data for women in state 
legislatures for the last several decades (Center for American Women and Politics, 
Archived Fact Sheets, 2012).  I use their data to create a variable denoting percentage of 
legislators that are women. 
 
Missing Data 
Data were missing for some years for select independent variables and were 
assumed to be missing at random. I used linear interpolation to address missing data. 
Thus, for each state, I regressed any variable with missing data on years and imputed the 
missing data as appropriate. Appendix B provides more detail concerning what variables 
are missing.   
 
 
 
42	  
3.3 Sample Size and Statistical Power for Quantitative Analysis 
Sample Size 
 
The quantitative aims study Medicaid expenditures and/or utilization for the years 
1999-2008 or 1996-2008 (aim 1) and 1996-2008 (aim 2). In both aims, the units of 
observation consist of all 50 states and the District of Columbia.  
 
Statistical Power 
 While this study uses a population, it is still necessary to test for statistical power. 
For aim 1 (using years 1996-2008 or 1999-2008), for a 95% level of significance, a 
medium effect size (R2=0.15), and a sample size ranging 270-611, the analyses have 
sufficient power (Cohen, 1988). Aim 2 (using years1996-2008) is also sufficiently 
powered. A larger sample size would be optimal to lessen the likelihood of type II error, 
but the available years of data are the bounds of this analysis. Given these calculations 
and that previous studies used similar numbers of years and variables, I should have 
sufficient statistical power. 
 
3.4 Measurement for Quantitative Analysis 
 In this section, I first describe the dependent variables used in the quantitative 
analysis. I then describe the key independent variables for each aim and provide some 
theoretical justification for their inclusion. After which I describe the instrumental 
variable for aim 2. I conclude by describing the control variables used for each aim.   
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3.4.1 Dependent Variables 
The quantitative aims of this study use a non-experimental longitudinal            
trend analysis design.  For aim 1 I use total HCBS expenditures and recipients as well as 
the three types of HCBS expenditures and recipients in separate analyses. I use two 
different expenditure dependent variables to measure the breadth and depth of HCBS. To 
measure the breadth, that is how much each state spends on HCBS, I use an expenditures 
per 1000 population dependent variable. In order to study the depth of expenditures, that 
is how much each state is spending on each recipient, I use an expenditure per recipient 
dependent variable for each type of HCBS.  This totals twelve different regressions.  All 
expenditures data are adjusted for CPI. For Aim 2, I use state Medicaid institutional long-
term care expenditures per 1000 state population after adjusting for CPI as the dependent 
variable. See Table 3.1 for a complete list of variables. 
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Table 3.1-Description of Quantitative Study Variables 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1. Thompson Reuters/Steve Kaye/From 64 2. UCSF, PAS/Form 372  3. William Berry Ideology Data  4. Book of the States  
  5. Center for American Women and Politics 6. U.S. Census Bureau  7. CMS  8. Bureau of Labor Statistics       
  9. OSCAR 10. Area Resource File 11.Grabowski & Gruber,2007  
 Type Source Aim 
Dependent Variables    
Total State Medicaid HCBS Expenditures/1000 State Population 
Adjusted for CPI 
Continuous 1 1 
Total State Medicaid HCBS Recipients/1000 State Population Continuous 2 1 
State Medicaid 1915(c) Waiver Expenditures/1000 State 
Population Adjusted for CPI 
Continuous 1 1 
State Medicaid 1915(c) Waiver Recipients/1000 State 
Population 
Continuous 2 1 
State Medicaid Home Health Expenditures/1000 State 
Population Adjusted for CPI 
Continuous 2 1 
State Medicaid Home Health Recipients/1000 State Population Continuous 2 1 
State Medicaid PCS Expenditures/1000 State Population 
Adjusted for CPI 
Continuous 1 1 
State Medicaid PCS Recipients/1000 State Population Continuous 2 1 
State Medicaid HCBS Expenditures/ State HCBS Recipients 
Adjusted for CPI 
Continuous 2 1 
State Medicaid 1915(c) Waiver Expenditures/ State 1915(c) 
Recipients Adjusted for CPI 
Continuous 2 1 
State Medicaid Home Health Expenditures/ State Home Health 
Recipients Adjusted for CPI 
Continuous 2 1 
State Medicaid PCS Expenditures/ State PCS Recipients 
Adjusted for CPI 
Continuous 2 1 
State 1915(c) Waiver Medicaid Institutional Expenditures/ 1000 
State Population Adjusted for CPI 
Continuous 1 2 
Key Independent Variables/Instrumental Variable  
Ideology Measure Continuous 3 1 and 2 
Democratic Governor Binary 4 1 and 2 
Percent Female Legislators Continuous 5 1 and 2 
Percentage of Legislature Seats Held By Democrats Continuous  4 1 and 2 
State Medicaid HCBS Expenditures/1000 Population Adjusted 
for CPI 
Continuous 1 2 
Socio-Demographic/ Economic Control Variables  
Population 85+ Continuous 6 1 and 2 
Poverty Rate  Continuous 6 1 and 2 
Percent African-American Continuous 6 1 and 2 
Percent Hispanic  Continuous 6 1 and 2 
Income per Capita  Continuous 6 1 and 2 
Percent Metropolitan Population Continuous 6 1 and 2 
Percent 65+ Population With a Self-Care Disability  Continuous 6 1 and 2 
Female Labor Force Participation  Continuous 6 1 and 2 
Medicare HH Users/1000 State Population Continuous 7 1 and 2 
Percent Unionized Workforce Continuous 8 1 and 2 
Average Home Health Wage Continuous 8 1 and 2 
FMAP Continuous 7 1 and 2 
Unemployment Rate Continuous 6 2 
Supply/Policy Control Variables 
NH Beds/ Capita  Continuous 9 1 and 2 
HH Agencies/ 1000 State Population Continuous 10 1 and 2 
Medicaid NH Reimbursement Rate Continuous 11 1 and 2 
 
Table 1 Description 
of Study Variables 
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3.4.2.Key Independent Variables 
In previous studies, HCBS studes have controlled for state politics by using a 
measure of state political ideology based on the AFDA rating of a state’s United States 
senators.  These measures are inconclusive in measuring any political effect on HCBS 
expenditures or utilization (Harrington, Carrillo, Wellin, Miller, & LeBlanc, 2000; 
Kitchener, et al., 2004; Miller, Harrington, & Goldstein, 2002; Miller, Harrington, 
Ramsland, et al., 2002; Miller, et al., 2001). Using the AFDA state ideology measure 
assumes that the record of a U.S. senator reflects a state’s ideology, thereby affecting 
Medicaid. This link between voters, U.S. Senators, and Medicaid is tenuous for several 
reasons. Voters regard state legislatures differently than the U.S. Congress (Pattterson, 
Ripley, & Quinlan, 1992). Furthermore, states elect their state legislatures more often 
than every six years, the term for a U.S. Senator (Book of the States, 2008).  This makes 
state legislators more responsive, in theory, to a state’s electorate than a U.S. Senator.  
Moreover, a United States senator has little to no direct effect on state Medicaid politics.  
Analyzing the behavior of a member of the United States Congress fails to capture state 
political effects.  For these reasons, I use the state-level ideology measure developed by 
William Berry as a key independent variable for aim 1.  
Past studies show mixed results in terms of Democratic governors’ influence on 
HCBS programs. Kitchener and colleagues (2004) found that a Democratic governor to 
have no significant effect on HCBS.   However, another study found a positive 
association between Democratic governors and waiver spending per capita (Harrington, 
Carrillo, Wellin, Miller, & LeBlanc, 2000).  I seek to study the effects of state governors 
46	  
on HCBS spending and utilization and include a dummy variable to denote a Democratic 
control of the state governorship.  
However, just including a Democratic governor variable fails to control for the 
effect of partisan composition of state legislatures. Party make-up of state legislatures 
affects Medicaid spending and participants (Kousser, 2002; Kronebusch, 1993, 2004). I 
use a continuous variable denoting the percentage of state legislators that are Democrats 
to control for the effects of legislative party politics on HCBS spending and utilization.  
The influence of women in state legislatures can also affect public policy. Women 
are more likely to work in committees addressing health and welfare in state legislatures 
(Thomas & Welch, 1991). In addition, women hold more liberal welfare policy 
preferences than their male colleagues (Poggione, 2004). These effects are still 
statistically significant even after controlling for party, ideology and constituency 
demands. This effect is greater in Republican women. In fact, Republican and 
conservative women hold significantly more liberal policy preferences than their male 
counterparts (Poggione, 2004). Because of these effects, I include a variable denoting 
percentage of legislators that are women. 
The key independent variable for aim 2 is state 1915(c) waiver Medicaid HCBS 
long-term care expenditures per 1000 state population after adjusting for inflation using 
the CPI. All independent variables are listed in table 3.1.    
 
3.4.3 Instrumental Variable for Aim 2 
 The instrumental variable I used for aim 2 is the Berry state ideology measure. I 
also tested the partisan politics variables and the percentage of women legislator variable 
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as instruments. The results pointed to state ideology, used exclusively, as the most 
appropriate instrument. Chapter 5 describes these tests and their results in more detail.   
 
3.4.4 Control Variables 
Control variables are socio-demographic, economic, supply, and policy variables 
that affect long-term care expenditures and/or utilization (Harrington, et al., 2000; Kane, 
et al., 1998; Kitchener, et al., 2004; Lockhart, et al., 2008; Miller, Harrington, & 
Goldstein, 2002; Miller, Harrington, Ramsland, et al., 2002). See table 3.1 for a complete 
list of control variables.   
Economic and socio-demographic variables control for the influences that affect 
of long-term care utilization at the state level. The percentage of a state’s population over 
85 years old; the percentage of a state living in a metropolitan area; the percentage of 
state’s women in the workforce; and the number of Medicare home health users all likely 
have a positive relationship with long-term care spending and utilization. The greater 
percentage of elderly residents, the greater number of women working in the formal 
workforce (and thus unable to provide informal care), and the number of people already 
receiving Medicare home health will likely have a positive correlation with formal long-
term care consumption. Furthermore, people living in a metropolitan area are more likely 
to receive professional health care services, meaning this variable also likely has a 
positive relationship with long-term care consumption. Racial and ethnic minorities have 
historically used less formal long-term care, thus these measures likely have a negative 
relationship with Medicaid long-term care. Since a state’s income per capita and poverty 
rate are likely related to Medicaid consumption, these variables likely have a relationship 
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to Medicaid long-term care. The home health aide wage variable is added to account for 
state-to-state differences in the cost of provision of care. For example, it is likely that one 
dollar of care goes further in a southern and/or less metropolitan place such as Jackson, 
Mississippi compared to New York City. This variable is a proxy to capture this variation 
in costs across states. Unions can affect employee salaries, which can influence HCBS 
provision between states. Moreover, some states have a greater percentage of its 
workforce in unions (e.g. California) than other states (e.g. North Carolina).  Thus, I 
control for a state’s percentage of workforce that is part of a union. Finally, I interact the 
race/ethnicity measures with the poverty and state metropolitan variables in order to 
understand the heterogeneous effect of race/ethnicity on poverty and rural/urban 
composition.  
Supply and policy variables for influences on long-term care delivery by 
controlling for the availability of long-term care alternatives. According to Roemer’s law, 
greater hospital bed supply begets greater hospital service utilization (Roemer, 1961). 
Lower nursing home bed supply may be correlated with higher HCBS consumption given 
that it is an alternative to institutional care. Conversely, a higher number of home health 
agencies could increase HCBS expenditures and utilization.   
The daily nursing home reimbursement rate and FMAP can affect a state’s 
propensity to invest in HCBS. A higher reimbursement rate would likely foster the 
“institutional bias” precluding investment in expanded home- and community-based 
long-term care service options. In contrast, a higher FMAP can influence the expansion 
of HCBS, given that a state has access to more funds. 
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3.5 Quantitative Analysis and Hypotheses 
3.5.1 Aim 1: To study the political, economic and socio-demographic, and supply and 
policy influences on HCBS utilization and expenditures. 
 
Overview 
 This aim measures the effect of the political, economic and socio-demographic, 
and supply and policy influences on the growth of total and composite HCBS 
expenditures per 1000 state population and recipients per 1000 state population. The 
analysis of expenditures covers years 1996-2008, while the HCBS recipient analysis 
spans 1999-2008.This results in twelve separate quantitative regressions.7 State budgeting 
processes, even for states that use a biennial budget, occur in the late spring/early summer 
for the upcoming fiscal year (Budget Processes in the States, 2008), thus I lagged all 
independent variables by one year.8 Table 3.2 shows the time frames for analyses for 
each dependent variable. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 I examine the three components (1915(c) waivers, PCS, and home health) of HCBS 
expenditures per capita and per recipeitn (8 regressions). I also analyze total and 
composite HCBS recipients (4 regressions).  
 
8 The one exception is the FMAP variable since it is published so far in advance of its 
year of implementation. For example the FMAP for FY 2012 was announced in 
November 2010.   
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Table 3.2 Time Frames for Aim 1 Analyses     
Dependent Variable Time Frame 
Total Medicaid HCBS Expenditures/1000 Population 1996-2008 
Medicaid Home Health Expenditures/1000 Population 1996-2008 
Medicaid 1915(c) Waiver Expenditures/1000 Population 1996-2008 
Medicaid PCS Expenditures/1000 Population 1996-2008 
 
Total Medicaid HCBS Recipients/1000 Population 1999-2008 
Medicaid Home Health Recipients/1000 Population 1999-2008 
Medicaid 1915(c) Waiver Recipients/1000 Population 1999-2008 
Medicaid PCS Recipients/1000 Population 1999-2008 
 
Total Medicaid HCBS Expenditures/Recipient  1999-2008 
Medicaid Home Health Expenditures/Recipient 1999-2008 
Medicaid 1915(c) Waiver Expenditures/Recipient 1999-2008 
Medicaid PCS Expenditures/Recipient 1999-2008 
 
Statement of Hypotheses for Aim 1 
Because HCBS programs represent an expansion of the welfare state, I 
hypothesize that political influences are significant drivers of HCBS expenditures and 
utilization.  Consistent with other areas of state social welfare spending, states with more 
liberal political ideologies, states with Democratic governors, and states with more 
Democratic legislatures and more women in the legislature will be associated with 
increased HCBS expenditures and utilization. For this analysis, I examine total HCBS 
expenditures and recipients, in addition to all three composite types of HCBS.     
The hypotheses for aim 1, which test the effect of three different political 
variables, are: 
H1:States with more liberal ideology will have greater total and composite Medicaid 
HCBS expenditures and recipients per 1000 state population 
H2: States with Democratic governors will have greater total and composite 
Medicaid HCBS expenditures and recipients per 1000 state population.  
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H3: States with Democratically-controlled state legislatures will be associated with 
greater total and composite Medicaid HCBS expenditures and recipients per 1000 
state population.  
H4: States with more women in their state legislatures will be associated with 
greater total and composite Medicaid HCBS expenditures and recipients per 1000 
state population.  
 
Aim 1 Analyses  
 I used Wald tests to determine if the state-level, time-varying state-level effects 
were equal to zero (meaning that the models are fully specified and state-specific effects 
are irrelevant) which all failed. Thus, fixed effect is preferred to OLS. Usually, the 
Hausman test (1978) is used to determine using fixed or random effects. However, an 
assumption for using the Hausman test, that one of the estimators is efficient, is likely not 
met.  Furthermore, a small sample may render the Hausman test invalid as finite samples 
may not be deemed positive definite (Shaffer & Stillman, 2006). Thus, as a second step to 
determine the correct model, I used the “xtoverid” command in Stata™ to test for fixed 
versus random effects. The tests all pointed to using fixed effect over random effects. See 
Equation 1 for the models used for aim1. 
  
Equation 1    Yit=β0+β1Xit+β2γit+εit   
 
 The β0 term above represents the constants for each model. The Yit term is the 
dependent variable (HCBS expenditures or utilization) for each state “i” at time “t”.  The 
Xit term is the vector of key independent variables for each model. The γit represents the 
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vector of control variables. The εit term is the error for each model which is broken down 
broken down into µi,, the state-specific time-invariant effects, and the υit term, which is 
the idiosyncratic error. 
 
3.5.2 – Aim 2: To study the effect of Medicaid 1915(c) HCBS expenditures on  
Medicaid institutional Expenditures. 
 
Overview  
This aim studies the effect of Medicaid 1915(c) expenditures on institutional 
Medicaid expenditures during 1996-2008. Some researchers argue that HCBS long-term 
care is less expensive than institutional care on an individual basis (Alecxih, et al., 1998; 
Kitchener, et al., 2006; Scanlon, et al., 1994; Wiener & Stevenson, 1998).  However, no 
study to date explores the effect of Medicaid 1915(c) waiver expenditures on state 
institutional long-term costs in the years following the Olmstead ruling.9 This analysis, 
similar to one originally proposed by Grabowski (2006), seeks to understand how 
1915(c) program expenditures affect institutional Medicaid expenditures.  
 
Statement of Hypothesis for Aim 2 
 Since the intent of waiver expenditures is to reduce institutional expenditures (by 
reducing institutionalization), I posit that Medicaid 1915(c) waiver expenditures will 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 Steve Kaye (2012) found that the square-root of the year-to-year percentage change of 
state non-MRDD waiver expenditures, PCS expenditures, and home health expenditures 
have a negative association with the percent change of state institutional long-term care 
expenditures excluding ICFMR spending. The level term (that is, the “not square-root” 
term) has a positive association. The analysis presented here provides an understanding 
of how waiver spending affects institutional spending (both nursing home and ICFMR 
spending) since the purpose of waivers is to provide a cost-neutral alternative to any type 
of institutional care.     
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have a negative relationship with institutional expenditures.  The hypothesis for aim is the 
following: 
H4: Medicaid 1915(c) waiver long-term care expenditures will have a negative 
association with institutional long-term care expenditures.  
 
Aim 2 Analyses  
Two Endogeneity Problems and Two Solutions 
Endogeneity is likely present in the model for two reasons. First, simultaneity is 
present meaning the dependent variable is jointly determined by an independent variable. 
As a reading of aim 1 shows, I use several independent/control variables to predict 
institutional long-term care expenditures that can and have been used to predict waiver 
expenditures (Harrington, et al., 2000; Kitchener, et al., 2004; Miller, Harrington, & 
Goldstein, 2002; Miller, Harrington, Ramsland, et al., 2002). Thus, the key independent 
variable is likely jointly determined with the dependent variable, institutional 
expenditures. In other words, a feedback persists between one (but likely several) of the 
independent and dependent variables.   
Second, omitted variable bias is likely present. That is, there are likely omitted 
independent variables that are correlated with the error term. These omissions bias the 
parameter estimates in the regression. In short, there are controls missing from the model 
that either are not and/or cannot be measured. For example, it would be difficult and/or 
impossible to measure accurately the strength of a state’s home health or nursing home 
lobbies. These unavoidable omissions indicate a likely bias in parameter estimates.  
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I build on the two-pronged approach in aim 2 to address endogeneity problems 
similar to that used by Laurence Baker (1997) to study the spill-over effect of Medicare 
HMO market-share on fee-for service expenditures. Like Baker (1997), I employ both an 
instrumental variable analysis and a fixed effect analysis for aim 2. The instrumental 
variable analysis controls for omitted variables and simultaneity. If the instrument is 
uncorrelated with the omitted variables and with the institutional expenditures, then the 
IV analysis will produce unbiased estimates. The fixed effects estimates, another 
approach to control for endogeneity, is biased if the omitted variables are constant over 
time within states or are constant across states within years (Baker, 1997). Because of 
these limitations I also provide a pooled OLS model and a 2SLS analysis with FE in 
order to provide the most complete understanding possible of the effect of waiver 
spending on institutional spending.  Below I present these approaches and the results of 
all four models in the manuscript for aim 2. 
 
Figure 3.2-Theoretical Framework for Aim 2 
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 Figure 3.2 illustrates the theoretical framework for this analysis. The instrumental 
variable is a proxy to estimate a state’s propensity for HCBS investment. These 
estimations are then used to predict institutional expenditures. I propose that a political 
measure is a valid predictor of a state’s predisposition for greater HCBS investment. The 
theoretical case for using a political variable is presented below. 
 The “u (error term)” box helps illustrate the theory of the fixed effects analysis. 
The staggered arrows denoted the fixed effect analysis. Using this technique will capture 
effects that influence both waiver expenditures and institutional expenditures. By 
differencing out state-level time-invariant qualities, the fixed effects control for the 
simultaneity and omitted variable bias phenomena that I described in the previous 
section. The two-headed arrow denotes omitted variable bias in figure 3.2, which are 
controlled for with the fixed effects analysis described below.      
 
Defense of Instrumental Variable 
I argue that due to the legally-mandated nature of institutional expenditures, the 
lack of state-to-state uniformity of HCBS programs, and the discretionary nature of 
HCBS program expansion, a political variable will be highly correlated with HCBS 
expenditures but not with institutional expenditures, indicating a strong instrument. 
Below I provide the theoretical justification for each tested instrument. For more detail 
about the strength of each possible instrument and the combination of instruments 
performed, see chapter 5.       
I tested state ideology, the percentage of Democratic legislators, Democratic 
governors, and percentage of women in the legislature as potential instrumental variables. 
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State ideology has a significant influence on state policies (Berry, Ringquist, Fording, & 
Hanson, 1998; Erikson, MacKuen, & Stimson, 2002; Erikson, Wright, & McIver, 1993; 
Rom, 1999; Soss, Schram, Vartanian, & O'Brien, 2001). In general, more liberal states 
have adopted more generous welfare polices and health policies (Bradbury & Crain, 
2002; Rom, 1999). I use the state ideology measure developed by Berry and colleagues as 
a possible instrument (Berry, et al., 1998). More Democratic legislatures have been found 
to have a positive relationship with public spending(Alt & Lowry, 1994, 2000; Brown, 
1995; Dye, 1984; Hwang & Gray, 1991; Painter & Bae, 2001).  Similarly, Democratic 
governors are more likely to spend resources on social welfare programs (Adolph, 
Breunig, & Koski, 2007).   Women legislators are more likely to be working in 
committees addressing health and welfare in state legislatures (Thomas & Welch, 1991) 
and to hold more liberal welfare policy preferences than the their male colleagues 
(Poggione, 2004). Please see chapter 5 on the results of the tests for instrument strength.  
 
3.5.3 Aim 2 Analyses  
Fixed Effect and OLS Analysis 
 The fixed effects analysis is similar to analyses in aim 1. Like aim 1, I included 
year and state fixed effect in the analysis. The results from the OLS models are presented 
to provide an understanding of the effects of the independent variables without 
differencing out the time-invariant state-level effects. Equation 2 illustrates the OLS and 
FE models.  
 
Equation 2 Yit=β0+β1Xit+β2γit+εit 
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The β0 term above represents the constant for the OLS model. The Yit term is the 
dependent variable (institutional expenditures) for each state “i” at time “t”.  The Xit term 
is the vector of key independent variables for the model. The γit represents the vector of 
control variables. The εit term is the error for each model. For the FE model, the error 
term is broken down into µi and υit terms. The first of these terms represents the time-
invariant effects that are controlled for with the FE analysis. The υit  term represents the 
time-variant aspect of the error term. I contend that the fixed effects (denoted by the “u” 
in figure 3.2) will control for omitted variable bias and simultaneity. These effects will 
capture phenomena I cannot measure such as having a state having an HCBS champion 
in the legislature, a particularly strong disability lobby, and/or a unusually weak nursing 
home lobby. This list is far from exhaustive. Fixed effects control for omitted variables 
affecting the dependent and endogenous key independent variables by differencing out 
time-invariant state-level phenomena unavailable for quantitative measurement.     
 
Instrumental Variable Analysis  
 Equations 3 and 4 present the 2SLS and 2SLSFE analyses for this aim where Y1 
is the endogenous independent variable, HCBS Medicaid expenditures, for each state “i” 
at time “t”.  The Y2 term is the dependent variable, Medicaid institutional expenditures. 
The Xit term is the vector of control variables; the δ term is the instrument; and the Y1’ is 
the predicted value of the endogenous variable (waiver expenditures) for the 2SLS 
analysis. The β0 term is the constant and the εit is the error term.  For the 2SLSFE model, 
the error term is again composed of two terms described in the FE analysis above.  
 
Equation 3    Y1it=β0+β1Xit +β2δ+εit 
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Equation 4  Y2it=β0+β1Y1’it +β2Xit+εit  
  
For this part of the analysis, I used the ‘ivreg2’ and ‘xtivreg2’ commands 
designed by Baum and colleagues (2010). With these commands, I used the ‘endog’ 
option to test for endogeneity. The test produces a test similar to the C-statistic, also 
known as a "GMM distance" or "difference-in-Sargan" statistic with a null hypothesis 
that the specified endogenous regressors, in this case waiver expenditures, can actually be 
treated as exogenous. The test statistic is distributed as chi-squared with degrees of 
freedom equal to the number of regressors tested (Baum, et al., 2010).These commands 
also provide tests for weak instruments. Stock and Yogo (2002) have compiled critical 
values for the Cragg-Donald F statistic for several different estimators, which are 
provided in the output for the ‘ivreg2’ and ‘xtivreg2’ commands. For each model, an F-
statistic is reported with these commands along with a range of critical values in order to 
test the null that the instruments are weak (Baum, et al., 2010; Stock & Yogo, 2002).   
 
3.6 Qualitative Data Sources and Sample 
 
Overview 
The qualitative analysis, aim 3, used semi-structured topical interviews. Building 
on the three types of influences on HCBS in the quantitative aims and the phenomena I 
describe in section 2.4, I investigated the administrative, socio-demographic, economic, 
policy, and political challenges to HCBS expansion. In accordance with the sequential 
explanatory design, the quantitative analysis informed the qualitative analysis by helping 
guide the questions for the interviews. Creswell and Plano Clark (2007) provide several 
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suggestions as to how the quantitative analysis can inform a qualitative study, including 
prompting further examination of surprising results and outliers.  
 
3.6.1 Sample Description and Data Collection 
I conducted eighteen semi-structured interviews with state Medicaid officials, 
each from a different state. I chose state officials as informants in order to obtain an 
understanding, at the state level, of what impedes HCBS expansion. In order to create a 
diverse sample, I first stratified all 50 states and the District of Columbia by HCBS 
spending per capita10 for the year 2008 to create five quintiles. Then, using a random 
number generator, I randomly sampled within each quintile and emailed the state 
Medicaid director explaining the study and asked for a more appropriate informant if 
such a person was not the director.11 Appendix D provides the recruitment letter. All 
interviews were done via telephone, recorded, and later transcribed. Interviews were 
conducted until (1) no new information was presented and (2) there were at least two 
states interviewed from each quintile. I guaranteed informants confidentiality; their 
responses are not linked to their name, title, and state’s name. Given that many 
informants had very specific titles, I cannot list them here. The states included in the 
study include: Connecticut, Georgia, Illinois, Iowa, Massachusetts, Michigan, Montana, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 The sum of spending per capita for the three largest Medicaid HCBS programs (home 
health, 1915(c) waiver, and Personal Care Services) was used to indicate total HCBS 
spending per capita. The year 2008 is the most recent year available with reliable data.  
 
11 While placed in a spending quintile, I excluded Alaska, the District of Columbia, 
Hawaii, and Nebraska from the qualitative sample because these states were not included 
in the quantitative analyses.  
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Nevada, New Hampshire, New Mexico, North Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, South 
Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, and Vermont.  
 
3.6.2 Theoretical Framework for Aim 3 
I used respondent interviews (Rubin & Rubin, 2005). This approach is appropriate 
because (1) it investigates the interviewee’s experiences and their understanding of their 
respective worlds in which they operate and (2) the design is flexible and adaptive (Rubin 
& Rubin, 2005,). The guide for the interviews was semi-structured to maintain flexibility 
in my approach (Encyclopedia of Social Science Research Methods, 2004).  This second 
point is crucial because as any unexpected themes that emerge from coding can be 
addressed by changing the interview guide and/or codebook as the analysis progresses. 
Figure 3.3 shows the theoretical model for aim 3.  
 
Figure 3.3-Theoretical Framework for Qualitative Analysis 
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questions: (1) community and infrastructure challenges and (2) general challenges. 
Questions concerning community and infrastructure challenges focus on a state’s 
definition of community care and the state of its long-term care infrastructure. The 
section on general challenges included inquiries concerning how states have carried out 
the Olmstead ruling and how the ruling has affected state LTC systems.    
The next set of questions concerned the economic and socio-demographic 
challenges to HCBS programs since 1999. For example, I asked about any fiscal impact 
of Olmstead. In addition, I inquired about LTC workforce issue and how state 
demographics, such as the aging population have affected state long-term care systems.   
The last section focused on political and policy challenges. My inquiries 
concerned political influences on long-term care policy including interest group lobbying 
and partisan influences. In addition, I inquired about the state’s regulatory structure 
effects on Medicaid HCBS. Appendix E is the final interview guide.  
 
3.7 Qualitative Analysis 
For the qualitative analysis I used the coding technique developed by Hrushcka 
and colleagues (2004). First, I read all eighteen transcripts and developed a codebook. A 
second reader then read a subsample of transcribed interviews and developed a separate 
codebook. Next, both readers collaborated to create one codebook, which ultimately 
comprised more than 75 codes. A second sub-sample was randomly selected for both 
readers to code using the new codebook similar to previous studies that have used this 
technique (Jones, et al., 2010; Kanotra, et al., 2007; McMurphy, Shea, Switzer, & Turner, 
2006). Reliability was then calculated and deemed to be sufficient. Discrepancies that 
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remained between coders were reconciled to reach full consensus. After all coding was 
complete, both readers convened again to agree on the final eight themes presented in 
chapter 6. Appendix F provides the final codebook and Appendix G provides selected 
finings from qualitative analysis.    
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Chapter 4: Medicaid Home- and Community-Based Services in the Age of 
Olmstead: Spending and Utilization 1996-2008. 
 
4.1 Introduction  
Long-Term Care and Medicaid Home-and Community-Based Services 
Long-term care services provide assistance with Activities of Daily Living (ADL) 
(e.g. bathing and dressing) and/or Instrumental Activities of Daily Living (IADL) (e.g. 
shopping or doing housework). Most long-term care is informal, usually unpaid care 
provided by family members and friends (RA Kane, Kane, & Ladd, 1998).  Medicaid 
pays for formal long-term care, in two settings: institutional care (nursing homes and 
ICRMR/ICFDD12) and home-and community-based services (HCBS). HCBS are services 
provided to persons who would otherwise be served in institutions (Center for Personal 
Assistance Services, 2012).  Approximately 12 million Americans, or 4 percent of the 
population, need assistance with ADLs or IADLs. Since approximately 1.5-1.8 million 
Americans receive nursing home care, roughly 10 million people in the community 
require long-term care services. Half of those needing long-term care in the community 
are elderly (Kaye, Harrington, & LaPlante, 2010). Even though seniors are not the only 
group that uses long-term care, demand for long-term care will increase as the population 
aged over 65 grows from 44 million in 2010 to 72 million by 2030 (Vincent & Velkoff, 
2010).   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 ICFMR/ICFDD are Intermediate Care Facilities for the Mentally 
Retarded/Developmentally Disabled.  
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Medicaid HCBS has grown substantially over the last two decades as states have 
tried to “rebalance” their long-term care systems.13 In 1988, 90 percent of Medicaid 
dollars spent on long-term care went for institutional care (O'Keeffe, et al., 2010). By 
2009, however, Medicaid HCBS served over 3 million people (Howard, et al., 2011) and 
over 40 percent of Medicaid long-term care dollars were used for HCBS (Howard, et al., 
2011). Despite these gains, demand for HCBS remains high; 10 million adults still need 
long-term care in the community and many states have waitlists for HCBS (Kaye, et al., 
2010; Howard, et al., 2011). Given these demographic and spending trends, the 1999 
Olmstead vs L.C. ruling requiring states to invest more in HCBS, and the incentives 
included in the 2010 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA), Medicaid HCBS 
will remain at the forefront of long-term care policy discussion for some time (Olmstead 
vs L.C., 1999; Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 2010). This study examines 
the political, economic, socio-demographic, policy, and supply influences on HCBS 
spending and utilization for 1996-2008.   
I begin by describing the policy context of HCBS programs, my conceptual 
model, and methods. I then present the independent variables in their respective 
categories and include the hypothesized relationship of each measure. Finally, I present 
the results and conclude with recommendations for future research and policy 
implications. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 Rebalancing is shifting money from institutional to HCBS settings.	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4.2 Background/Policy Context  
 
Three Types of Medicaid HCBS: Home Health, 1915(c) Waiver Programs, and 
Personal Care Services 
 
The three largest Medicaid HCBS programs include home health services (HH), 
1915(c) waiver programs (waiver), and personal care services (PCS). Home health 
services have been a mandated Medicaid service since 1970. States must offer home 
health services to persons eligible to receive nursing home care, however Medicaid 
enrollees do not have to require an institutional level of care to receive the home health 
benefit.  By law, states must provide the following services with their home health 
programs: nursing, home health aids, medical supplies and equipment, and necessary 
appliances for home care (Smith, O'Keefe, Carepenter, Doty, & Kennedy, 2000).  
In 2008, almost all states and the District of Columbia14 had at least one 1915(c) 
waiver to provide home care. Named after the section 1915(c) of the Social Security Act, 
the law waives federal Medicaid rules otherwise requiring the equal provision of services 
to all qualified persons. Thus, waiver services may be limited to a predefined number of 
recipients, persons with a particular diagnosis, and/or residents from a particular part of 
the state (Carlson & Coffey, 2010). States are allowed to provide services not offered 
under Medicaid in order to avoid institutionalization, but must document cost neutrality. 
Waiver services include case management, homemaker, home health aide, personal care, 
adult day health, habilitation, respite care, and “such other services requested by the state 
as the Secretary of Health and Human Services (HHS) may approve” (O'Keeffe, et al., 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 Arizona and Vermont operate 1115 waivers. Arizona has never had a 1915(c) waiver. 
Vermont used a 1915 (c) waiver until 2006.  
72	  
2010). Populations currently served with 1915(c) waivers include the elderly, the 
physically disabled, the mentally retarded/developmentally disabled, children with 
special needs, persons with HIV/AIDS,  persons with mental heath needs, and persons 
with traumatic brain injuries/spinal cord injuries (Howard, Ng, & Harrington, 2011).  
Since 1975, states have had the option of offering the PCS benefit through 
Medicaid Title XIX to build and expand their long-term care services. These services are 
variously labeled personal attendant services, personal assistance services, and attendant 
care services.  PCS are provided to people with disabilities of all ages in need of help 
with ADLs or IADLs.  By law, PCS cannot be just supplementary tasks such as 
housekeeping (LeBlanc, Tonner, & Harrington, 2001). In addition, to help with ADLs 
and IADLs, services provided under PCS include but are not limited to the following: 
medical and non-medical transportation, “cuing” services to assist persons with cognitive 
impairments so they can perform tasks themselves, animal assistance, emergency 
support, and case management (Kitchener, Ng, Miller, & Harrington, 2007). As of 2010, 
34 states operate optional PCS programs (Howard, et al., 2011). 
 
Potential Cost Savings with HCBS, Consumer Preferences, Olmstead vs L.C., and the 
ACA 
Some scholars argue that more HCBS spending fails to produce savings for state 
governments (Greene, Lovely, & Ondrich, 1993; Kemper, 1988; Weissert, 1985, 1986, 
1993; Weissert, Cready, & Pawelak, 1988; Wiener & Stevenson, 1998) and is no less 
costly than nursing home care (Weissert, 2008). Weissert (1986) argues that while those 
in the community need care and are at a high risk to be institutionalized, HCBS programs 
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do not save public funds: “they cost extra money simply because it gives more care to 
more people (p. 480).”  
However, several additional studies have found HCBS programs to be cost-
effective alternatives to institutional care (Alecxih, Lutzky, & Corea, 1998; Scanlon, et 
al., 1994).  Additionally, one study found that HCBS waivers could save approximately 
$44,000 per participant in comparison to institutional care. Extrapolating these savings to 
all waiver recipients in 2002 yields a prediction of calculated savings ranging from $2 
billion to $40 billion (Kitchener, Ng, Miller, & Harrington, 2006). Furthermore, states 
that spend more on HCBS programs have experienced lower overall Medicaid 
expenditures (Kaye, LaPlante, & Harrington, 2009) and can lower overall state spending 
on long-term care (Kaye, 2012). However, money is spent for both care and housing with 
institutional long-term care, while HCBS funds only care and supports. Thus, these 
spending comparisons should be interpreted as aggregate state dollars saved and not 
money spent on two analogous forms of care. 
 Most people needing long-term care prefer to stay in their homes and/or the least 
restrictive setting (RL Kane & Kane, 2001; Reinhard, 2010).  More than seventy percent 
of Americans over age 45 want to stay in their homes as long as possible (Bayer & 
Harper, 2000) while seventy percent of respondents, in a different study, have positive 
attitudes toward receiving paid in-home care.  Only 28 percent of those asked were 
inclined to seek long-term care in a nursing home (McAuley & Blieszner, 1985).  
Similarly, Eckert and colleagues found that most Americans prefer to receive long-term 
care at home or in the community with few respondents preferring nursing homes (2004).  
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 These preferences are noteworthy as many baby-boomers entire retirement 
without adequate savings.  Baby-boomers are different than previous retirees because 
they are more likely to live alone in old age due to divorce, have higher incomes, and 
have lower numbers of adult offspring (Easterlin, Schaeffer, & Macunovich, 1993; 
Macunovich, Easterlin, Schaeffer, & Crimmins, 1995). However, most adults currently 
have little saved. Seventy-five percent of US adults aged 50-64 have less than $30,000 
saved for retirement (Schwartz Center for Economic Policy Analysis, 2012). These trends 
suggest that many baby boomers will have fewer resources for informal care, coupled 
with an inability to pay for formal long-term care.  
Despite these preferences, states still rely heavily on institutional long-term care 
(Ng and Harrington, 2009), which is sometimes referred to as an “institutional bias” 
(Bishop, 1999; Blaser, 2008). HCBS programs, however, have been shown to keep the 
elderly in the community (Centers of Medicare and Medicaid Services, 2009).  Higher 
state spending on HCBS lowers the risk of end-of-life nursing home relocation 
(Muramatsu & Campbell, 2002; Muramatsu, Hoyem, Yin, & Campbell, 2008), and the 
risk of nursing home admission for childless seniors (Muramatsu, et al., 2008).  
The 1999 Olmstead vs. L.C. ruling addressed this institutional bias.  In accordance 
with the 1990 Americans with Disabilities Act, the Supreme Court ruled that states must 
serve recipients of state services in the least restrictive setting possible (Olmstead vs L.C., 
1999).  Olmstead does not explicitly direct states to spend a particular amount on 
Medicaid HCBS, meaning the total allocated for HCBS, in comparison to institutional 
care, is at the discretion of each state. For example, in 2008 New Mexico and Oregon 
allocated over 70 percent of their Medicaid long-term care expenditures to HCBS, while 
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Mississippi allotted just 14 percent (Burwell, Sredl, & Eiken, 2009; O'Keeffe, et al., 
2010). 
The 2005 Deficit Reduction Act (DRA) established the Money Follows the 
Person (MFP) demonstration program, which provided a higher Medicaid matching rate 
(FMAP) to states for transitioning nursing home residents into the community. Also 
under the DRA, the 1915(i) and 1915(j) waiver programs were created. The first program 
allows states to provide HCBS as part of its state plan; the latter permits states to provide 
more self-direction known as the Cash and Counseling option (Harrington, Ng, LaPlante, 
& Kaye, 2012).  
The 2010 ACA encourages states to devote more of their Medicaid long-term care 
resources to HCBS in three ways.  First, the Community First Choice option gives states 
financial incentives to provide PCS services to those with disabilities. Having a PCS 
program, however, remains optional. Second, the ACA allows states to expand their state 
plan benefit, the 1915(i) option. Third, states can participate in the state balancing 
incentive program that provides a temporary, higher matching rate for allocating more 
resources for Medicaid HCBS (Carlson & Coffey, 2010). While these provisions are 
meant to encourage HCBS spending, some analysts are skeptical that the ACA will 
promote HCBS growth given that such investment will remain optional (Harrington, et 
al., 2012).   
 
4.3 Conceptual Model 
This state-level, longitudinal study analyzes Medicaid HCBS spending (spending 
per capita and spending per recipients) and utilization (recipients per capita) for 1996-
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2008. These measures encompass both breadth (spending per capita and recipients per 
capita) and depth (spending per recipient) in the context of the 1999 Olmstead ruling. 
Given that the need for long-term care will increase as the population ages, most people 
want to receive long-term care in the least restrictive setting possible, investment in 
Medicaid HCBS holds some promise of curtailing state spending, and the Olmstead 
ruling requires states to invest more in HCBS, policy makers have experienced and will 
continue to experience demographic, constituent, financial, and legal pressures to invest 
more in these services. Since Medicaid expansion is an enlargement of the welfare state, 
and past studies show a strong association between politics and state spending, I predict 
state politics to be robust influences on HCBS expansion since the Olmstead ruling.  In 
addition to political factors, I control for other known influences of state spending and 
Medicaid, including socio-demographic, economic, policy and supply factors.  
 
Political Variables 
Partisan Politics 
 Several studies examine the effect of political parties on state expenditures. 
Garand (1985) showed that shifts in party control of state governments affect state 
spending over time. Democratic state legislatures spend larger amounts per capita 
(Painter & Bae, 2001) and Democratic state legislatures spend a greater percentage of a 
state’s income on public spending compared to Republican legislatures (Alt & Lowry, 
1994, 2000).  In short, partisan control of legislatures matters regarding state 
expenditures.  
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 Parties also influence state social welfare and Medicaid spending. Democratic 
state legislatures spend more on state welfare programs (Brown, 1995; Dye, 1984; 
Hwang & Gray, 1991) and have a positive association with redistribution policy  (Uslaner 
& Weber, 1975). States that replace their Republican governments with Democratic 
governments see a greater increase in welfare spending, but not other types of 
expenditures (Husted & Kenny, 1997). Kronebusch (1993) found that Democratically 
controlled legislatures are associated with higher payments per capita for adults receiving 
welfare benefits and Kousser (2002) found that Republican legislatures spend less on 
discretionary state spending. The party that controls the state legislature controls the 
“breadth of a Medicaid program to fit its partisan goals” (Kousser 2002, p. 666). 
Furthermore, Democratic governors are more likely to spend their resources on social 
welfare programs compared to their Republican counterparts (Adolph, Breunig, & Koski, 
2007).  
HCBS studies show mixed results regarding the impact of Democratic governors 
on these programs. One study found that having a Democratic governor had no 
significant effect on HCBS (Kitchener, Carrillo, & Harrington, 2004). However, another 
study found a positive association between Democratic governors and waiver spending 
per capita (Harrington, Carrillo, Wellin, Miller, & LeBlanc, 2000). However, these 
studies examined HCBS prior to Olmstead and did not control for the partisan 
composition of state-legislatures. I hypothesize that states with more Democrats in the 
legislature and Democratic governors will have greater HCBS spending and utilization. 
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State Ideology  
State ideology influences public policy (Berry, Ringquist, Fording, & Hanson, 
1998; Erikson, MacKuen, & Stimson, 2002; Erikson, Wright, & McIver, 1993; Rom, 
1999; Soss, Schram, Vartanian, & O'Brien, 2001). In general, more liberal states have 
adopted more generous welfare polices and health policies (Bradbury & Crain, 2002; 
Rom, 1999). Previous studies of HCBS spending and utilization control for state 
ideology, but have not found a significant effect on HCBS (Lockhart, Giles-Sims, & 
Klopfenstein, 2008; N. Miller, Harrington, & Goldstein, 2002; N. Miller, Harrington, 
Ramsland, & Goldstein, 2002; N. Miller, Ramsland, Goldstein, & Harrington, 2001).  I 
hypothesize that a liberal state ideology has a positive relationship with HCBS spending 
and utilization.  
 
Women Legislators  
The proportion of women in state legislatures also can influence policy. Women 
are more likely to sit on committees that address health and welfare in state legislatures 
(Thomas & Welch, 1991).  In addition, women hold more liberal welfare policy 
preferences than the their male colleagues. These effects are still statistically significant 
even after controlling for party, ideology and constituency demands. This effect is greater 
in Republican women. In fact, Republican and conservative women hold significantly 
more liberal policy preferences than their male counterparts (Poggione, 2004). Previous 
studies of HCBS do not control for the proportion of women in the legislature. I 
hypothesize that a greater proportion of women in the legislature will have a positive 
relationship with HCBS spending and utilization.  
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Socio-Demographic Variables 
State Population Aged Over 85  
Age has consistently predicted the use of formal long-term care (Houde, 1998; 
Kemper, 1992; Wallace, Campbell, & Lew-Ting, 1994).  HCBS studies accounting for 
age show a positive and significant association with HCBS spending and/or utilization 
(Harrington, et al., 2000; Kitchener, et al., 2004; N. Miller, Harrington, & Goldstein, 
2002; N. Miller, Harrington, Ramsland, et al., 2002; N. Miller, et al., 2001). I predict 
states with a higher percentage of elderly population will have greater HCBS spending 
and utilization.  
 
State Minority Population  
Several studies have shown that the size of minority populations affect state 
Medicaid programs. Grogan (1994) found that larger minority populations have a 
negative association with the generosity of Medicaid eligibility policies. Kronebusch 
(1993) found that larger minority populations have a negative associaton with lower 
Medicaid payments per capita. In addition, Kousser (2002) found that a larger state 
minority population is linked to lower optional Medicaid spending and spending per 
recipient.  Likewise, larger minority populations are associated with lower HCBS 
spending per capita (Kitchener, et al., 2004) and lower state share of community-based 
LTC spending (N. Miller, Harrington, Ramsland, et al., 2002).  
However, there is no consensus regarding patterns of long-term care use by racial 
and ethnic minorities. Many scholars argue that minorities use less formal long-term care 
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than Whites. Some scholars argue that African Americans use less formal care due to 
more expansive social networks compared to whites (Kemper, 1992; Kersting, 2001). 
Others argue that informal care networks do not differ by race (Burton, et al., 1995; 
Stevens, et al., 2004). Scholars studying Hispanics and formal long-term care utilization 
found that this group’s lower formal long-term care usage is linked to structural barriers 
such as lack of health insurance (Wallace, et al., 1994; Wallace & Lew-Ting, 1992). 
 Conversely, additional studies report that racial and ethnic minorities actually use 
more home health care, which is formal care, compared to Whites (Cagney & Agree, 
1999; Mitchell & Krout, 1998; Mui & Burnette, 1994; White-Means & Rubin, 2004).  
Others have found no differences by race in home health care use (B. Miller, et al., 1996; 
Peng, Navaie-Waliser, & Feldman, 2003). Thus, at least in terms of home health care 
utilization, racial and ethnic disparities do not seem to exist (Konetzka & Werner, 2009). 
Historically, white women have been and continue to be the largest consumers of 
institutional long-term care (Kaye, Harrington, & LaPlante, 2010; Vladeck, 1980). This 
trend is changing since institutional (nursing home) care is increasing among racial and 
ethnic minorities. Using data from 2000, Smith and colleagues found that African 
Americans’ use of nursing homes was 14 percent higher than Whites’ use. Additionally, 
Feng and colleagues showed that Hispanics’ use of nursing homes increased by over 50 
percent and increased for African Americans by over 10 percent between 1999 and 2008.  
The use of nursing homes by Whites declined over 10 percent for the same time period, 
which could indicate a lack of equal access to HCBS (2011).  Additionally, more Whites 
have recently been seeking long-term care in Assisted Living facilities, leading to a 
greater supply of nursing home beds (Akamigbo & Wolinsky, 2007).  In order to examine 
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these trends, this study includes variables for state African American population and state 
Hispanic population. Given the above findings, I do not predict an association with state 
share of minority populations and HCBS spending and utilization.  
 
State Metropolitan Population 
 States with larger metropolitan populations are associated with lower Medicaid 
waiver recipients per capita (Kitchener, et al., 2004) and lower state share of Medicaid 
LTC funds spent in the community (N. Miller, Harrington, & Goldstein, 2002; N. Miller, 
Harrington, Ramsland, et al., 2002). Likewise, McAuley and colleagues (2004) found 
that rural Medicaid recipients are more likely to use formal home care.  I predict that 
more metropolitan states will have a negative relationship with HCBS spending and 
utilization.  
 
State Population Over 65 With a Self-Care Limitation  
Having a large state population with self-care limitations and being over age 65 
may increase demand for long-term care.  However, past HCBS studies controlling for 
this variable found no statistically significant effect (RL Kane, Kane, Veazie, & Ladd, 
1998; Lockhart, et al., 2008). Even though the elderly are not the sole users of LTC, age 
is a strong predictor of nursing home placement (Cohen-Mansfield & Wirtz, 2011). I 
predict that states with a higher proprtion of persons aged over 65 with a self-care 
limitation will have a positive association with HCBS spending and utilization.   
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Medicare Home Health Users  
Greater use of Medicare home health resources has a positive association with 
HCBS spending and utilization (Kitchener, et al., 2004; N. Miller, Harrington, & 
Goldstein, 2002; N. Miller, Harrington, Ramsland, et al., 2002; N. Miller, et al., 2001).  
Thus, I predict states with higher proportions of Medicare home health users will have a 
positive relationship with HCBS spending and utilization.   
 
Economic Variables 
Per Capita Income 
 More affluent states may better be able to afford larger HCBS programs. Higher 
state income has been shown to have a positive association with discretionary Medicaid 
spending (Kousser, 2002) and with increased HCBS (Harrington, et al., 2000; N. Miller, 
Harrington, & Goldstein, 2002; N. Miller, Harrington, Ramsland, et al., 2002; N. Miller, 
et al., 2001). I predict a positive relationship between state per capita income and HCBS 
investment and utilization.  
 
Poverty Rate  
States that are less affluent are more likely to have larger Medicaid programs due 
to higher poverty rates. However, fewer state resources may also restrain state Medicaid 
spending. While many Medicaid services are required, such as institutional long-term 
care, it is hard know how greater levels of poverty will affect HCBS, whose size is 
ultimately up to state policy makers (Kousser, 2002). However, higher poverty could 
impede state’s ability to provide HCBS and/or indicate fewer people in the formal 
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workforce allowing for more resources for informal care (Harrington, et al., 2000; 
Kitchener, et al., 2004). I do not predict a relationship between state poverty levels and 
HCBS spending and utilization.  
 
Female Labor Force Participation  
More women in the labor force has been found to have a positive relationship 
with HCBS spending and utilization (Kitchener, et al., 2004; N. Miller, Harrington, & 
Goldstein, 2002; N. Miller, Harrington, Ramsland, et al., 2002; N. Miller, et al., 2001).  
This could be due to fewer resources for informal care. I predict a positive relationship 
between state women labor force participation rates and HCBS spending and utilizatoin. 
 
Federal Medical Assistance Percentage (FMAP) 
 Medicaid is a joint state-federal program where states pay a portion.  States 
spend, on average, 43 cents for every Medicaid dollar, with the federal government 
paying the remainder (Financing and Reimbursement, 2012). California and Connecticut 
had the minimum FMAP, also known as the matching rate, of 50 percent for fiscal year 
2008. The FMAP for less affluent Mississippi was about 76 percent, meaning the state 
was responsible for only around 24 percent of every Medicaid dollar. The federal 
government can use the FMAP to create incentives for Medicaid expansion and it has 
been shown to have a positive relationship with state spending (Kousser, 2002). 
However, Kronebusch (2004) found only a weak association between higher FMAP and 
Medicaid expansion. I predict a positive relationship between a state’s FMAP and HCBS 
spending and utilization.   
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Average Home Health Wage  
Health care costs, including long-term care costs, in the United States vary 
between geographic regions (Auerbach & White, 2008).  I include average home health 
wages by state as a proxy to control for this variation.  Since higher costs of care may 
limit the ability to expand Medicaid, I predict a negative relationship between higher 
home health wages and HCBS spending and utilization. 
 
Unionized Work Force  
No studies were found where unionization influenced state health care spending. 
However, greater unionization is associated with greater governmental redistribution of 
resources to the poor (Hicks, Friedland, & Johnson, 1978). Additionally, a stronger labor 
movement has been associated with increased rates of welfare and education spending 
(Radcliff & Saiz, 1998). Because of these effects, I hypothesize that greater levels of state 
workforce unionization will increase HCBS spending and utilization.   
 
Interactions 
  An additional contribution of this study is to get a better understanding of how 
different state demographics interact statistically with each other and Medicaid HCBS 
spending. Thus, I interact the race/ethnicity variable with sate metropolitan population 
and state poverty rates.  
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Supply and Policy Factors 
Nursing Home Bed Supply  
A greater supply of nursing home beds may limit resources for HCBS and has a 
negative relationship with these programs (Harrington, et al., 2000; Kitchener, et al., 
2004; N. Miller, Harrington, & Goldstein, 2002; N. Miller, Harrington, Ramsland, et al., 
2002; N. Miller, et al., 2001). I predict that nursing home bed supply will have a negative 
relationship with HCBS spending and utilization.   
 
Home Health Agency Supply 
 More home health agencies in a state may indicate a greater propensity to invest 
in HCBS and has been shown to be a positive predictor of HCBS (Harrington, et al., 
2000; Kitchener, et al., 2004).  I predict that greater home health agency supply will have 
a positive relationship with HCBS spending and utilization. 
 
Average Medicaid Nursing Home Reimbursement Rate  
While reimbursement rates have been shown to affect the supply of nursing home 
beds (Swan, Kitchener, & Harrington, 2009), they do not appear to affect nursing home 
utilization (Grabowski & Gruber, 2007; Swan, et al., 2009). However, higher Medicaid 
reimbursement might divert possible funds away from HCBS. Results from past studies 
are mixed (Harrington, et al., 2000; Kitchener, et al., 2004). Given the finite resources for 
state long-term care, I predict the average reimbursement rate to have a negative effect on 
HCBS spending and utilization. 
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4.4 Methods 
Measures and Data Sources 
Dependent Variables 
 
This study uses twelve dependent variables. The first four analyses (expenditures 
per capita) use HH, waiver,15 PCS, and state total expenditures divided by yearly 
population estimates (to standardize each variable) from the U.S. Census Bureau. Data 
for HCBS expenditures per capita are from Burwell and colleagues that compile data 
from CMS form 64 (Burwell, Srewell, & Eiken, serial reports).16   The next four analyses 
(recipients per capita) use HH, waiver, PCS and state total recipients divided by yearly 
population estimates from the U.S. Census Bureau. The final set of analyses 
(expenditures per recipient) use HH, waiver, PCS, and state total expenditures divided by 
recipients. Data for HCBS recipients come from the University of California San 
Francisco Center for Personal Assistance Services that collect data from CMS form 372 
(Howard, et al., 2011).17 Expenditure data from CMS form 372 are divided by the 
recipient data to create the expenditure per recipient variables. All dependent variable 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 1915(c) waivers serve several populations to avoid institutionalization. Because of this 
study’s interest in Medicaid HCBS since the Olmstead ruling, I keep waivers aggregated 
into one category instead of by individual categories (MR/DD, Aged, Aged/Disabled, 
etc.).  
 
16 I am incredibly thankful to Steve Kaye for sharing his reformatted Form 64 data with 
me. 
 
17 Two forms provide expenditure data.  Form 64 is used by states to claim 
reimbursement for provide care under Medicaid. Form 372 is used to declare cost 
neutrality for HCBS.  
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expenditure data are adjusted to 2008 dollars using the regional medical consumer price 
index (CPI)18. 
 
Political Measures 
The number of Democrats for each chamber was added and divided by the total 
number of seats for the entire legislature to create a percentage of Democratic state 
legislators. Democratic governors are coded as a dichotomous variable (0/1). Party data 
come from the Council of State governments (Book of the States, 1995-2008). The 
percentage of women legislators was calculated in a similar fashion to the percentage of 
Democratic legislators. Data for women legislators are from the Center for American 
Women in Politics at the Eagleton Institute of Politics at Rutgers University (Center for 
American Women and Politics, Archived Fact Sheets, 2012).  I use the state ideology 
measure developed by William Berry and colleagues (1998) as a key independent 
variable for aim 1. This measure varies from year to years allowing for its use in the fixed 
effect models described in more detail below. These data are from Professor Richard 
Fording’s website (Fording, 2012).  Since the debate over the best measure for state 
ideology is ongoing (Berry, Ringquist, Fording, & Hanson, 2007; Brace, Arceneaux, 
Johnson, & Ulbig, 2004, 2007), I run separate analysis using the measure developed by 
Wright and colleagues (1985).  
 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 I use this measure, and not the all items CPI, because the Bureau of Labor Statistics 
uses nursing home and adult day service care in the calculation of medical care CPI.	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Socio-Demographic and Economic Measures 
The population aged over 85, women in the workforce, African-American 
population, Hispanic population19, and poverty variables are all state percentages. Per 
capita income is adjusted to 2008 dollars using the all-items CPI.20 Data for the above 
variables are from the Census Bureau (Small Area Income and Poverty Estimates, 2012; 
The 2012 Statitical Abstract: Earlier Versions (2012)).  Using the Office of Management 
and Budget’s definition of metropolitan counties, I divided the state population located in 
metropolitan counties over total population to create a percent metropolitan variable 
(Metropolitan and Micropolitan, 2012). The FMAP is simply a percentage obtained from 
ASPE (ASPE, 2012). The state unionization variable is a percentage obtained from the 
Bureau of Labor Statistics (Union Affiliation of Employed Wage and Salary Workers by 
State, Annual Averages, 2011).  The percent of the over aged 65 population with a self-
care limitation data are from the American Community Survey kept by the Minnesota 
Population Center (Minnesota Population Center-Home of the IPUMS and other Data 
Projects, 2012). Medicare home health user data were obtained from CMS as counts of 
beneficiaries (Centers of Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) "Medicare and 
Medicaid Statistical Supplement", 2012). I divided these counts over state population (in 
1,000s) to create the variable. Data for the average home health aide wage are from the 
Occupational Employment Statistics Query System housed at the Bureau of Labor 
Statistics (code 31101) (Occupational Employment Statistics Query System, 2012). 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 Hispanic is measured as those who are of Hispanic ethnicity of any race.  
 
20 All CPI measures were used are from the Bureau of Labor statistics: 
http://www.bls.gov/cpi/ 
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Policy and Supply Measures  
State nursing home data were obtained from the Online Survey Certification and 
Reporting (OSCAR) database21 and home health agency data are from the Area Resource 
File (ARF) (Health Resources and Services Administration, 2010). Both of these 
measures are standardized by dividing by state population in 1,000s.22 Nursing home 
reimbursement data were obtained from authors of previous work (Grabowski & Gruber, 
2007) and were adjusted using medical care CPI.  
Table 4.1 presents summary statistics for all variables. As described above, the 
dependent variables are for the first and final years, 1996 and 2008. The first and final 
years for the independent variables are 1995 and 2007. Table 4.1 also provides summary 
statistics for the HCBS recipients per 1000 population and expenditures/recipient 
analyses. The first and final years for the dependent variables are 1999 and 2008, 
respectively. The years 1996 and 2007 are the first and final years for the independent 
variables.  
Data were missing for some years for select independent variables and were 
assumed to be missing at random. I used linear interpolation to address missing data. 
Thus, for each state, I regressed any variable with missing data on years and imputed the 
missing data as appropriate. Appendix A provides more detail concerning what variables 
are missing.   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 I used these data from the serial publication Health, United States from the Centers for 
Disease Control found at: http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/hus.htm 
 
22 The number of nursing homes was divided by state population in thousands. The 
number of home health agency supply was divided by state population in 100,000s due to 
the different scaling needed for the numbers of agencies compared to the numbers of 
beds.	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Empirical Models 
State budgeting processes, even for states that use a biennial budget, usually occur 
in the late spring/early summer for the upcoming fiscal year (Budget Processes in the 
States, 2008).  Because of this, I lag the independent variable data from 1995-2007 to 
predict HCBS expenditures per 1000 state population for years 1996-2008. Likewise, the 
independent variable data from 1998-2006 predict HCBS recipients per 1000 and 
expenditures per recipient.23   
 The first set of analyses examines the effect of the independent variables on 
HCBS expenditures per 1000 state population. Four regressions examine each type of 
HCBS (home health, waiver, and PCS) as well as total state HCBS expenditures. A 
second set of analyses examines HCBS recipients per 1000 state population. Similar to 
the above analyses, I use HH, waiver, PCS, and total recipients per 1000 state population 
for four separate analyses. The final set of analyses examines HCBS expenditures per 
recipient. Again, I analyze all three types of HCBS. 
I explored several model variations. I regressed the models on both logged and 
unlogged forms of the dependent variables and examined the effects of logged, unlogged, 
random, fixed, robust, or not-robust standard errors on the t-tests/z-tests for the key 
independent variables.  For the most part, the robust standard errors were larger than the 
non-robust standard errors. Since the random effects estimator is deemed more efficient 
than the fixed effects estimator, and under the null hypothesis that both models are 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 The one exception is the FMAP variable since it is published so far in advance of its 
year of implementation. For example the FMAP for FY 2012 was announced in 
November 2010.  
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consistent, most of the observed robust standard errors between the two models were 
smaller. Given the presence of heteroskedasdicity, skewed dependent variables, and 
further tests24, all models use fixed effects models of logged dependent variables with 
robust standard errors.   
 
Sample 
State HCBS programs are heterogeneous sample sizes vary by program type. All 
states have Medicaid home health programs. Arizona is excluded from the waiver 
analyses since it has never used a 1915(c) waiver. Vermont is included in the waiver 
analyses up to year 2005, after it which it uses an 1115 waiver. Nebraska is excluded 
from all models since its legislators do not run with a party affiliation. The District of 
Columbia was excluded due its lack of statehood.  Alaska and Hawaii are excluded from 
all of the analyses as the Medicaid nursing home reimbursement rate is unavailable for 
these states for all years. I estimated the following models for home health, PCS, 1915(c) 
waiver, and total HCBS:  
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 
24 Wald tests determining if the state-level, time-varying state-level effects were equal to 
zero (meaning that the models are fully specified and state-specific effects are irrelevant) 
all failed. Usually, the Hausman test (1978) is used to determine using fixed or random 
effects. However, an assumption for using the Hausman test, that one of the estimators is 
efficient, is likely not met.  Furthermore, a small sample may render the Hausman test 
invalid as finite samples may not be deemed positive definite.  I instead used the 
“xtoverid” command in Stata™ to test for fixed versus random effects. This test uses the 
artificial regression described by Arellano (1993) and Wooldridge (2006). This test is 
well-suited for this study since the xtoverid command can be used in heteroskedastic 
models, always produces a non-negative test-statistic, and can be used with small samples 
(Shaffer & Stillman, 2006). 
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Expenditures/1000 population=a + Political Factorst-1 + Socio-Demographic Factors t-1 + 
Economic Factors t-1  + Supply Factors t-1  + Policy Factors t-1  + Eit-1  
 
Recipient/1000 population= a + Political Factorst-1 + Socio-Demographic Factors t-1 + 
Economic Factors t-1  + Supply Factors t-1  + Policy Factors t-1  + Eit-1 
 
Expenditures/recipient= a + Political Factorst-1 + Socio-Demographic Factors t-1 + 
Economic Factors t-1  + Supply Factors t-1  + Policy Factors t-1  + Eit-1 
 
4.5 Results 
Table 4.2 presents the regression output for the spending per capita models. 
Coefficients on interacted variables cannot be interpreted directly from the output 
because one must account for the variables comprising each interacted variable. The 
results from the OLS models are presented to provide an understanding of the effects of 
the independent variables without differencing out the time-invariant state-level effects. 
Models using OLS use robust standard errors and clustering by state and still use dummy 
variables for each year. Table 4.3 provides the marginal effects, calculated at the mean, 
for the variables that have been interacted.25  Like tables 4.2 and 4.3, tables 4.4 and 4.5 
present the results for the recipients per capita models. Thus, tables 4.6 and 4.7 present 
the results for the spending per recipient models. Below, the results are grouped by 
independent variable and denote each effect as it corresponds to the appropriate category 
of dependent variable (spending per capita, recipients per capita, spending per recipient). 
For brevity, I only discuss a few significant effects.  
 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25 The ‘lincom’ command in Stata was used to determine the marginal effects of 
interacted variables at their respective means for the respective sample.   
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Political Factors  
Political factors have an association with Medicaid HCBS, but not necessarily in 
the hypothesized, positive direction. For example, greater state liberalism has a 
significant and positive relationship with PCS spending, while more Democratic 
legislators have a negative relationship with PCS expenditures. In addition more 
Democrats in the legislature are associated with lower home health and total HCBS 
spending per recipient. Governors appear to have a different effect on HCBS. Having a 
Democratic governors is associated with 25.32 percent higher total HCBS per capita 
spending, an 9.63 percentage-point increase and total HCBS recipients per capita, and an 
16.74 percentage-point increase in home health spending per recipient.26 A greater 
percentage of women legislators has a positive relationship with HH spending per capita 
and waiver recipients per capita, but a negative relationship with PCS recipients per 
capita. 
 
Socio-Demographic Factors 
Several socio-demographic variables influence HCBS spending per capita. The 
effects of race and ethnicity differ by HCBS program and breadth (spending and 
recipients per capita) versus depth (spending per recipient). Increasing African American 
populations have a positive and significant association with waiver recipients per capita. 
However, states with a larger percentage of African American populations are associated 
with lower waiver spending per recipient and lower PCS spending per recipient.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26 The Kennedy transformation is used to interpret a dummy independent variable with a 
logged dependent variable. The formula for the transformation is as follows: e^((β)exp(− 
0.5σ2)) 
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State Hispanic populations also influence HCBS expansion. States with greater 
percentages of Hispanic populations have a positive relationship with HH spending per 
capita and HH recipients per capita.27 Only waiver recipients per capita have a negative 
relationship with greater Hispanic populations.  
Differences in a state’s urban/rural composition also influence Medicaid HCBS. 
A more metropolitan population has a negative association with HH spending and 
recipients per capita. Conversely, more metropolitan populations have a positive and 
significant relationship with waiver spending and recipients per capita.  
One final socio-demographic effect of note is the differential effects of Medicare 
home health users. Higher numbers of Medicare home health recipients have a positive 
relationship with HH spending per capita. However, this measures has a negative 
association with PCS spending and recipients per capita.  
 
Economic Factors 
For most models, greater poverty has a positive association with HCBS. Higher 
poverty is a significant, positive predictor for PCS recipients per capita. Poverty is a 
significant and positive predictor for waiver spending per capita and remains so with 
larger African American populations. Additionally, state poverty rate is a positive and 
significant predictor of waiver spending and total spending per recipient.   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27 The effect of a greater population aged over 85 years has a very large, but not 
significant effect in the PCS recipients per capita model. This is due to this variable 
having a limited range meaning a one percentage point increase in a state population over 
85 years old would be significant in magnitude. Furthermore, only a few states have an 
increase near one full percentage point with this measure meaning this effect is due to 
increases in just a few states. 
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Other economic effects of interest include per capita income, more women in the 
workforce, average home health aide wages, and unionized workforce. Per capita income 
has a positive association with waiver and total HCBS recipients per capita.  More 
women in the workforce have a positive relationship with home health spending per 
capita and spending per recipients, but a negative relationship with home heath recipients 
per capita. A higher average home health hourly wage has a negative association with 
home health spending per recipient, but a positive influence on PCS spending per 
recipient. Greater unionization has a negative association with HCBS. A more unionized 
workforce is a negative predictor of waiver and total HCBS recipients per capita as well 
as lower waiver and total HCBS spending per capita.  
 
Supply & Policy Factors 
Supply factors also have a relationship with Medicaid HCBS.  A larger nursing 
home supply has a negative relationship with home health spending per capita and waiver 
recipients per capita. Contrary to these effects, more nursing home beds have a positive 
relationship with HH recipients per capita and waiver spending per recipient.  Greater 
HCBS providers also present mixed results. Larger home health agency supply is linked 
to increased HH spending per capita and PCS spending per recipient, but with lower PCS 
spending per capita and recipients per capita.  
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4.6 Discussion 
Political Factors  
Several factors could account for the differences between Democratic governors 
and more Democratic legislatures. Governors could pursue expansion of HCBS in 
partnership with a legislature regardless of party control. Another explanation may have 
to do with the timing of this analysis, which encompasses the recession of the early 
2000s, and the decline into the “Great Recession” that came later in the same decade. 
Since this analysis measures the effects of the independent variables over time, states that 
were already relying on HCBS more than others might have had Democratic legislatures 
and became less Democratic while perhaps curtailing the growth of HCBS because of 
economic reasons. The best explanation may also be the most obvious: the politics of 
HCBS are not predictably partisan as reported by previous studies. The results indicate 
that the politics of HCBS differ between state legislators and governors with respect to 
party. More Democrats in the legislature do not have the same effect as a Democratic 
governor. However, Democratic governors having different effects than those of more 
Democratic legislatures could be due to chance in the composition of state governments 
during the study time period. The proportion of Democrats in legislatures increased a few 
percentage points, but the number of Democratic governors increased substantially (see 
table 4.1). Democratic governorships and HCBS expansion occurred simultaneously. 
Because of this concurrence, any statistical inference about partisan politics should be 
made with caution. The results show Democratic governors spend more on HCBS and 
have greater utilization, but not across all types of spending and utilization.  Such 
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findings are similar to those found in past studies (Harrington, et al., 2000; Kitchener, et 
al., 2004).  
State liberalism, like partisan politics, fails to convey a consistent story. The 
effect is statistically significant in only one model, PCS spending per capita, meaning the  
results provide only some additional support for the argument that state liberalism is 
associated with more generous health policies (Bradbury & Crain, 2002).  
The results of the analyses using the Wright ideology also provide mixed results. 
The measure was significant and positive for waiver spending per capita and all 
recipients per capita models. However, the measure has a negative and significant 
relationship with PCS spending per recipient (results not shown).  
More women in the legislature has a mixed effect with HCBS programs. The 
positive effect of women in the legislature on waiver recipients and HH spending 
supports the effects of women described in past studies. Yet, the negative effect of more 
women legislators with PCS recipients per capita provides an alternative argument to the 
current understanding of women in state politics (Poggione, 2004).   
 
Socio-Demographic Factors 
 State racial/ethnicity minority populations have distinct effects on HCBS for this 
time period. While larger African American populations are associated with waiver 
recipients per capita, states with more African Americans have lower waiver spending 
per recipient and PCS spending per recipient. As table 4.1 shows, all HCBS spending per 
recipient decreased during this time period. Consequently, these results may not 
necessarily indicate health disparities, but perhaps the inability to expand HCBS breadth 
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(the number of recipients served) and depth (the amount served per recipient) 
simultaneously.  Furthermore, larger Hispanic populations are associated with more home 
health spending and recipients per capita. With the significant caveat that these are state-
level analyses, these results support the finding that Hispanics do not experience 
disparities in access to home health care (Konetzka & Werner, 2009).  
 The differential effects of more metropolitan populations could indicate 
differences of HCBS provision across states. Medicaid home health having a negative 
association with more metropolitan states supports my hypothesis. These findings are 
similar to that of previous work (McAuley, et al., 2004). However, the opposite 
relationship persists with waiver and total HCBS spending per capita as well as waiver 
recipients per capita.  Thus, these findings differ from previous work (Kitchener, et al. 
2004).  Since waiver programs may not be statewide, waivers may be implemented in 
more urban areas, or at least, more metropolitan states.   
The differential effects between state race/ethnicity and state metropolitan 
populations denote differences in HCBS investment according to state demographics. 
For example, this variable has a different association on home health (negative effect) in 
comparison to waiver programs (positive effect). Concurrently, a persistent positive 
relationship persists between home health and greater Hispanic populations. The 
interactions of these variables (percent metropolitan and percent Hispanic) indicate a 
robust relationship. The negative effects of greater metropolitan population on home 
health spending per capita and recipients per capita increase in magnitude and 
significance with increasing Hispanic populations. Likewise with increasing metropolitan 
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populations, the significant, positive effects of greater Hispanic populations in the home 
health models decrease in magnitude (results not shown).  
 Probing state metropolitan variable provides more information concerning the 
interplay between state metropolitan and Hispanic populations. Larger metropolitan 
populations have a strong positive association with waiver spending per capita and 
recipients per capita. A larger state metropolitan population becomes more positive and 
more significant with increasing Hispanic populations (results not shown). However, the 
effect of larger Hispanic populations, on its own, has a negative effect with waiver 
recipients per capita. 
The effects of the interactions above show the following: (1) that states with 
larger Hispanic populations spend more on home health per capita and have more home 
health recipients per capita (2) these effects are tempered by a larger metropolitan 
population, (3) states with larger metropolitan populations spend more on waiver 
spending per capita and have more recipients per capita and these effects increase in 
magnitude with greater Hispanic populations.  Thus, states with increasing Hispanic 
populations may be expanding their HCBS programs more than other states, but states 
with both a higher percentage of metropolitan and Hispanic populations may be 
expanding HCBS at even faster rate than others, for the study time period, ceteris paribus.  
However, these effects may be due to the distribution of HCBS providers. That is, 
the distribution of HCBS providers varying across geographic regions within and 
between states could mask the effects of race/ethnicity. Since state-wideness can be 
waived, waivers may be offered in place of home health meaning that states may have 
augmented their waiver utilization to make up for decreased home health spending. An 
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alternative explanation could be that states purposefully increased waiver spending 
leading to a decline in home health spending.  
 Several socio-demographic factors do not appear to have strong associations with 
HCBS. For example, that an aged sate population or that a higher state elderly population 
with a self-care limitation do not have a greater effect on HCBS could be due to the 
diversity of the population that use these services (Howard, et al., 2011). People with 
developmental disabilities, many of whom use HCBS or are eligible for HCBS, may not 
be counted under any metric for the aged. However, this analysis focuses more on the 
elderly population, as they are the most at risk for being institutionalized for long-term 
care.   
 
Economic Factors 
 The findings support several of the hypothesized relationships of economic 
factors. The proposed relationship of greater per capita income having a positive 
relationship with HCBS is confirmed by the waiver spending per capita and total HCBS 
spending per capita model results. Moreover, more women in the workforce has a robust, 
positive relationship with HCBS. Greater unionization, however, does not have the 
proposed positive direction. While no distinct relationship was predicted, greater poverty 
has a positive relationship with HCBS. The one exception is PCS spending per recipient. 
However, like other factors affecting spending per recipient analyses, this negative effect 
could indicate an inability maintain spending per recipient levels for this time period. 
That the matching rate does not also have a positive relationship with HCBS is surprising 
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clear narrative concerning state economic resources and HCBS given the positive effects 
of affluence (per capita income) and state poverty. 
 The interactions between state poverty and state racial and ethnic minority 
provide some interesting results. That the effects of poverty, for the most part, increase in 
the positive direction with increasing racial/ethnic minorities could indicate fewer 
resources among states with greater minorities. On the other hand, these effects may have 
more to do with geography and provider supply discussed above.  
 
Supply & Policy Factors 
 Supply influences on HCBS are in the expected direction.  The negative 
relationship of nursing home supply, coupled with the positive relationship with HCBS 
provider supply, is not surprising. The Roemer effect appears to be in effect across the 
LTC spectrum (Roemer, 1961). However, the opposite effects of home health agency 
supply on home health and PCS programs could indicate a give-and-take relationship 
between these types of services. Increasing home health agency supply could lead to a 
lower dependence on PCS services, indicating a possible tendency to home health 
investment over PCS.  Alternatively, these effects could simply indicate a greater demand 
for home health over PCS. The similar effects of Medicare home health recipients per 
capita on home health and PCS support this interpretation. Any effects on supply only 
concern breadth and not depth. None of the effects of supply had a significant association 
with spending per recipient. This lack of significance could indicate that supply affects 
HCBS provision at large, but not greater services per recipient.  
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4.7 Limitations 
 The above analyses have several limitations. The vagueness of the Olmstead 
ruling fails to provide a distinct policy shock. States were free to expand their HCBS 
programs under broad guidelines. Consequently, there was no distinct policy shift to 
create a natural experiment preferred in studying panel data.  These are only trend 
analyses. Any relationships are associative and not causal. While I controlled for 
geographic composition of states, there is no viable way to control for urban/rural 
differences within states. Furthermore, this state-level analysis allows for only a state-to-
state comparison, meaning the results denote differences between Florida and Minnesota, 
not Miami and Minneapolis. While I controlled for average home health wage by state, 
differences in the costs of care may not be adequately controlled for within states and 
across geographic areas. Furthermore, waivers are not, as with PCS and HH services, 
used statewide limiting my ability to make the inferences made about these services.  
While assisted living facilities are being used to provide some HCBS, I was not 
able to include a measure in the analysis for two primary reasons. First, assisted living 
facilities are not regulated by the federal government meaning, so no interstate 
examination of these facilities is possible.  What constitutes “assisted living” varies 
widely between states. In addition, no known resources provide a census for assisted 
living facilities in each state for every year in the above analysis. The statistical methods, 
in this case the state fixed effects, difference out these state-specific factors in addition to 
any other state-level effects that cannot be operationalized.   
The analyses do not include lobbying efforts. Lobbying efforts by the nursing 
home industry (or any industry) are not controlled for due to the lack of available data 
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and/or means to operationalize any such effects on HCBS. If a state has a particularly 
strong or weak nursing home lobby across this time period, these influences are 
differenced out with the state fixed effects.  
While sound, the fixed effects analysis also has limitations. Given that time-
invariant characteristics are differenced out of the equation, such variables could not be 
included. For example, there was no way to adequately control for a state being southern 
state since such a characteristics are stable over time. In addition, the limited sample size 
might promote larger standard errors than studies with more years of data and thus larger 
sample sizes.  
 The data present additional limitations. The expenditures data and the 
expenditures per recipient data are from two different sources. Because the recipient data 
are only reported on CMS form 372, which includes expenditure data to demonstrate cost 
neutrality, expenditures from this form were used to create the expenditures per recipient 
variables. In addition, the recipient data is somewhat crude. If a person uses these 
services more than twice a year they will counted as two recipients. 
 
4.8 Conclusion 
In light of the growing need for long-term care, Americans’ preferences to remain 
at home, and the mandate to rebalance state LTC systems in the Olmstead ruling, this 
study sought to understand the political, socio-demographic, economic, policy, and 
supply influences on Medicaid HCBS spending and utilization. While some political 
factors do have a positive association with HCBS expansion, such as Democratic 
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governors, HCBS spending and utilization, unlike other state programs, are not generally 
subject to legislative partisan politics.  
Socio-demographic factors do have distinct associations with HCBS including 
state minority populations, state metropolitan population, and the Medicare home health 
population. Economic factors do not appear to have a clear impact on HCBS. Perhaps the 
economic tumult of the time period, or the overall trends of increases in HCBS may mask 
any distinct economic effects.   The effects of state long-term care infrastructure supply, 
including home health agency and nursing home supply, indicate there may be trade-offs 
between state long-term care programs. These results provide more information to the 
debate concerning state resources and long-term care and state rebalancing efforts. 
Indeed, these results are especially pertinent as states consider provisions in the ACA 
aimed towards specific HCBS programs. Further inquiry, as the ACA is implemented and 
the population ages, will help identify more factors leading to HCBS investment over 
institutional spending.  
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4.9 Tables 4.1-4.7 
 
 Table 4.1 Chapter 4 Summary Statistics  
 1996 2008 
Dependent Variables Mean SD Mean SD 
Home Health 
Expenditures/1000 Population* $11,549.03 $12,976.56 $10,661.45 $15,222.63 
PCS Expenditures/1000 
Population* $17,907.27 $28,081.15 $35,144.59 $38,553.39 
1915(c) Waiver 
Expenditures/1000 Population* $54,812.40 $38,811.01 $120,792.00 $59,642.68 
Total HCBS Expenditures/1000 
Population* $75,863.37 $54,193.53 $149,493.90 $85,860.95 
Independent Variables 1995 2007 
Political Factors     
State Ideology 44.650 12.745 58.335 15.933 
Democratic Legislators (%) 51.393 16.043 53.120 13.998 
Democratic Governor 0.362 0.486 0.574 0.500 
Women Legislators (%) 18.473 8.212 21.365 7.052 
Socio-Demographic Factors     
Over 85 (%) 1.421 0.301 1.874 0.363 
African American Population 
(%) 10.326 9.783 10.926 9.711 
Hispanic Population (%) 5.750 8.230 9.711 10.032 
Metropolitan Population (%) 69.383 20.744 73.701 18.277 
Population with a Self-Care 
Limitation aged over 65 (%) 8.047 2.339 13.245 1.982 
Medicare Home Health Users 
per 1000 population 9.407 7.492 10.044 3.510 
Economic Factors     
Per Capita Income* $31,149.64 $4,387.36 $38,375.39 $5,865.52 
Poverty Rate (%) 13.245 3.755 12.806 3.035 
Female Labor Force 
Participation(%) 57.260 4.795 58.038 4.251 
FMAP (%)** 60.767 8.545 59.920 8.311 
Average Home Health Aide 
Wage* $13.09 $1.39 $10.46 $1.15 
Unionized Workforce (%) 13.355 5.817 12.062 5.053 
Supply Factors and Policy 
Factors     
Nursing Home Beds per 1000 
population 7.122 2.70 6.148 2.162 
Home Health Agencies per 
100000 population 3.476 2.432 3.067 1.58 
Average Medicaid Nursing 
Home Reimbursement Rate* $143.48 $29.92 $152.41 $29.02 
*Adjusted for Consumer Price Index **FMAP is presented for years 1996 and 2008 respectively 
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Dependent Variables  1999 2008 
 Mean SD Mean SD 
Home Health Recipients/1000 
Population 2.52 2.084 2.343 2.094 
PCS Recipients/1000 
Population 2.30 2.068 3.330 2.648 
1915(c) Waiver 
Recipients/1000 Population 3.05 1.750 4.853 2.336 
Total HCBS Recipients/ 1000 
Population 6.690 3.406 9.045 3.727 
Home Health 
Expenditures/Recipient* $4,554.86 $4,442.21 $4,224.82 $4,699.40 
PCS Expenditures/Recipient* $10,056.29 $8,546.60 $9,782.37 $6,444.19 
1915(c) Waiver Expenditures/ 
Recipient* $27,042.39 $12,651.80 $25,066.11 $10,825.85 
Total HCBS 
Expenditures/Recipient* $15,745.31 $6,652.39 $16,759.75 $7,162.62 
Independent Variables 1998 2007 
Political Factors     
State Ideology 49.498 14.200 58.335 15.933 
Democratic Legislatures (%) 51.305 14.970 53.120 13.998 
Democratic Governor 0.298 0.462 0.574 0.500 
Women Legislators (%) 19.726 6.977 21.364 7.052 
Socio-Demographic Factors     
Over 85 (%) 1.544 0.322 1.873 0.363 
African American Population 
(%) 10.583 9.731 10.926 9.711 
Hispanic Population (%) 6.780 8.682 9.711 10.032 
Metropolitan Population (%) 69.621 20.590 73.703 18.277 
Population with a Self-Care 
Limitation aged over 65 (%) 8.899 2.092 13.245 1.982 
Medicare Home Health Users 
per 1000 population 9.636 5.853 10.033 3.510 
Economic Factors     
Per Capita Income* $33,544.06 $5,394.96 $38.375.39 $5,865.52 
Poverty Rate (%) 12.300 2.959 12.806 3.035 
Female Labor Force 
Participation(%) 58.449 4.577 58.038 4.251 
FMAP*** (%) 60.074 8.320 59.920 8.311 
Average Home Health Aide 
Wage* $12.90 $1.17 $10.46 $1.15 
Unionized Workforce (%) 13.832 5.354 12.062 5.052 
Supply and Policy Factors     
Nursing Home Beds per 1000 
population 7.214 2.499 6.148 2.162 
Home Health Agencies per 
100,000 population 3.296 1.982 3.067 1.578 
Average Medicaid Nursing 
Home Reimbursement Rate* $152.09 $31.12 $152.41 $29.02 
*Adjusted for Consume Price Index ***FMAP is presented for years 1999 and 2008 respectively 
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Table 4.2 Spending Per Capita Results 
 Home Health PCS 
 OLS FE OLS FE 
State Ideology -0.0094 -0.0051 0.0081 0.0141 
 (0.0154) (0.0046) (0.0131) (0.0080)* 
Democratic Legislators(%) 0.0191 0.0027 0.0117 -0.0278 
 (0.0106)* (0.0109) (0.0161) (0.0123)** 
Democratic Governor 0.1496 -0.0074 -0.1835 0.0601 
 (0.2136) (0.1098) (0.3764) (0.1534) 
Women Legislators (%) -0.0270 0.0201 0.0052 -0.0118 
 (0.0217) (0.0096)** (0.0348) (0.0135) 
Over 85 Population (%) -0.5719 -0.4309 -0.1731 1.0039 
 (0.6816) (0.6167) (0.9188) (0.7052) 
African American Population 
(%) 
-0.1663 0.1744 0.1663 -0.2392 
 (0.0749)** (0.1732) (0.2992) (0.2133) 
Hispanic Population (%) 0.0047 0.6388 0.3363 -0.0055 
 (0.1416) (0.2081)*** (0.2097) (0.4529) 
Metropolitan Population -0.0347 0.0428 0.0219 -0.0410 
 (0.0132)** (0.0200)** (0.0235) (0.0306) 
African American*Metro 0.0017 -0.0028 -0.0013 0.0001 
 (0.0007)** (0.0015)* (0.0028) (0.0019) 
Hispanic*Metro 0.0010 -0.0069 -0.0029 0.0041 
 (0.0009) (0.0018)*** (0.0015)* (0.0044) 
Population with a Self-Care 
Limitation Aged Over 65 (%) 
0.1216 0.0116 0.3014 0.0230 
 (0.1002) (0.0451) (0.1074)*** (0.0708) 
Medicare Home Health Users 
per 1000 Population  
-0.0022 0.0158 0.0052 -0.0305 
 (0.0146) (0.0040)*** (0.0177) (0.0063)*** 
Per Capita Income 1.66e-06 4.03e-05 0.0002 3.2e-5 
 (0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
Poverty Rate (%) -0.0838 -0.0037 0.7057 -0.0304 
 (0.1300) (0.0907) (0.3627)* (0.1100) 
African American*Poverty 0.0051 0.0008 -0.0120 0.0167 
 (0.0039) (0.0020) (0.0094) (0.0072)** 
Hispanic*Poverty -0.0041 0.0028 -0.0090 -0.0089 
 (0.0054) (0.0052) (0.0076) (0.0045)* 
Female Labor Force 
Participation Rate (%) 
0.0324 0.0567 0.2166 -0.0042 
 (0.0484) (0.0324)* (0.0986)** (0.0406) 
FMAP -0.0237 -0.0730 -0.0654 -0.0221 
 (0.0329) (0.0416)* (0.0657) (0.0306) 
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Average Home Health Aide 
Wage 
 
0.0493 
 
-0.0629 
 
-0.3644 
 
-0.0952 
 (0.1223) (0.0479) (0.2163) (0.1008) 
Unionized Workforce (%) -0.0123 -0.0363 0.0587 0.0149 
 (0.0322) (0.0289) (0.0638) (0.0427) 
Nursing Home Beds per 1000 
Population 
0.1653 -0.1658 -0.2536 0.5300 
 (0.0944)* (0.0760)** (0.2498) (0.3314) 
Home Health Agencies per 
100,000 Population 
0.1633 0.2405 0.2554 -0.3956 
 (0.1299) (0.0870)*** (0.2015) (0.1353)*** 
Average Medicaid Nursing 
Home Reimbursement Rate  
0.0301 -0.0025 0.0092 -0.0050 
 (0.0065)*** (0.0040) (0.0098) (0.0057) 
1995 0.1166 0.1214 0.2858 0.2845 
 (0.2210) (0.2132) (0.3460) (0.1571)* 
1996 -0.0283 0.0285 -0.2155 -0.1126 
 (0.2485) (0.2536) (0.3157) (0.3572) 
1997 -0.1100 -0.0438 -0.4289 -0.1181 
 (0.2896) (0.3338) (0.4120) (0.4169) 
1998 -0.3211 -0.3711 -0.7869 -0.0118 
 (0.3424) (0.4401) (0.6848) (0.6781) 
1999 -0.7995 -0.4688 -1.0386 -0.0494 
 (0.5205) (0.5806) (0.9640) (0.6486) 
2000 -0.2229 -0.2854 0.0761 0.0138 
 (0.3989) (0.4899) (0.6841) (0.4978) 
2001 -0.2906 -0.3806 -0.3071 0.0823 
 (0.4302) (0.5324) (0.8437) (0.4995) 
2002 -0.2756 -0.4006 -0.5263 -0.1150 
 (0.4704) (0.5744) (0.9042) (0.6170) 
2003 -0.2142 -0.5135 -1.1009 -0.3292 
 (0.5060) (0.5837) (0.9674) (0.7400) 
2004 0.0983 -0.6510 -1.4086 -0.1225 
 (0.5687) (0.5549) (1.1361) (0.7340) 
2005 -0.4124 -0.8647 -2.7258 -0.2848 
 (0.7743) (0.6915) (1.3113)** (0.9651) 
2006 -0.3476 -0.9129 -3.0336 -0.4411 
 (0.8245) (0.7496) (1.4503)** (1.0644) 
Constant 4.4896 7.2074 -16.0843 10.0046 
 (4.9081) (3.4334)** (11.7761) (7.5611) 
R2 0.38 0.19 0.46 0.31 
Adjusted R2 0.34 0.14 0.40 0.24 
N 602 602 398 398 
 
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
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Table 4.2 Cont’d. Spending Per Capita Results 
 1915(c) Waiver Total HCBS 
 OLS FE OLS FE 
State Ideology 0.0100 0.0052 0.0069 -0.0013 
 (0.0048)** (0.0032) (0.0063) (0.0047) 
Democratic Legislators(%) 0.0026 -0.0020 0.0053 -0.0150 
 (0.0054) (0.0042) (0.0055) (0.0097) 
Democratic Governor 0.0310 0.0196 0.1406 0.2331 
 (0.0669) (0.0411) (0.1212) (0.1214)* 
Women Legislators (%) -0.0019 0.0004 -0.0216 -0.0019 
 (0.0076) (0.0055) (0.0161) (0.0071) 
Over 85 Population (%) 0.2618 -0.0536 0.2890 0.0077 
 (0.2659) (0.1894) (0.2325) (0.1636) 
African American Population 
(%) 
-0.1164 -0.0580 -0.1231 -0.1273 
 (0.0316)*** (0.0817) (0.0635)* (0.0800) 
Hispanic Population (%) 0.0299 -0.0109 0.1269 -0.0682 
 (0.0571) (0.0805) (0.1154) (0.0869) 
Metropolitan Population 0.0052 0.0153 0.0062 -0.0047 
 (0.0052) (0.0089)* (0.0097) (0.0083) 
African American*Metro 0.0005 0.0017 0.0007 0.0017 
 (0.0003)* (0.0013) (0.0005) (0.0010)* 
Hispanic*Metro -0.0012 -0.0002 -0.0017 0.0017 
 (0.0003)*** (0.0006) (0.0010) (0.0008)** 
Population with a Self-Care 
Limitation Aged Over 65 (%) 
-0.0204 -0.0210 0.1495 0.0171 
 (0.0372) (0.0158) (0.1019) (0.0279) 
Medicare Home Health Users 
per 1000 Population  
0.0021 -0.0017 0.0087 -0.0053 
 (0.0038) (0.0031) (0.0085) (0.0034) 
Per Capita Income 4.01e-5 -1.74e-06 4.43e-5 2.04e-5 
 (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
Poverty Rate (%) 0.0217 -0.0005 0.0229 -0.0443 
 (0.0400) (0.0339) (0.0658) (0.0422) 
African American*Poverty 0.0033 0.0003 0.0033 0.0037 
 (0.0011)*** (0.0014) (0.0023) (0.0019)* 
Hispanic*Poverty 0.0029 -0.0021 -0.0003 -0.0016 
 (0.0023) (0.0015) (0.0028) (0.0024) 
Female Labor Force 
Participation Rate (%) 
0.0164 0.0020 0.0655 -0.0188 
 (0.0168) (0.0121) (0.0243)*** (0.0214) 
FMAP -0.0095 0.0066 -0.0198 0.0432 
 (0.0115) (0.0120) (0.0282) (0.0275) 
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Average Home Health Aide 
Wage 
 
-0.0547 
 
-0.0669 
 
-0.0640 
 
-0.0854 
 (0.0419) (0.0326)** (0.0463) (0.0399)** 
Unionized Workforce (%) -0.0170 -0.0144 0.0282 -0.0524 
 (0.0145) (0.0144) (0.0236) (0.0408) 
Nursing Home Beds per 1000 
Population 
-0.0301 -0.0120 -0.0547 -0.0548 
 (0.0426) (0.0465) (0.0495) (0.0414) 
Home Health Agencies per 
100,000 Population 
0.0419 0.0349 0.1763 -0.0719 
 (0.0408) (0.0389) (0.0792)** (0.0555) 
Average Medicaid Nursing 
Home Reimbursement Rate  
0.0048 0.0023 0.0068 0.0012 
 (0.0019)** (0.0017) (0.0029)** (0.0015) 
1995 0.1573 0.2084 0.0692 0.0995 
 (0.0455)*** (0.0425)*** (0.0511) (0.0597) 
1996 0.2653 0.3466 0.0360 0.2359 
 (0.0672)*** (0.0705)*** (0.0740) (0.0682)*** 
1997 0.3546 0.4475 0.0238 0.2470 
 (0.0928)*** (0.1008)*** (0.1071) (0.1031)** 
1998 0.3948 0.5331 -0.0856 0.2782 
 (0.1265)*** (0.1355)*** (0.1616) (0.1587)* 
1999 0.6697 0.6955 -0.3068 0.1030 
 (0.2216)*** (0.1854)*** (0.3987) (0.3115) 
2000 0.5566 0.6283 0.2155 0.1838 
 (0.1370)*** (0.1640)*** (0.1332) (0.2371) 
2001 0.5885 0.6841 0.2819 0.0889 
 (0.1567)*** (0.1760)*** (0.1602)* (0.3212) 
2002 0.5683 0.7021 0.2456 0.0366 
 (0.1829)*** (0.1901)*** (0.1908) (0.3636) 
2003 0.4779 0.6888 0.1889 -0.0168 
 (0.2113)** (0.1979)*** (0.2336) (0.3957) 
2004 0.4264 0.7618 -0.0136 -0.0432 
 (0.2418)* (0.2120)*** (0.3004) (0.4792) 
2005 0.4855 0.8645 -0.6300 -0.1441 
 (0.3467) (0.2505)*** (0.4628) (0.6088) 
2006 0.4579 0.9008 -0.7061 -0.0985 
 (0.3654) (0.2778)*** (0.4881) (0.5970) 
Constant 8.3481 9.4581 3.9173 11.8272 
 (2.2076)*** (1.6439)*** (2.5583) (1.8667)*** 
R2 0.71 0.74 0.50 0.49 
Adjusted R2 0.69 0.72 0.47 0.46 
N 595 595 611 611 
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01
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Table 4.3 Spending Per Capita Marginal Effects of Controls with Interaction Terms  
HH Expenditures Per Capita Coefficient t P>|t| 
Percent African American -0.021 -0.25 0.804 
Percent Hispanic  0.180 2.02 0.049 
Poverty Rate   0.027 0.36 0.721 
Percent Metro -0.042 -2.76 0.008 
    
PCS Expenditures Per Capita Coefficient t P>|t| 
Percent African American -0.028 -0.16 0.876 
Percent Hispanic 0.179 1.39 0.172 
Poverty Rate 0.049 0.58 0.566 
Percent Metro -0.003 0.58 0.566 
    
1915(c) Waiver Expenditures Per 
Capita Coefficient t P>|t| 
Percent African American 0.069 1.35 0.183 
Percent Hispanic -0.052 -1.24 0.223 
Poverty Rate -0.014 -0.61 0.543 
Percent Metro 0.032 2.63 0.012 
    
Total HCBS Expenditures Per Capita Coefficient t P>|t| 
Percent African American 0.038 0.65 0.516 
Percent Hispanic 0.033 0.69 0.496 
Poverty Rate -0.018 -0.70 0.489 
Percent Metro 0.027 3.07 0.004 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
112	  
Table 4.4 Recipients Per Capita Results 
 Home Health PCS 
 OLS FE OLS FE 
State Ideology -0.0015 0.0007 0.0172 -0.0074 
 (0.0105) (0.0039) (0.0138) (0.0103) 
Democratic 
Legislators(%) 
-0.0053 0.0045 -0.0014 0.0081 
 (0.0076) (0.0057) (0.0161) (0.0101) 
Democratic Governor 0.0357 0.0850 -0.3060 0.0296 
 (0.1093) (0.0504)* (0.1821) (0.0862) 
Women Legislators (%) -0.0005 0.0044 -0.0155 -0.0311 
 (0.0159) (0.0071) (0.0314) (0.0150)** 
Over 85 Population (%) -0.7633 -0.3403 -0.4098 -1.2925 
 (0.3535)** (0.2692) (0.3915) (0.9184) 
African American 
Population (%) 
-0.0720 0.1987 0.6492 0.2801 
 (0.0598) (0.1329) (0.1235)*** (0.2113) 
Hispanic Population (%) -0.3287 0.8749 -0.2614 -0.1839 
 (0.0983)*** (0.1850)*** (0.2035) (0.3214) 
Metropolitan Population -0.0223 0.0506 0.0062 0.0024 
 (0.0096)** (0.0129)*** (0.0165) (0.0331) 
African 
American*Metro 
0.0002 -0.0024 -0.0054 -0.0042 
 (0.0005) (0.0009)** (0.0010)*** (0.0023)* 
Hispanic*Metro 0.0030 -0.0078 0.0031 0.0053 
 (0.0007)*** (0.0019)*** (0.0010)*** (0.0027)* 
Population with a Self-
Care Limitation Aged 
Over 65 (%) 
0.0078 -0.0305 -0.0203 -0.0273 
 (0.0753) (0.0227) (0.1032) (0.0448) 
Medicare Home Health 
Users per 1000 
Population  
0.0134 0.0026 0.0042 -0.0209 
 (0.0079)* (0.0025) (0.0100) (0.0040)*** 
Per Capita Income 4.34e-5 -2.16e-5 -1.29e-5 -2.22e-06 
 (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0000) 
Poverty Rate (%) -0.0033 0.0047 0.4250 0.2500 
 (0.1026) (0.0498) (0.1525)*** (0.0848)*** 
African 
American*Poverty 
0.0037 -0.0006 -0.0154 -0.0004 
 (0.0028) (0.0018) (0.0038)*** (0.0049) 
Hispanic*Poverty 0.0073 -0.0008 0.0028 -0.0014 
 (0.0033)** (0.0021) (0.0081) (0.0035) 
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Female Labor Force 
Participation Rate (%) 
 
-0.0220 
 
-0.0246 
 
0.1484 
 
0.0063 
 (0.0395) (0.0138)* (0.0732)* (0.0369) 
FMAP -0.0055 -0.0263 0.0519 0.0366 
 (0.0225) (0.0156)* (0.0471) (0.0499) 
Average Home Health 
Aide Wage 
0.0699 -0.0463 -0.0634 0.0046 
 (0.0758) (0.0348) (0.0912) (0.0605) 
Unionized Workforce 
(%) 
-0.0591 0.0098 0.1055 0.0003 
 (0.0220)** (0.0163) (0.0259)*** (0.0226) 
Nursing Home Beds per 
1000 Population 
0.2942 0.2245 0.1168 0.0963 
 (0.0720)*** (0.0894)** (0.1638) (0.1977) 
Home Health Agencies 
per 100,000 Population 
-0.1094 0.0860 -0.2555 -0.4122 
 (0.0744) (0.0641) (0.1209)** (0.1428)*** 
Average Medicaid 
Nursing Home 
Reimbursement Rate  
0.0080 0.0005 0.0068 -0.0018 
 (0.0049) (0.0022) (0.0073) (0.0035) 
1998 0.0085 -0.0216 0.2684 0.4273 
 (0.0924) (0.0645) (0.2034) (0.1663)** 
1999 -0.0158 -0.0915 0.5818 0.0278 
 (0.3018) (0.1403) (0.4835) (0.3308) 
2000 0.0394 -0.1623 0.4845 0.1040 
 (0.1505) (0.1371) (0.2059)** (0.3377) 
2001 0.0343 -0.2159 0.6859 0.0245 
 (0.1724) (0.1455) (0.2253)*** (0.3947) 
2002 0.0243 -0.2072 0.7630 0.1116 
 (0.2118) (0.1575) (0.2812)** (0.4356) 
2003 0.0432 -0.2431 0.8069 0.1676 
 (0.2412) (0.1656) (0.3484)** (0.5113) 
2004 0.0905 -0.2651 0.5845 0.1304 
 (0.2933) (0.1907) (0.4145) (0.5749) 
2005 0.0980 -0.1511 0.5009 0.1937 
 (0.4665) (0.2540) (0.6777) (0.6728) 
2006 0.2110 -0.2142 0.5963 0.3140 
 (0.4836) (0.2715) (0.6817) (0.7280) 
Constant 0.7688 -2.2322 -18.5611 -2.7490 
 (4.2009) (2.5167) (9.7389)* (4.0248) 
R2 0.46 0.31 0.63 0.46 
Adjusted R2 0.42 0.26 0.58 0.39 
N 470 470 270 270 
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
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Table 4.4 (Cont’d) Recipients Per Capita Results 
 1915(c) Waiver Total HCBS 
 OLS FE OLS FE 
State Ideology -0.0019 -0.0027 0.0022 0.0007 
 (0.0056) (0.0021) (0.0047) (0.0021) 
Democratic 
Legislators(%) 
-0.0043 0.0005 -0.0061 -0.0014 
 (0.0047) (0.0035) (0.0034)* (0.0032) 
Democratic Governor 0.1161 0.0595 0.1273 0.0923 
 (0.0672)* (0.0317)* (0.0558)** (0.0284)*** 
Women Legislators (%) 0.0182 0.0194 0.0192 0.0071 
 (0.0090)** (0.0054)*** (0.0083)** (0.0054) 
Over 85 Population (%) 0.6618 0.1461 0.2131 0.0509 
 (0.2082)*** (0.1399) (0.1844) (0.1347) 
African American 
Population (%) 
0.0153 0.0171 0.0254 0.0429 
 (0.0455) (0.0799) (0.0393) (0.0837) 
Hispanic Population (%) 0.1132 -0.1750 -0.0932 0.0656 
 (0.0653)* (0.0718)** (0.0435)** (0.0938) 
Metropolitan Population 0.0067 0.0101 -0.0011 0.0163 
 (0.0053) (0.0082) (0.0039) (0.0078)** 
African 
American*Metro 
-0.0005 0.0004 -0.0005 -0.0006 
 (0.0003) (0.0009) (0.0003) (0.0008) 
Hispanic*Metro -0.0009 0.0013 0.0008 0.0001 
 (0.0004)** (0.0007)** (0.0003)*** (0.0007) 
Population with a Self-
Care Limitation Aged 
Over 65 (%) 
0.0407 0.0054 0.0698 -0.0047 
 (0.0393) (0.0074) (0.0350)* (0.0098) 
Medicare Home Health 
Users per 1000 
Population  
-0.0073 0.0011 0.0001 -0.0031 
 (0.0068) (0.0029) (0.0043) (0.0026) 
Per Capita Income 1.38e-5 4.09e-5 3.91e-5 2.56e-5 
 (0.0000) (0.0000)*** (0.0000)** (0.0000)** 
Poverty Rate (%) 0.0975 -0.0181 0.1137 0.0083 
 (0.0522)* (0.0355) (0.0440)** (0.0293) 
African 
American*Poverty 
0.0004 0.0030 -0.0007 0.0023 
 (0.0018) (0.0012)** (0.0014) (0.0013)* 
Hispanic*Poverty -0.0037 0.0002 0.0018 -0.0006 
 (0.0025) (0.0011) (0.0017) (0.0014) 
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Female Labor Force 
Participation Rate (%) 
 
0.0377 
 
0.0160 
 
0.0430 
 
0.0045 
 (0.0198)* (0.0100) (0.0186)** (0.0093) 
FMAP -0.0131 0.0100 0.0034 0.0028 
 (0.0135) (0.0084) (0.0116) (0.0087) 
Average Home Health 
Aide Wage 
-0.0548 -0.0327 -0.0412 -0.0252 
 (0.0416) (0.0179)* (0.0435) (0.0230) 
Unionized Workforce 
(%) 
-0.0061 -0.0346 0.0155 -0.0243 
 (0.0151) (0.0121)*** (0.0130) (0.0090)*** 
Nursing Home Beds per 
1000 Population 
-0.0121 -0.0875 0.0295 0.0548 
 (0.0534) (0.0520)* (0.0462) (0.0633) 
Home Health Agencies 
per 100,000 Population 
0.0260 0.0043 0.0563 -0.0308 
 (0.0559) (0.0291) (0.0465) (0.0329) 
Average Medicaid 
Nursing Home 
Reimbursement Rate  
0.0021 0.0008 0.0016 -0.0008 
 (0.0027) (0.0014) (0.0026) (0.0012) 
1998 0.0916 0.0059 -0.0009 0.0142 
 (0.0453)** (0.0403) (0.0454) (0.0398) 
1999 0.0482 0.0398 -0.0949 -0.0472 
 (0.1499) (0.0717) (0.1255) (0.0827) 
2000 0.1957 0.1022 0.1666 -0.0102 
 (0.0712)*** (0.0654) (0.0658)** (0.0752) 
2001 0.2059 0.1138 0.1930 -0.0193 
 (0.0854)** (0.0774) (0.0747)** (0.0886) 
2002 0.1831 0.1198 0.1820 0.0113 
 (0.1037)* (0.0843) (0.0894)** (0.0973) 
2003 0.1237 0.0838 0.1203 -0.0417 
 (0.1359) (0.0930) (0.1216) (0.1075) 
2004 0.0067 0.0739 -0.0261 -0.0849 
 (0.1750) (0.1019) (0.1584) (0.1198) 
2005 -0.1643 0.0525 -0.3379 -0.1059 
 (0.2886) (0.1249) (0.2472) (0.1438) 
2006 -0.1384 0.0661 -0.3260 -0.1072 
 (0.3033) (0.1443) (0.2604) (0.1663) 
Constant -3.2758 -2.0737 -4.8623 -1.1186 
 (2.2746) (1.4601) (2.0597)** (1.4514) 
R2 0.51 0.66 0.52 0.51 
Adjusted R2 0.48 0.63 0.48 0.47 
N 457 457 470 470 
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01
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Table 4.5 Recipients Per Capita Marginal Effects of Controls with Interaction 
Terms  
Total HH Recipients Per Capita Coefficient t P>|t| 
Percent African American -0.019 -0.21 0.836 
Percent Hispanic 0.300 5.85 0.000 
Poverty Rate -0.008 -0.26 0.798 
Percent Metro -0.043 -2.71 0.009 
    
Total PCS Recipients Per Capita Coefficient t P>|t| 
Percent African American -0.031 -0.26 0.796 
Percent Hispanic 0.185 1.57 0.127 
Poverty Rate 0.232 3.58 0.001 
Percent Metro 0.021 0.63 0.532 
    
Total 1915(c) Waiver Recipients Per 
Capita Coefficient t P>|t| 
Percent African American 0.080 2.03 0.049 
Percent Hispanic -0.080 -2.39 0.021 
Poverty Rate 0.016 0.68 0.501 
Percent Metro 0.026 2.82 0.007 
    
Total Recipients Per Capita  Coefficient t P>|t| 
Percent African American 0.023 0.47 0.643 
Percent Hispanic 0.064 1.64 0.107 
Poverty Rate 0.027 1.46 0.151 
Percent Metro 0.011 1.13 0.263 
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Table 4.6 Spending Per Recipient Results 
 Home Health PCS 
 OLS FE OLS FE 
State Ideology 0.0045 0.0026 -0.0168 0.0067 
 (0.0090) (0.0048) (0.0065)** (0.0046) 
Democratic 
Legislators(%) 
-0.0022 -0.0223 0.0152 0.0008 
 (0.0075) (0.0095)** (0.0063)** (0.0050) 
Democratic Governor 0.1389 0.1589 -0.0895 -0.0766 
 (0.1189) (0.0922)* (0.1282) (0.0546) 
Women Legislators (%) -0.0227 0.0118 0.0002 -0.0077 
 (0.0158) (0.0142) (0.0188) (0.0068) 
Over 85 Population (%) -0.6718 -0.2179 -0.7966 0.8744 
 (0.3315)** (0.5741) (0.3907)* (0.5205) 
African American 
Population (%) 
-0.1490 -0.1306 -0.0710 -0.2027 
 (0.0713)** (0.1949) (0.0880) (0.1526) 
Hispanic Population (%) 0.1363 -0.2195 0.1148 -0.0314 
 (0.1236) (0.2314) (0.0592)* (0.1641) 
Metropolitan Population 0.0017 -0.0173 -0.0293 -0.0044 
 (0.0080) (0.0164) (0.0097)*** (0.0125) 
African 
American*Metro 
0.0006 -0.0002 -0.0003 0.0008 
 (0.0006) (0.0009) (0.0008) (0.0012) 
Hispanic*Metro 0.0000 0.0008 -0.0009 0.0008 
 (0.0008) (0.0020) (0.0004)** (0.0014) 
Population with a Self-
Care Limitation Aged 
Over 65 (%) 
-0.0738 0.0216 0.0459 0.0366 
 (0.0774) (0.0345) (0.0514) (0.0247) 
Medicare Home Health 
Users per 1000 
Population  
-0.0064 0.0051 -0.0045 -0.0019 
 (0.0097) (0.0036) (0.0042) (0.0018) 
Per Capita Income 1.58e-5 -5.71e-5 3.42e-5 2.54e-5 
 (0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
Poverty Rate (%) -0.0634 -0.0429 -0.1765 -0.0210 
 (0.0866) (0.0847) (0.0760)** (0.0649) 
African 
American*Poverty 
0.0072 0.0041 0.0073 -0.0016 
 (0.0030)** (0.0040) (0.0022)*** (0.0032) 
Hispanic*Poverty -0.0074 0.0038 0.0009 -0.0023 
 (0.0045) (0.0037) (0.0021) (0.0025) 
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Female Labor Force 
Participation Rate (%) 
 
 
-0.0106 
 
 
0.0621 
 
 
-0.0468 
 
 
0.0250 
 (0.0389) (0.0286)** (0.0280) (0.0209) 
FMAP 0.0236 -0.0136 -0.0300 -0.0178 
 (0.0227) (0.0182) (0.0265) (0.0168) 
Average Home Health 
Aide Wage 
-0.0475 -0.0893 0.0653 0.0830 
 (0.0695) (0.0509)* (0.0576) (0.0335)** 
Unionized Workforce 
(%) 
-0.0388 0.0045 0.0263 -0.0210 
 (0.0232) (0.0230) (0.0151)* (0.0150) 
Nursing Home Beds per 
1000 Population 
0.2015 -0.0743 0.2367 -0.0219 
 (0.0786)** (0.1824) (0.0884)** (0.1097) 
Home Health Agencies 
per 100,000 Population 
-0.1342 0.0697 -0.0466 0.1063 
 (0.0961) (0.1019) (0.0689) (0.0580)* 
Average Medicaid 
Nursing Home 
Reimbursement Rate  
0.0106 -0.0059 0.0157 0.0013 
 (0.0040)** (0.0046) (0.0038)*** (0.0025) 
1999 0.0398 0.1217 -0.2066 -0.1765 
 (0.0877) (0.1222) (0.1239) (0.0968)* 
2000 0.1673 0.2626 -0.3051 -0.2363 
 (0.2704) (0.2424) (0.1974) (0.1448) 
2001 -0.2116 0.2026 0.0596 -0.1481 
 (0.1438) (0.1922) (0.1646) (0.1294) 
2002 -0.3465 0.2338 0.0442 -0.0668 
 (0.1801)* (0.2075) (0.1770) (0.1527) 
2003 -0.3016 0.2614 0.0003 -0.1514 
 (0.2034) (0.2509) (0.2122) (0.1979) 
2004 -0.3603 0.2951 0.0491 -0.2254 
 (0.2499) (0.2850) (0.2598) (0.2499) 
2005 -0.2140 0.2228 0.3285 -0.2713 
 (0.3019) (0.3236) (0.3506) (0.2726) 
2006 0.0238 0.1044 0.2218 -0.4578 
 (0.4234) (0.4065) (0.4792) (0.3099) 
2007 0.0887 0.2804 0.3412 -0.4733 
 (0.4757) (0.4667) (0.5300) (0.3667) 
Constant 7.8692 13.6254 12.1894 6.5919 
 (3.7090)** (3.8862)*** (4.6685)** (2.5932)** 
R2 0.27 0.17 0.71 0.26 
Adjusted R2 0.22 0.11 0.68 0.16 
N 470 470 270 270 
• p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
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Table 4.6 (Cont’d) Expenditures Per Recipient Results 
 1915(c) Waiver Total HCBS 
 OLS FE OLS FE 
State Ideology 0.0067 0.0028 -0.0001 -0.0005 
 (0.0047) (0.0026) (0.0051) (0.0030) 
Democratic 
Legislators(%) 
0.0081 -0.0037 0.0092 -0.0087 
 (0.0036)** (0.0025) (0.0047)* (0.0042)** 
Democratic Governor -0.0440 -0.0439 0.0111 0.0063 
 (0.0555) (0.0331) (0.0631) (0.0466) 
Women Legislators (%) -0.0180 -0.0029 -0.0166 0.0001 
 (0.0078)** (0.0044) (0.0095)* (0.0061) 
Over 85 Population (%) -0.3389 -0.2989 -0.0422 -0.1688 
 (0.1416)** (0.1230)** (0.1895) (0.1529) 
African American 
Population (%) 
-0.1314 -0.0743 -0.1190 -0.0626 
 (0.0357)*** (0.0556) (0.0408)*** (0.0628) 
Hispanic Population (%) -0.0960 0.0553 0.0433 -0.1875 
 (0.0504)* (0.0806) (0.0553) (0.1047)* 
Metropolitan Population -0.0035 0.0028 0.0046 -0.0146 
 (0.0041) (0.0050) (0.0051) (0.0077)* 
African 
American*Metro 
0.0010 0.0002 0.0008 0.0010 
 (0.0003)*** (0.0005) (0.0003)** (0.0005)** 
Hispanic*Metro -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0010 0.0018 
 (0.0003) (0.0007) (0.0004)*** (0.0008)** 
Population with a Self-
Care Limitation Aged 
Over 65 (%) 
-0.0509 -0.0226 -0.0797 -0.0006 
 (0.0261)* (0.0110)** (0.0360)** (0.0110) 
Medicare Home Health 
Users per 1000 
Population  
0.0075 -0.0032 -0.0042 -0.0001 
 (0.0031)** (0.0011)*** (0.0059) (0.0015) 
Per Capita Income 1.31e-5 -3.76e-06 1.26e-5 1.61e-5 
 (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
Poverty Rate (%) -0.0460 0.0804 -0.0405 0.0342 
 (0.0350) (0.0344)** (0.0392) (0.0342) 
African 
American*Poverty 
0.0029 -0.0008 0.0033 0.0017 
 (0.0014)** (0.0013) (0.0016)** (0.0015) 
Hispanic*Poverty 0.0070 -0.0021 0.0022 -0.0009 
 (0.0017)*** (0.0011)* (0.0019) (0.0013) 
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Female Labor Force 
Participation Rate (%) 
 
-0.0090 
 
0.0233 
 
-0.0103 
 
0.0240 
 (0.0119) (0.0103)** (0.0178) (0.0126)* 
FMAP -0.0040 -0.0010 -0.0021 0.0217 
 (0.0116) (0.0076) (0.0126) (0.0141) 
Average Home Health 
Aide Wage 
0.0305 0.0330 -0.0059 0.0092 
 (0.0303) (0.0181)* (0.0393) (0.0201) 
Unionized Workforce 
(%) 
-0.0092 -0.0150 -0.0142 -0.0354 
 (0.0099) (0.0081)* (0.0127) (0.0158)** 
Nursing Home Beds per 
1000 Population 
-0.0069 0.1071 -0.0215 0.0021 
 (0.0307) (0.0553)* (0.0400) (0.0599) 
Home Health Agencies 
per 100,000 Population 
-0.0293 0.0118 -0.0495 -0.0172 
 (0.0463) (0.0264) (0.0541) (0.0480) 
Average Medicaid 
Nursing Home 
Reimbursement Rate  
0.0028 0.0013 0.0036 0.0007 
 (0.0021) (0.0011) (0.0022) (0.0014) 
1998 0.0219 0.0785 0.0735 0.0540 
 (0.0438) (0.0420)* (0.0529) (0.0423) 
1999 0.2492 0.1393 0.3121 0.1331 
 (0.1155)** (0.0969) (0.1372)** (0.1206) 
2000 0.0843 0.1274 0.0454 0.1521 
 (0.0580) (0.0688)* (0.0764) (0.0998) 
2001 0.1019 0.1637 0.0260 0.1525 
 (0.0698) (0.0940)* (0.1041) (0.1362) 
2002 0.1018 0.1664 0.0268 0.1244 
 (0.0737) (0.1000) (0.1168) (0.1524) 
2003 0.1152 0.1856 0.0076 0.1172 
 (0.0901) (0.1096)* (0.1394) (0.1761) 
2004 0.1331 0.1841 0.0348 0.1095 
 (0.1044) (0.1283) (0.1628) (0.2082) 
2005 0.3160 0.2350 0.3312 0.0837 
 (0.1645)* (0.1700) (0.2202) (0.2465) 
2006 0.2940 0.2804 0.3177 0.1517 
 (0.1676)* (0.1768) (0.2250) (0.2452) 
Constant 11.5098 7.9568 11.0169 8.0010 
 (1.3720)*** (1.3621)*** (2.0343)*** (1.5387)*** 
R2 0.55 0.26 0.44 0.23 
Adjusted R2 0.52 0.20 0.40 0.18 
N 457 457 470 470 
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01
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Table 4.7 Spending Per Recipient Marginal Effects of Controls with 
Interaction Terms 
HH Expenditures Per Recipient Coefficient t P>|t| 
Percent African American -0.096 -0.50 0.619 
Percent Hispanic -0.111 -1.21 0.231 
Poverty Rate 0.034 0.61 0.545 
Percent Metro -0.012 -0.81 0.420 
    
PCS Expenditures Per Recipient Coefficient t P>|t| 
Percent African American -0.161 -1.98 0.058 
Percent Hispanic -0.003 -0.05 0.959 
Poverty Rate -0.057 -1.58 0.125 
Percent Metro 0.010 0.71 0.481 
    
1915(c) Waiver Expenditures Per 
Recipient Coefficient t P>|t| 
Percent African American -0.067 -1.82 0.076 
Percent Hispanic 0.016 0.52 0.604 
Poverty Rate 0.053 1.84 0.073 
Percent Metro 0.006 0.61 0.543 
    
Total HCBS Expenditures Per 
Recipient Coefficient t P>|t| 
Percent African American 0.029 0.62 0.538 
Percent Hispanic -0.069 -1.54 0.131 
Poverty Rate 0.044 1.81 0.077 
Percent Metro 0.011 1.62 0.112 
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Chapter 5: The Impact of 1915(c) Medicaid Waiver Investment on State 
Institutional Long-Term Care Expenditures, 1996-2008 
5.1 Introduction  
Introduction  
Home- and community-based (HCBS) spending has greatly expanded since the 
1999 U.S. Supreme Court Olmstead vs. L.C. ruling that Medicaid long-term care (LTC) 
recipients must be served in the least restrictive setting possible (Howard, Ng, & 
Harrington, 2011; Olsmtead vs LC, 1999). Given this mandate to rebalance state LTC 
systems, 1915(c) waivers28 grew from 687,000 recipients in 1999 to over 1.2 million in 
2008 (Howard, et al., 2011). Similarly, these waiver expenditures, provided to those who 
would be otherwise served in institutions, increased from $9 billion in 1995 to over $30 
billion in 2008 (Burwell, Sredl, & Eiken, 2009).  
This study examines the impact of 1915(c) waiver spending on institutional 
spending29 since the Olmstead ruling. This analysis is especially relevant given the 
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act’s (ACA) promotion of HCBS through its 
Medicaid State Balancing Incentives Program (Carlson & Coffey, 2010; Patient 
Protection and Affordable Care Act, 2010) and the aging population (Vincent & Velkoff, 
2010). 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28 Populations currently served with 1915(c) waivers include the elderly, disabled, 
mentally retarded/developmentally disabled, children, people with HIV/AIDS, or 
traumatic brain injuries/spinal cord injuries. 
 
29 Institutional spending is combined nursing home and Intermediate Care Facilities for 
the Mentally Retarded/Developmentally Disabled (ICFMR/DD)	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5.2 Background  
Benefits Associated with 1915(c) Waivers and Current Cost-Effectiveness HCBS 
Literature 
Several studies show the benefits of HCBS investment, including the avoidance of 
unnecessary nursing home care and better clinical outcomes. HCBS programs have been 
shown to reduce the number of elderly who go without care (Kemper, Weaver, Short, 
Shea, and Kang, 2008) and reduce nursing home use (Mitchell, Salmon, Polivka, & 
Soberon-Ferrer, 2006; Muramatsu & Campbell, 2002; Muramatsu, Hoyem, Yin, & 
Campbell, 2008).  For example, Hahn and colleagues (2011) showed that investment in 
HCBS waiver programs resulted in a reduction in the population of low-needs nursing 
home residents. Elderly in the community experience better clinical outcomes than those 
in a nursing home, including better cognition, reduced incontinence, and reduced 
depression (Marek, et al., 2005). Meanwhile, lower spending on HCBS can lead to higher 
rates of hospitalization, emergency room use, permanent nursing home placement 
(D'souza, James, Szafara, & Fries, 2009), and/or greater likelihood of elderly 
hospitalization (Shugarman, Buttar, Fries, Moore, & Blaum, 2002). In addition, several 
studies show that Americans prefer to receive care in the community (Bayer & Harper, 
2000; Eckert, Morgan, & Swamy, 2004; McAuley & Blieszner, 1985).   
While HCBS investment has several benefits, several studies show that more 
HCBS spending leads to greater public spending (Greene, Lovely, & Ondrich, 1993; 
Kemper, 1988; Weissert, 1985, 1986, 1993; Weissert, Cready, & Pawelak, 1988; Wiener 
& Stevenson, 1998) and that HCBS programs fail to achieve cost savings compared to 
nursing home care (Weissert, 2008). Weissert (1986) argues HCBS programs do not save 
public funds because “they cost extra money simply because it gives more care to more 
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people (p. 480).”Put simply, “if you spend too much, it’s hard to save money” (Weissert, 
1993, p. SS119). Some scholars have identified this phenomenon of increased usage with 
increasing services as the “woodwork effect”, meaning people will come “out of the 
woodwork” to consume services who would not have otherwise (Kane, Kane, & Ladd, 
1998). An examination of The National Channeling Project showed that channeling, 
matching needs of those in need of LTC with the appropriate setting, increases costs. The 
new costs of case management and community services with channeling were not offset 
by savings from preventing nursing home use (Kemper, 1988). Greene and colleagues 
(1993) extend this argument, writing “community service programs require rigorous and 
systematic management of the resource allocation process if they are to achieve their 
potential for efficiency” (p.187).  
However, more recent studies of HCBS have found that these programs lower 
expenditures compared to institutional long-term care. Two studies from the mid-1990s 
concluded that expansion of HCBS programs were cost-effective alternatives to 
institutional long-term care (Alecxih, Lutzky, & Corea, 1998; Scanlon, et al., 1994).  A 
2006 study shows HCBS waivers saved approximately $44,000 per participant in 
comparison to institutional care. Multiplying these savings to all waiver recipients in 
2002 yields an estimated savings ranging from $2 billion to $40 billion (Kitchener, Ng, 
Miller, & Harrington, 2006).  Furthermore, some previous studies have shown that states 
spending more on HCBS programs have experienced lower Medicaid expenditures 
(Kaye, LaPlante, & Harrington, 2009) and nursing home expenditures (Kaye, 2012).30  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30 To be clear, such “savings” here and throughout this chapter represent savings at the 
state level, not at the individual level.  With institutional care, money is being spent for 
the care and housing of an individual, while HCBS are monies spent mostly on care. 
	  135 
Table	  1	  Summary	  Statistics	  	  
This study adds to the ongoing analysis of HCBS programs’ impact on 
institutional spending.  Specifically, I examine how state 1915(c) waiver spending 
impacts institutional LTC expenditures.  I hypothesize that greater waiver investment 
results in lower institutional expenditures while controlling for socio-demographic, 
economic, supply and policy influences. 
 
5.3 Methods 
This state-level analysis, similar to one originally proposed by Grabowski (2006), 
seeks to understand how 1915(c) program expenditures affect Medicaid expenditures. 
What follows is a description of the data and the empirical models, which include a two-
stage, least squares analysis (2SLS).  
 
Measures and Data Sources 
Dependent and Key Independent Variable  
The dependent variable is the sum of state nursing home and ICFMR/DD 
expenditures denoted as total institutional expenditures. The key independent variable is 
1915(c) waiver expenditures. Both the dependent and independent variables are adjusted 
for regional medical consumer price index and divided by state population (in 
thousands).31 In the model, both the dependent and key independent variables are 
transformed using the natural logarithm. Data for these variables are from Burwell and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Thus, these comparisons are to be interpreted as aggregate state dollars saved and not 
money spent on two analogous forms of care. 
31 All CPI measures were used are from the Bureau of Labor statistics: 
http://www.bls.gov/cpi/ 
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colleagues that compile data from CMS form 64 (Burwell, Sredl, & Eiken, Serial 
Reports)32. Table 1 presents summary statistics for all variables. 
 
Instrumental Variables 
Part of this analysis uses 2SLS regression due to possible endogeneity described 
below in further detail. I predict that a political instrument will be the most appropriate. I 
tested state ideology, percentage of Democratic legislators, Democratic governors, and 
percentage of women in the legislature as potential instrumental variables. State ideology 
has proven to be a significant predictor in affecting state policies (Berry, Ringquist, 
Fording, & Hanson, 1998; Erikson, MacKuen, & Stimson, 2002; Erikson, Wright, & 
McIver, 1993; Rom, 1999; Soss, Schram, Vartanian, & O'Brien, 2001). In general, more 
liberal states have adopted more generous welfare and health policies (Bradbury & Crain, 
2002; Rom, 1999). More Democratic legislatures have been found to have a positive 
relationship with public spending (Alt & Lowry, 1994, 2000; Brown, 1995; Dye, 1984; 
Hwang & Gray, 1991; Painter & Bae, 2001).  Similarly, Democratic governors are more 
likely to spend resources on social welfare programs (Adolph, Breunig, & Koski, 2007). 
Women legislators are more likely to serve on committees addressing health and welfare 
in state legislatures (Thomas & Welch, 1991) and to hold more liberal welfare policy 
preferences than the their male colleagues (Poggione, 2004). I use the state liberalism 
measure developed by Berry and colleagues as a possible instrument (Berry, et al., 1998) 
which are provided by Professor Richard Fording’s website (Fording, 2012).  Party data 
are from the serial publications from the Council of State governments (Book of the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32 I am incredibly thankful to Steve Kaye for sharing his reformatted From 64 data with 
me. 
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States, 1995, 1997, 1999, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008).  Data for 
women in state legislatures were obtained from the Center for American Women in 
Politics at the Eagleton Institute of Politics at Rutgers University (Center for American 
Women and Politics, Archived Fact Sheets, 2012). 
 
Control Variables 
 For control variables, I build on Grabowski’s (2006) suggestions to examine long-
term care supply and demand influences and their impact on institutional spending with 
increased HCBS. Demand factors include the aged population (percentage of those aged 
over 85). Supply measures include state economic factors that allow for, or prevent, 
greater Medicaid provision and include per capita income (adjusted for the consumer 
price index), percent metro population, and unemployment rate.  
This study includes additional socio-demographic variables used in previous long-
term care studies including women in the workforce (coded as a percentage), percent 
African-American population, and percent Hispanic population. The analyses also 
include a percent-of-adults-aged-over-65-with-a-self-care limitation measure and 
Medicare home health users per 1000 population variable to control demand. In other 
words, with greater home health users and those with disabilities, a state will experience a 
greater demand for long-term care.  
Additional controls for economic influences in this study include poverty and the 
state Medicaid matching rate (FMAP) to correctly capture a state’s economic condition. 
Additionally, a percent-unionized workforce measure controls for union effects on (1) the 
provision of health care financing to its members/retirees and (2) the effect of certain 
unions (such as nursing unions) possibly shaping political discourse of public health care 
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financing, meaning this measures overlaps with any political influences on HCBS. The 
average home health aide wage is included as a proxy to control for variation in costs of 
health care provision. This measure is also adjusted by the Consumer Price Index. The 
number of home health agencies per 100,000 population and nursing homes beds per 
1000 population control for facility supply. I include the average daily Medicaid nursing 
home reimbursement rate controlling for the effect of nursing home investment. This 
measure was also adjusted by the Consumer Price Index. Finally, I interact the race and 
ethnicity variables on the poverty and metropolitan populations to better understand any 
heterogeneous effects.  
The race/ethnicity, state population over 85 years old, female labor force, 
unemployment and the per capita income data are from US Census Bureau data (The 
2012 Statitical Abstract: Earlier Versions, 2012). In order to test for heterogeneous 
effects of race/ethnicity with state metropolitan populations and state poverty rates, I 
interact each of these variables with each other. Unionization data and home health aide 
wage data were obtained from the Bureau of Labor Statistics (Union Affiliation of 
Employed Wage and Salary Workers by State, Annual Averages, 2011).  The percent of 
the population with a self-care limitation aged over 65 data were obtained from the 
American Community Survey (Home of the IPUMS and other Data Projects, 2012). 
Poverty data are from the U.S. Census Bureau’s Small Area Income and Poverty 
Estimates (Small Area Income and Poverty Estimates, 2012). The federal medical 
assistance percentage (FMAP) data and Medicare home health user data come from CMS 
(ASPE, 2012). In order to create the state metropolitan variable, I used the Office of 
Management and Budget’s definition of metropolitan counties, and divided the state 
population located in metropolitan counties over total population (Metropolitan and 
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Micropolitan,2012). Data for the average home health aide wage came are from the 
Occupational Employment Statistics Query System housed at the Bureau of Labor 
Statistics (code 31101) (Occupational Employment Statistics Query System, 2012). 
State nursing home data were obtained from the Online Survey Certification and 
Reporting (OSCAR) database as reported annually by the CDC ("Health, United States," 
2012) and home health agency data are from the Area Resource File (Health Services and 
Resources Administration, 2010). Medicaid nursing home reimbursement data were 
obtained from the authors of previous work (Grabowski & Gruber, 2007). All missing 
data were assumed to be missing at random. I used linear interpolation to replace all 
missing data. Of the 11,609 possible data points for the independent variables (46 states * 
13 years * 19 independent variables), approximately 10% are missing. Only control 
variables have data missing.  
 
Sample 
 The analyses include all states for years 1995-2008 with a few exceptions. Since 
some data are not available for any years for Alaska and Hawaii, they were excluded. 
Arizona does not have a 1915(c) waiver program. Nebraska does not have partisan 
elections, and Washington, DC, lacks a governorship. These limitations mean that they 
could not be tested for the instrumental variable analysis. The final sample size includes 
45 states for 13 years and Vermont missing two years of data making for a sample size of 
595 for the contemporaneous models and 596 for the lagged models.33 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33 All analyses use the prior year’s control variables to predict the current year’s 
institutional expenditures, meaning the first year of institutional expenditures to be 
analyzed is 1996. Thus, the waiver data for 1995 predict 1996 institutional expenditures. 
Since Vermont used a 1915(c) waver for only 11 years, there are the 11 years of lagged 
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Analytical Approach 
Endogeneity is likely present in the model for two reasons. First, simultaneity is 
present meaning the dependent variable is jointly determined by an independent variable. 
I use several independent/control variables to predict institutional long-term care 
expenditures that can and have been used to predict waiver expenditures (Harrington, 
Carrillo, Wellin, Miller, & LeBlanc, 2000; Kitchener, Carrillo, & Harrington, 2004; 
Miller, Harrington, & Goldstein, 2002; Miller, Harrington, Ramsland, & Goldstein, 
2002).  Consequently, the key independent variable is likely jointly determined with the 
dependent variable, institutional expenditures. In other words, a feedback persists 
between one (but likely several) of the independent and dependent variables.   
Second, omitted variable bias is likely present. That is, there are likely omitted 
independent variables that are correlated with the error term. These omissions bias the 
parameter estimates in the regression. In short, there are controls missing from the model 
that either are not and/or cannot be measured. For example, it would be difficult or 
impossible to “measure” and thus “control for” the strength of a state’s home health or 
nursing home lobbies. These unavoidable omissions indicate a likely bias in parameter 
estimates.  
In order to address the endogeneity problems above, I employ both two-staged 
least squares (2SLS) analysis and a fixed effect analysis to address possible endogeneity 
similar to that used by Baker (1997). If the instrument is uncorrelated with the omitted 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
spending to predict future spending, where there are only 10 years of contemporaneous 
spending to be analyzed. The above explains why there is one additional observation for 
the lagged analyses.  
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variables and with the institutional expenditures, then the 2SLS analysis will produce 
unbiased estimates. The fixed effects estimates will be unbiased if the omitted variables 
are constant over time within states or are constant across states within years (Baker, 
1997). Below I explain reasons for possible endogeneity and justifications for the 
instrumental variable.   
 
Statistical Models 
I estimated eight models. For the first four of the models, all independent variable 
data from 1995-2007 predict institutional expenditures per 1000 state population for 
years 1996-2008. The remaining four models do not lag the key independent variable 
(waiver spending), but do lag the remaining control variables.  
Independent variables were lagged one year34 because many state budgeting 
processes, even many using biennial budgets, occur in the spring-summer for the 
upcoming fiscal year (Budget Processes in the States, 2008). Furthermore, lagging the 
independent variables further addresses simultaneity since lagging separates, at least to 
some extent, the effects of the controls on institutional spending. In other words, a 
previous year’s control variables are not tied to the current year’s spending. I separate 
both lagged and contemporaneous waiver spending since waiver spending from the 
previous year may affect institutional spending (lagged), while budgeted spending for one 
form of Medicaid spending may limit the amounts for other types of spending 
(contemporaneous).  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
34	  The one exception is the FMAP variable since it is published so far in advance of its 
year of implementation. For example the FMAP for FY 2012 was announced in 
November 2010.	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Building on Baker’s approach of presenting both fixed effects (FE) and 2SLS 
(1997), I present these models in addition to the OLS models and two-stage least squares 
model with fixed effects (2SLSFE). While specification tests can be used to determine 
the best model, I do not present these tests as my goal is to present a body of evidence 
and indings, with results from all of the above models, and discuss the relationships 
present in the results.  The OLS and FE models are the following:  
Yit=β0+β1Xit+β2γit+εit 
The terms β0 term represents the constants for each model. The Yit term is the 
dependent variable (institutional long-term care expenditures) for each state “i”  at time 
“t”.  The Xit term is the independent variables for each model (contemporaneous and 
lagged). The γit represents the vector of lagged control variables. The εit term is the error 
for each model. For the FE model, the error term is broken down into µi and υit terms. 
The first of these terms represents the state-specific time-invariant effects that are 
controlled for with the FE analysis. The υit term represents the idiosyncratic error term. 
For the 2SLS and 2SLSFE analyses, I use the Stata ‘ivreg2’ and ‘xtivreg2’ 
commands respectively designed by Baum and colleagues (2010). These commands 
provide tests for weak instruments.  A strong instrument is one that has a strong 
relationship with waiver spending, but not with institutional spending outside of any 
overlap between the two types of spending. The test for weak instruments include an F-
statistic that is reported with these commands along with a range of critical values in 
order to test the null that the instruments are weak (Baum et al., 2010; Stock & Yogo, 
2002). Given my hypothesis that political variables are the most appropriate, I 
experimented with several political variables including state ideology, the percentage of 
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Democrats in the state legislature, the percentage of legislators that are women, and 
Democratic governors. Several tests showed that the state liberalism variable used alone 
tended to be the most appropriate, that is the best choice given these instruments and any 
combination of instruments and the desire to use the same instrument for all models.  
In order to test for endogeneity, I used the ‘endog’ option with the above commands. The 
option performs a test that produces a test similar to the C-statistic, also known as a 
"GMM distance" or "difference-in-Sargan" statistic, with a null hypothesis that the 
specified endogenous regressors can actually be treated as exogenous. The test statistic is 
distributed as chi-squared with degrees of freedom equal to the number of regressors 
tested (Baum et al., 2010). Tests for endogeneity failed to reject the null hypothesis that 
the suspected endogenous variable is exogenous. These results may indicate no 
endogenous relationship, which is improbable. These results more likely indicate a lack 
of evidence of an endogenous relationship with these data.	  Since any a priori 
understanding or theorization of state spending indicates a likely endogenous relationship 
between these two types of expenditures, I present the results for all of models discussed 
above. The statistical models for the 2SLS and 2SLSFE models are the following:	  
 
Y1it=β0+β1Xit +β2δ+εit 
Y2it=β0+β1Y1’it +β2Xit+εit  
The term Y1 is the endogenous independent variable, Meidicaid 1915(c) waiver 
expenditures, for each state “i” at time “t”.  The Y2 term is the dependent variable, 
Medicaid institutional expenditures. The Xit term is the vector of control variables; the δ 
term is the instrument; and the Y1’ is the predicted value of the endogenous variable 
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(waiver expenditures) for the 2SLS analysis. The β0 term is the constant and the εit is the 
error term. For the 2SLSFE model, the error term is again composed of two terms 
described in the FE analysis above. 
 
5.4 Results 
Tables 5.2 and 5.3 present the results from the statistical models. Again, 
“contemporaneous” indicates that the key independent variable is not lagged. Waiver 
expenditures are associated with a positive and significant increase in institutional 
spending over time. Six of the eight models present a positive relationship between 
waiver spending and institutional spending over time. Both of the fixed effects models 
present a significant and positive relationship: a 1-percent change in waiver spending is 
associated with a 0.05-0.08 percent change in institutional spending ceteris paribus. That 
the FE and 2SLS models differ is likely due high variance (which is consistently <0.90, 
results not shown) of the state effects that are not controlled for in the 2SLS analyses. 
Several socio-demographic and economic effects present some interesting results. 
Per capita income is a positive and significant predictor in several models. The 
coefficients for the effect of income on institutional spending are small in magnitude 
given the logged dependent variable and the level nature (that is, not scaled) nature of the 
income variable. To think about these effects in a different way, using the coefficient 
from the lagged 2SLS model (β=0.0000289) a $10,000 increase in state per capita 
income is associated with a 2.89 percentage increase in institutional spending. 
Accounting for the interactions with state poverty and state metropolitan populations, 
greater state Hispanic populations have a negative association with institutional spending. 
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All eight models provide a negative coefficient for this effect and four are negative and 
significant (results not shown).35    
Supply and policy factors seem to be robust predictors of institutional spending. 
Nursing home beds and nursing home reimbursement rates are positive predictors in both 
FE models. However, home health agency supply is not a predictor, positive or negative, 
of institutional spending.  
 
5.5 Discussion  
The results do not support the hypothesis that greater waiver spending is 
associated with lower institutional spending. In fact, the opposite may be true: increased 
waiver spending is associated with greater institutional spending albeit it is only nominal 
given the weak effects. However, other models did not present a statistically significant 
(positive or negative) relationship, indicating that waiver spending has a neutral effect on 
institutional spending. Regardless, these results were unexpected since waiver spending is 
meant to be a cost-neutral alternative to institutional spending.  
Further analyses may explain this positive relationship. A simple analysis 
regressing just institutional expenditures on waiver expenditures show a weak positive 
relationship. In addition, scatter plots examining the first and last years of waiver 
spending and institutional spending show similar orientations of high waiver/low waiver 
spending states versus high institutional/low institutional spending (results not shown). In 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35 The effect of higher female labor force participation is negative and significant in 
several models, but positive and significant in several other models. Omitted variable bias 
(OVB), controlled for with the fixed effect regressions that present positive results, likely 
explains this effect. Given these effects do not present a unidirectional trend across the 
models, the noticeable effect of OVB, and my approach that I do not prioritize one model 
over another, I do not discuss the implications of this finding.   
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other words, states that were high (or low) spenders on institutional spending and/or 
waiver spending tended to remain high (or low) spenders. This relationship is counter to, 
or at least does not support the hypothesized direction of state institutional spending 
shifting to waiver spending.     
However, these results support the argument that HCBS programs do not generate 
cost savings as they provide more care to more people (Weissert, 1986).  Recent trends in 
LTC provision could help further explain the impact of waiver spending on institutional 
spending. More racial and ethnic minorities are using institutional care (Feng, Fennell, 
Tyler, Clark, & Mor, 2011). At the same time, there is increased use of assisted living by 
whites (Akamigbo & Wolinsky, 2007). This could indicate that demand factors do not 
necessarily have an influence on institutional spending (hence the lack of demand effects 
this study) so much as the shifting of previously underserved populations into 
institutional care.  
The results of the socio-demographic and economic variables further the 
discussion of state resources and long-term care consumption. While it is difficult to 
predict how state economic conditions affect Medicaid spending (Kousser, 2002), these 
results show that there is a strong relationship between per capita income and Medicaid 
institutional spending. In addition, greater Hispanic populations have appear to have a 
negative relationship with institutional spending. These results build on the findings of 
Feng and colleagues (2011). While more Hispanics may be using institutional care, these 
results indicate that as Hispanic population increases, states spending on institutional 
long-term care decreases.  
Supply and policy factors are robust predictors of institutional spending. Both 
reimbursement rates and nursing home supply are statistically significant predictors of 
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institutional spending. These findings underscore the effects (or lack thereof) of the 
socio-demographic factors discussed above. Since different populations may now be 
using formal long-term care services, a steady supply of nursing home beds and/or 
growing reimbursement for institutional services occludes any savings to be had with 
increased waiver investment. 
While waiver programs may conserve resources at the individual level (Kitchener, 
et al., 2006), they do not at the state level. Institutional spending seems to increase even 
when holding several demand factors constant. However, the results concerning state 
policy and facility supply, may warrant a reexamination of state reimbursement and/or 
nursing home bed allocation policies as better routes for curtailing long-term care 
spending as new populations are now utilizing the institutional LTC infrastructure. 
 
5.6 Limitations 
 The above analyses have some limitations. The vagueness of the Olmstead ruling 
means that there is no distinct, well-defined policy shock. States were free to expand their 
1915(c) waiver programs under broad guidelines. In addition, all states had a 1915(c) 
waiver program for, and likely prior to, the study period. In short, there was no distinct 
policy shock to create a natural experiment preferred in studying panel data. However, 
the increases in waiver spending, although not instantaneous, provide inter-state and 
inter-termporal variation.  
The models above are only trend analyses. Any relationships are associative and 
not causal. However, the FE and IV analyses control for other explanations of increased 
institutional spending. In addition, more data would be optimal. Given the narrowness of 
the panel (46 states), it would be better to have a panel longer than 13 years. While I 
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controlled for geographic composition of states, there is no way to control for urban/rural 
differences within states. Furthermore, this state-level analysis allows for only a state-to-
state comparison meaning the results denote differences between Florida and Minnesota, 
not Miami and Minneapolis. I controlled for average home health wage by state, but 
differences in the costs of care may not be adequately controlled for within states across 
geographic areas.  
Additional analyses examining transitions from institutional settings to HCBS 
settings would add to the literature on cost savings for state long-term care programs. The 
Money Follows the Person program provides a new avenue for doing such analyses.  
 Although I control for omitted variable bias through FE fixed effects and 2SLS 
analysis, there are still likely effects that are not measured that may have added to the 
analysis. For example, a state’s propensity to invest in HCBS and/or the strength of the 
nursing home lobby potentially could have improved the model, but are either 
unavailable or impossible to be operationalized. 
 
5.7 Conclusion 
 While states’ efforts to reduce their long-term care spending continue, 1915(c) 
waiver spending may not be an effective tool for doing so. This study shows that waiver 
and institutional spending rise together. This simultaneous growth could be due to 
populations that were once served in institutional settings exiting allowing once-
underserved racial and ethnic minorities to access institutional long-term care. 
Concurrently, the LTC institutional infrastructure remains intact providing access to such 
populations. These findings support previous research skeptical of savings from HCBS. 
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This study contributes to the discussion as states continue to rebalance their long-
term care systems. While this study fails to show savings from waiver investment at the 
state level, HCBS are still the preferred setting for LTC by consumers and are associated 
with better clinical outcomes. More analysis of state spending is needed as demand for 
LTC grows with an aging population and as states consider expanding their respective 
HCBS programs under the ACA.
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5.8 Tables 5.1-5.3 
 
Table 5.1 Chapter 5 Summary Statistics 
Contemporaneous Variables Mean SD Mean SD 
Dependent Variable     
Institutional Long-Term Care 
Expenditures/1000 Population* 
$253,321    $114,499 $208,221    $92,715 
Independent Variable     
1915(c) Waiver Expenditures/1000 Population $53,860 $38,768 $120,868 $59,656 
Lagged Variables     
                            1995                                     2007 
Independent Variable     
1915(c) Waiver Expenditures/1000 Population* $48.456 $39,950 $115,121 $59,651 
Control Variables     
State Liberalism 44.745 12.869 58.898 15.628 
Democratic Legislators (%) 51.713 16.068 53.308 14.093 
Democratic Governor 0.369 0.488 0.565 0.501 
Women Legislators (%) 18.488 8.302 21.225 7.064 
Independent Variables     
Socio-Demographic Factors     
Over 85 (%) 1.426 0.302 1.876 0.367 
African American Population (%) 10.486 9.828 11.076 9.762 
Hispanic Population (%) 5.463 8.079 9.278 9.688 
Metropolitan Population (%) 69.994 20.799 73.290 18.257 
Population with a Self-Care Limitation aged 
over 65 (%) 8.075 2.356 13.311 1.950 
Medicare Home Health Users per 1000 
population 9.527 7.529 10.161 3.435 
Economic Factors     
Per Capita Income* $30.784 $4,591 $38,602         $5,922 
Poverty Rate (%) 13.178 3.769 12.778 3.062 
Unemployment Rate (%) 5.163 1.096 4.343 0.948 
Female Labor Force Participation(%) 57.280 4.846 58.141 4.238 
FMAP (%)*** 60.66 8.605 59.78 8.35 
Average Home Health Aide Wage* $12.83 $1.49 $10.42 $1.14 
Unionized Workforce (%) 13.471 5.826 12.113 5.096 
Supply Factors and Policy Factors     
Nursing Home Beds per 1000 population            7.183       2.680        6.226          2.119 
Home Health Agencies per 100,000 population 3.520 2.327 3.104 1.575 
Nursing Home Reimbursement Rate* $140.80     $31.00 $152.16    $29.13 
*Adjusted for Consume Price Index ***FMAP is presented for years 1999 and 2008 respectively 
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Table 5.2 Results from Contemporaneous Analyses n=595 
 Ordinary Least Squares 
(OLS) 
Fixed Effects Regression 
(FE) 
1915(c) Waiver 
Expenditures/1000 Population 
0.039 0.075 
 (0.050) (0.028)** 
Over 85 Population (%) 0.070 -0.075 
 (0.117) (0.076) 
African American Population (%) -0.021 -0.026 
 (0.016) (0.029) 
Hispanic Population (%) -0.063 0.030 
 (0.021)*** (0.024) 
Metropolitan Population -0.003 -0.003 
 (0.003) (0.002) 
African American*Metro 0.000 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000)** 
Hispanic*Metro 0.000 -0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000)* 
Population with a Self-Care 
Limitation Aged Over 65 (%) 
0.007 -0.006 
 (0.015) (0.007) 
Medicare Home Health Users per 
1000 Population  
0.002 -0.000 
 (0.002) (0.001) 
Per Capita Income 2.61e-5 -9.72e-07 
 (0.000)*** (0.000) 
Poverty Rate (%) -0.011 -0.020 
 (0.019) (0.011)* 
African American*Poverty 0.002 0.000 
 (0.001)*** (0.001) 
Hispanic*Poverty 0.003 -0.001 
 (0.001)*** (0.000)* 
Unemployment Rate (%) -0.030 -0.018 
 (0.030) (0.011) 
Female Labor Force Participation 
Rate (%) 
-0.018 0.006 
 (0.010)* (0.003)* 
FMAP 0.004 -0.002 
 (0.005) (0.004) 
Average Home Health Aide Wage -0.015 -0.004 
 (0.018) (0.009) 
Unionized Workforce (%) 0.006 0.007 
 (0.005) (0.005) 
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Nursing Home Beds per 1000 
Population 
0.112 0.040 
 (0.020)*** (0.019)** 
Home Health Agencies per 
100,000 Population 
-0.019 0.007 
 (0.018) (0.012) 
Average Medicaid Nursing Home 
Reimbursement Rate  
0.006 0.003 
 (0.001)*** (0.001)*** 
1995 -0.061 -0.028 
 (0.020)*** (0.017) 
1996 -0.127 -0.080 
 (0.034)*** (0.024)*** 
1997 -0.148 -0.105 
 (0.048)*** (0.032)*** 
1998 -0.205 -0.146 
 (0.057)*** (0.041)*** 
1999 -0.200 -0.151 
 (0.096)** (0.062)** 
2000 -0.182 -0.151 
 (0.060)*** (0.049)*** 
2001 -0.227 -0.140 
 (0.068)*** (0.056)** 
2002 -0.236 -0.119 
 (0.074)*** (0.061)* 
2003 -0.288 -0.129 
 (0.072)*** (0.068)* 
2004 -0.321 -0.134 
 (0.079)*** (0.071)* 
2005 -0.423 -0.175 
 (0.111)*** (0.092)* 
2006 -0.435 -0.183 
 (0.117)*** (0.098)* 
Constant 10.685 11.301 
 (1.281)*** (0.530)*** 
R2 0.84 0.57 
N 595 595 
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
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Table 5.2 (Cont’d.) Results from Contemporaneous Analyses n=595 
 Two-Stage Least Squares 
Regression (2SLS) 
Two-Stage Least Squares 
Regression with Fixed 
Effects (2SLSFE) 
1915(c) Waiver 
Expenditures/1000 Population 
0.006 -0.009 
 (0.072) (0.252) 
Over 85 Population (%) 0.084 -0.081 
 (0.053) (0.056) 
African American Population (%) -0.025 -0.032 
 (0.010)** (0.026) 
Hispanic Population (%) -0.063 0.030 
 (0.010)*** (0.020) 
Metropolitan Population -0.003 -0.002 
 (0.001)** (0.004) 
African American*Metro 0.000 0.001 
 (0.000) (0.001) 
Hispanic*Metro 0.000 -0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000)* 
Population with a Self-Care 
Limitation Aged Over 65 (%) 
0.007 -0.008 
 (0.008) (0.006) 
Medicare Home Health Users per 
1000 Population  
0.002 -0.000 
 (0.001) (0.001) 
Per Capita Income 2.79e-5 -1.68e-06 
 (0.000)*** (0.000) 
Poverty Rate (%) -0.010 -0.018 
 (0.009) (0.009)** 
African American*Poverty 0.002 0.000 
 (0.000)*** (0.000) 
Hispanic*Poverty 0.003 -0.001 
 (0.000)*** (0.001) 
Unemployment Rate (%) -0.029 -0.022 
 (0.013)** (0.015) 
Female Labor Force Participation 
Rate (%) 
-0.017 0.006 
 (0.004)*** (0.003)** 
FMAP 0.004 -0.001 
 (0.002)* (0.003) 
Average Home Health Aide Wage -0.017 -0.009 
 (0.009)* (0.018) 
Unionized Workforce (%) 0.006 0.006 
 (0.002)** (0.006) 
 
Nursing Home Beds per 1000 
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Population  
0.111 
 
0.038 
 (0.008)*** (0.014)*** 
Home Health Agencies per 
100,000 Population 
-0.019 0.011 
 (0.009)** (0.014) 
Average Medicaid Nursing Home 
Reimbursement Rate  
0.006 0.003 
 (0.001)*** (0.001)*** 
1995 -0.057 -0.009 
 (0.039) (0.057) 
1996 -0.119 -0.050 
 (0.044)*** (0.094) 
1997 -0.136 -0.065 
 (0.048)*** (0.120) 
1998 -0.192 -0.098 
 (0.052)*** (0.144) 
1999 -0.180 -0.092 
 (0.071)** (0.178) 
2000 -0.164 -0.091 
 (0.058)*** (0.178) 
2001 -0.210 -0.073 
 (0.059)*** (0.200) 
2002 -0.219 -0.049 
 (0.060)*** (0.210) 
2003 -0.274 -0.062 
 (0.062)*** (0.205) 
2004 -0.309 -0.062 
 (0.060)*** (0.219) 
2005 -0.410 -0.096 
 (0.075)*** (0.240) 
2006 -0.422 -0.099 
 (0.076)*** (0.253) 
Constant 10.921  
 (0.686)***  
R2 0.83 0.55 
N 595 595 
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
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Table 5.3 Results from Lagged Analyses n=596 
 Ordinary Least Squares 
(OLS) 
Fixed Effects Regression 
(FE) 
1915(c) Waiver 
Expenditures/1000 Population 
0.026 0.049 
 (0.046) (0.021)** 
Over 85 Population (%) 0.074 -0.074 
 (0.117) (0.076) 
African American Population (%) -0.021 -0.028 
 (0.016) (0.028) 
Hispanic Population (%) -0.062 0.028 
 (0.021)*** (0.025) 
Metropolitan Population -0.003 -0.003 
 (0.003) (0.002) 
African American*Metro 0.000 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000)** 
Hispanic*Metro 0.000 -0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
Population with a Self-Care 
Limitation Aged Over 65 (%) 
0.006 -0.007 
 (0.015) (0.007) 
Medicare Home Health Users per 
1000 Population  
0.002 -0.000 
 (0.002) (0.001) 
Per Capita Income 2.70e-5 2.96e-08 
 (0.000)*** (0.000) 
Poverty Rate (%) -0.011 -0.019 
 (0.019) (0.011)* 
African American*Poverty 0.002 0.000 
 (0.001)*** (0.001) 
Hispanic*Poverty 0.003 -0.001 
 (0.001)*** (0.000)* 
Unemployment Rate (%) -0.030 -0.019 
 (0.030) (0.011)* 
Female Labor Force Participation 
Rate (%) 
-0.017 0.006 
 (0.010)* (0.003)** 
FMAP 0.004 -0.001 
 (0.005) (0.004) 
Average Home Health Aide Wage -0.016 -0.006 
 (0.018) (0.009) 
Unionized Workforce (%) 0.006 0.006 
 (0.005) (0.005) 
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Nursing Home Beds per 1000 
Population 
0.112 0.038 
 (0.019)*** (0.020)* 
Home Health Agencies per 
100,000 Population 
-0.018 0.007 
 (0.018) (0.012) 
Average Medicaid Nursing Home 
Reimbursement Rate  
0.006 0.003 
 (0.001)*** (0.001)*** 
1995 -0.058 -0.022 
 (0.020)*** (0.016) 
1996 -0.125 -0.075 
 (0.035)*** (0.024)*** 
1997 -0.144 -0.098 
 (0.048)*** (0.032)*** 
1998 -0.202 -0.141 
 (0.059)*** (0.042)*** 
1999 -0.191 -0.141 
 (0.097)* (0.062)** 
2000 -0.178 -0.144 
 (0.061)*** (0.050)*** 
2001 -0.224 -0.134 
 (0.069)*** (0.057)** 
2002 -0.233 -0.113 
 (0.075)*** (0.062)* 
2003 -0.287 -0.127 
 (0.074)*** (0.069)* 
2004 -0.326 -0.131 
 (0.081)*** (0.073)* 
2005 -0.419 -0.167 
 (0.113)*** (0.094)* 
2006 -0.431 -0.174 
 (0.119)*** (0.100)* 
Constant 10.771 11.517 
 (1.263)*** (0.535)*** 
R2 0.83 0.56 
N 596 596 
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
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Table 5.3 (Cont’d.) Results from Lagged Analyses n=596 
 Two-Stage Least Squares 
Regression (2SLS) 
Two-Stage Least Squares 
Regression with Fixed 
Effects (2SLSFE) 
1915(c) Waiver 
Expenditures/1000 Population 
-0.007 0.076 
 (0.058) (0.110) 
Over 85 Population (%) 0.088 -0.070 
 (0.050)* (0.058) 
African American Population (%) -0.025 -0.026 
 (0.010)*** (0.018) 
Hispanic Population (%) -0.062 0.027 
 (0.010)*** (0.021) 
Metropolitan Population -0.003 -0.003 
 (0.001)** (0.002) 
African American*Metro 0.000 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
Hispanic*Metro 0.000 -0.000 
 (0.000)* (0.000) 
Population with a Self-Care 
Limitation Aged Over 65 (%) 
0.006 -0.007 
 (0.008) (0.005) 
Medicare Home Health Users per 
1000 Population  
0.002 -0.000 
 (0.001)* (0.001) 
Per Capita Income 2.89e-5 8.25e-07 
 (0.000)*** (0.000) 
Poverty Rate (%) -0.009 -0.020 
 (0.009) (0.008)** 
African American*Poverty 0.002 -0.000 
 (0.000)*** (0.000) 
Hispanic*Poverty 0.003 -0.001 
 (0.000)*** (0.000)* 
Unemployment Rate (%) -0.028 -0.018 
 (0.013)** (0.009)** 
Female Labor Force Participation 
Rate (%) 
-0.016 0.007 
 (0.004)*** (0.003)** 
FMAP 0.004 -0.000 
 (0.002)* (0.003) 
Average Home Health Aide Wage -0.018 -0.004 
 (0.009)** (0.009) 
Unionized Workforce (%) 0.006 0.007 
 (0.002)** (0.004) 
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Nursing Home Beds per 1000 
Population 
 
0.111 
 
0.039 
 (0.008)*** (0.012)*** 
Home Health Agencies per 
100,000 Population 
-0.018 0.005 
 (0.009)** (0.010) 
Average Medicaid Nursing Home 
Reimbursement Rate  
0.007 0.003 
 (0.000)*** (0.000)*** 
1995 -0.055 -0.027 
 (0.039) (0.030) 
1996 -0.115 -0.088 
 (0.044)*** (0.055) 
1997 -0.130 -0.113 
 (0.048)*** (0.069)* 
1998 -0.186 -0.161 
 (0.053)*** (0.090)* 
1999 -0.169 -0.164 
 (0.070)** (0.103) 
2000 -0.157 -0.169 
 (0.057)*** (0.106) 
2001 -0.204 -0.162 
 (0.059)*** (0.121) 
2002 -0.214 -0.143 
 (0.060)*** (0.127) 
2003 -0.269 -0.157 
 (0.062)*** (0.131) 
2004 -0.311 -0.161 
 (0.061)*** (0.136) 
2005 -0.403 -0.201 
 (0.078)*** (0.154) 
2006 -0.414 -0.209 
 (0.078)*** (0.158) 
Constant 10.988  
 (0.598)***  
R2 0.83 0.56 
N 596 596 
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
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Chapter 6: State Medicaid Officials’ Perceptions of Challenges to HCBS Expansion 
Since Olmstead vs L.C. 
 
6.1 Introduction 
Long-term care services are for people who need assistance with Activities of 
Daily Living (ADL) (e.g. bathing and dressing) and/or Instrumental Activities of Daily 
Living (IADL) (e.g. shopping or housework). Most long-term care is informal, usually 
unpaid care provided by family members and friends (Levine, Halper, Peist, & Gould, 
2010;	  RA Kane, Kane, & Ladd, 1998). Medicaid pays for formal long-term care in two 
settings: institutional care (nursing homes and ICRMR/ICFDD36) and home-and 
community-based services (HCBS). HCBS are services provided to persons who would 
otherwise be served in institutions (Center for Personal Assistance Services, 2012). 
Medicaid is the dominant payer for institutional long-term care stays over six months as 
well as for paid home- and community-based long-term care (Kaye, et al., 2010). 
Approximately 12 million Americans, or 4 percent of the population, need assistance 
with ADLs or IADLs. Since approximately 1.5-1.8 million Americans receive nursing 
home care, roughly 10 million people in the community are in need of long-term care 
services. Half of those needing long-term care in the community are elderly (Kaye, 
Harrington, & LaPlante, 2010). Although seniors are not the only group that uses long-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
36 ICFMR/ICFDD are Intermediate Care Facilities for the Mentally 
Retarded/Developmentally Disabled.  
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term care, demand for such care will grow as the population over 65 will increase from 
44 million in 2010 to 72 million by 2030 (Vincent & Velkoff, 2010).   
As the need for long-long-term care grows, states are moving to “rebalance” their 
long-term care systems.37 In 1988, 90 percent of Medicaid dollars spent on long-term 
care were spent for institutional care (O'Keeffe, et al., 2010). By 2009, however, 
Medicaid HCBS served over 3 million people and accounted for over 40 percent of 
Medicaid long-term care dollars. Despite this growth, over 400,000 people remained on 
wait lists to receive HCBS in 2010 (Howard, Ng, & Harrington, 2011).  
This study uses interviews from state officials to better understand the challenges 
states face to expanding home- and community-based long-term care. I begin by 
describing the origins of Medicaid HCBS and its growth since the 1999 Olmstead ruling. 
I then describe the methods used for qualitative analysis. Finally, I present the findings of 
the qualitative analysis, and conclude with a discussion of the challenges, and the 
unexpected catalysts, to further HCBS investment. 
 
6.2 Background  
In accordance with the 1990 Americans with Disabilities Act, the 1999 Olmstead 
vs. L.C. ruling requires states to serve those needing long-term care in the least restrictive 
setting possible. While the states’ responsibilities to serve recipients in the community 
are “not boundless” they must have a comprehensive plan in place to address Olmstead. 
Waitlists for HCBS are allowed as long as they move at a reasonable pace (Ng & 
Harrington, 2009).  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
37 Rebalancing is shifting money from institutional to HCBS settings.	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HCBS investment has steadily increased. In 2009, HCBS spending accounted for 
44 percent of total long-term care spending up from only 18 percent of total long-term 
Medicaid spending  in 1995 (Eiken, Sredl, Burwell, & Gold 2011).  
Most people needing long-term care prefer to stay in their homes or the least 
restrictive setting (Eckert, Morgan, & Swamy, 2004; RL Kane & Kane, 2001; Reinhard, 
2010). More than seventy percent of Americans over age 45 want to stay in their homes 
as long as possible (Bayer & Harper, 2000) while seventy percent of respondents, in a 
different study, have positive attitudes toward receiving paid in-home care.  Only a small 
minority, 28 percent of those asked, preferred long-term care in a nursing home 
(McAuley & Blieszner, 1985).  
The budgetary impact of HCBS investment is controversial.  Many scholars argue 
that more HCBS spending leads to greater public spending  (Greene, Lovely, & Ondrich, 
1993; Kemper, 1988; Weissert, 1985, 1986, 1993; Weissert, Cready, & Pawelak, 1988) 
and that HCBS programs fail to achieve cost savings compared to nursing home care 
(Weissert, 2008). However, other studies have found HCBS programs to be cost-effective 
alternatives to institutional care (Alecxih, Lutzky, & Corea, 1998; Kitchener, Ng, Miller, 
& Harrington, 2006; Scanlon, et al., 1994).  Furthermore, states that spend more on 
HCBS programs have experienced lower overall Medicaid expenditures (Kaye, LaPlante, 
& Harrington, 2009) and have lower overall spending on long-term care (Kaye, 2012).  
 Since the Olmstead ruling, the federal government has played an active role in 
promoting rebalancing, beginning with the 2001 New Freedom Initiative (NFI) sponsored 
by President George W. Bush. It aimed to remove barriers to live in the community for 
those with disabilities and/or long-term illnesses (New Freedom Initiative, 2003).  
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The 2005 Deficit Reduction Act (DRA) brought new federal investment into 
HCBS, most notably with the Money Follows the Person Program (MFP).  Like its name 
implies, money for Medicaid recipients currently receiving institutional care “follows” 
them as they transition to receiving care in the community. States receive increased 
reimbursement for every person transitioned to the community for the first 12 months 
(Carlson & Coffey, 2010). Currently, forty-three states and the District of Columbia have 
a MFP grant, accounting for just under 12,000 people transitioned to the community from 
institutional settings (Irvin, et al., 2011).  In addition, the DRA authorizes the Medicaid 
HCBS State Plan Benefit (section 1915(i) benefit). This program allows states to provide 
HCBS to beneficiaries who are not enrolled in Medicaid waivers.  Clinical eligibility 
standards are less restrictive than standards used for nursing home services and states are 
not limited to spending maxima for this program (Carlson & Coffey, 2010).   
The 2010 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act further encourages states to 
rebalance their long-term care systems. The State Balancing Incentive Payments 
Program, the community first-choice option, and more investment in the MFP program 
are three pathways for states to increase their Medicaid long-term care spending on 
HCBS (Harrington, Ng, LaPlante, & Kaye, 2012).   
 Despite the mandate to rebalance provided by Olmstead, Americans’ preferences, 
to receive care at home, potential cost savings, and federal efforts to encourage more 
investment in HCBS, many Medicaid recipients are unable to access home- and 
community-based care.  States continue to rely on institutional long-term care as the 
predominant source of care and hundreds of thousands of Medicaid recipients remain on 
waitlists in states across the country for HCBS (Howard, et al., 2011). This study 
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interviews Medicaid officials to both identify challenges and the catalysts to HCBS 
expansion. Understanding state policymakers’ perceptions of HCBS is crucial given the 
Olmstead ruling, the aging population, possible costs savings from HCBS, and the 
ACA’s incentives to expand state HCBS programs.  
In order to identify barriers to HCBS expansion for this study, I draw upon the 
challenges first noted by Kane and colleagues (RA Kane, et al., 1998). They identify 
three categories of obstacles: political, logistical, and philosophical. An example of 
political challenges is opposition from the nursing home lobby to expanding HCBS. 
Logistical barriers include funding issues such as limited state funds to increase HCBS 
spending. Philosophical issues include understanding, or perhaps misunderstanding, that 
HCBS is more expensive than institutional care. Another example of a philosophical 
barrier includes the apprehension that states will be burdened by too many trying to 
access services with increased HCBS. This growth is sometimes referred to as the 
“woodwork effect”, since people will “come out of the woodwork” to access HCBS (RA 
Kane, et al., 1998).   
I developed three similar categories of challenges to greater HCBS investment: 
(1) administrative challenges (such as a predisposition to place Medicaid LTC recipients 
into one setting versus another), (2) socio-economic and economic challenges (e.g. 
funding barriers), and (3) political and policy challenges (e.g. the effects of partisan 
politics on HCBS). I then developed an interview guide to perform semi-structured 
interviews that are described in further detail below.   
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6.3 Methods 
Sample Description and Data Collection 
I conducted eighteen semi-structured interviews with state Medicaid officials in 
2012, each from a different state. I chose state officials as informants in order to 
understand their perception of factors impeding  HCBS expansion. Semi-structured 
interviews were used since they allow for a flexible questioning process (Encyclopedia of 
Social Science Research Methods, 2004).  In order to create a diverse sample, I first 
stratified all 50 states and the District of Columbia by HCBS spending per capita38 for the 
year 2008 to create five quintiles. Then, using a random number generator, I randomly 
sampled within each quintile and emailed the state Medicaid director explaining the study 
and asked for a more appropriate informant if such a person was not the director. All 
interviews were done via telephone, recorded, and later transcribed. Interviews were 
conducted until no new information was presented and there were at least two states 
interviewed from each quintile. I guaranteed each informant confidentiality concerning 
linking their responses to their name, title, and state’s name. Given that many informants 
had very specific titles, I cannot list them here. However, I can list the states included in 
the study: Connecticut, Georgia, Illinois, Iowa, Massachusetts, Michigan, Montana, 
Nevada, New Hampshire, New Mexico, North Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, South 
Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, and Vermont.  
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
38 The sum of spending per capita for the three largest Medicaid HCBS programs (home 
health, 1915(c) waiver, and Personal Care Services) was used to indicate total HCBS 
spending per capita. The year 2008 is the most recent year available with reliable data.  
	  	  
	  
	  
171 
Table	  1	  Summary	  Statistics	  	  
 
Qualitative Data Analysis  
For the qualitative analysis I used the coding technique developed by Hrushcka 
and colleagues (2004). First, I read all eighteen transcripts and developed a codebook. 
Next a second reader39 read a subsample of transcribed interviews and developed a 
separate codebook. Both readers them collaborated to create one codebook, which 
ultimately comprised more than 75 codes. A second sub-sample was randomly selected 
for both readers to code using the new codebook similar to previous studies that have 
used this technique (Jones, et al., 2010; Kanotra, et al., 2007; McMurphy, Shea, Switzer, 
& Turner, 2006). We then calculated reliability which was deemed to be sufficient.40 
Discrepancies that remained between coders were reconciled to reach full consensus. 
After all coding was complete, both readers convened again to agree on the final eight 
themes described below.      
 
6.4 Findings 
Eight total themes emerged from the data. The eight themes fall into four 
categories: states are increasingly using more HCBS, barriers to HCBS expansion, 
catalysts for HCBS expansion, and both barrier and catalyst to HCBS expansion. While 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
39 I am indebted and immensely grateful to my second reader, Tandrea Hilliard, for her 
time, humor, and expertise. 
 
40 The Kappa Coefficient was abnormally high (1.0) because of high overlap between 
what both readers did code and did not code. That is, what was coded and left blank was 
so similar that a “perfect” overall kappa coefficient was achieved. However, where 
insufficient kappa coefficients were calculated for individual codes (<0.6), the readers 
convened to reach full consensus.   
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analysis sought to illuminate barriers to HCBS expansion since the Olmstead ruling, 
several facilitating factors were found in addition to barriers. Below I describe each of the 
eight themes that emerged from the data according to the four categories noted above. 
 
 
States Are Increasingly Using More HCBS  
Theme 1: States Are Carrying Out The Olmstead Ruling While Olmstead mandates 
states to Medicaid recipients in the least restrictive setting possible, states have flexibility 
in carrying out the ruling. While all informants said that their state was carrying out the 
requirements of the Olmstead ruling, several noted that the Olmstead ruling did not play a 
large role in rebalancing because their state was either already heavily invested in HCBS 
at the time of the ruling, or moving towards increased HCBS independent of Olmstead. 
As one official explained, “… prior to Olmstead we were well along the way to making 
sure that there was a community option for anyone who wanted it.”  While some states 
are spending less on HCBS per capita than others, all informants said that their state was 
moving forward with carrying out the requirements of the Olmstead ruling.  
In line with Olmstead, respondents reported moving away from an institutional 
bias, by explaining the placement is usually based on the level of care needed and/or 
choice of the recipient. As one informant put it: “We do everything we can to place them 
in the setting of their choice.”  Another expanded on a growing trend of keeping 
recipients in the community:  
 
“The only trend [for Medicaid LTC recipient placement] that exists is non-
institutional.  Now, our system has lots of options, and the choices are driven by 
the client.  Not us.  So we try and educate them on where the best place is for 
them to get their needs met and then really try and advocate for non-institutional 
settings.” 
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Theme 2: Seniors Are Increasingly Using HCBS Many informants (12 out of 18) spoke 
about seniors using HCBS, and not just younger populations, such as the MR/DD41 
population. As  a state Medicaid official from a southern state said: 
 
 “We have a large chunk of elderly people, very old people, which is really cool, 
who are still saying, ‘You know what?  I don’t want to die in a nursing home and 
yeah, I’ll take advantage of this opportunity and try and make it work in the 
community.’  So we have a surprising amount of older people in community 
settings.”  
 
 The respondents identified three drivers to explain the increased use of HCBS: 
growing demand from seniors for home-and community-based LTC options,  increasing 
awareness by recipients and their families to provide this care and, advocacy groups that 
influence state HCBS (described below in theme 8). The aging population will continue 
to drive demand for long-term care. As one official said: “… There’s been more of a need 
for the home and community-based service option because the population has become 
older, and because they have expressed an interest in non-institutional options.” In 
addition, Medicaid officials believe that LTC recipients and their families have a growing 
awareness of these services from word-of-mouth, and state action to increase awareness 
of HCBS. One informant said: 
 “Well, as far as our programs, we run a pretty ongoing campaign of awareness 
with nursing homes and all of our other provider entities.  The folks that we work 
with, they know that this is something that we do ongoingly,[sic]  and we promote 
it.  Then we provide a lot of awareness about it...” 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
41 MR/DD refers to people that are developmentally or intellectually disabled. These 
persons used to be referred to as mentally retarded. 
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Barriers to HCBS Expansion 
Theme 3: Decreased Funding by State and Federal Governments Reduce HCBS   
Since states have discretion concerning the scope of HCBS, these programs are 
particularly vulnerable to a state’s economic circumstances. The economic downturn of 
the late 2000s and early 2010s decreased state revenues, forcing many states to cut 
spending. Almost every informant spoke about budget cuts (16 out of 18) and how they 
impede the growth of HCBS.  As one official put it: 
 
“Let’s face it.  I don’t think there is a state in this union that is not feeling the 
economic crunch.  We fell woefully short as a state last year in our budget.  We 
had to do some cutting.  Every agency in our state did, and we were no different.  
So, it’s just always going to be resources.  Where does the money come from?  If 
you don’t have any new revenue coming in, it’s hard to spend money that you 
don’t have.” 
 
While the recent recession has not stopped HCBS investment, it makes it more difficult 
for states to provide these services and maintain the pace of HCBS expansion as 
alternatives to institutional care. Speaking to this point, a Medicaid official from a 
southern state said: “And the funding for home- and community-based services continues 
to increase.  The last few years have been challenging for all states, and we’ve tried very 
hard not to lose ground in home care.” 
 Decreased funding from the federal government also limits states’ capacities to 
expand HCBS. While a higher Medicaid matching rate can help expand Medicaid HCBS 
(described in theme 7), having a lower matching rate can affect Medicaid programs 
negatively since states are receiving less money from the federal government. Again, the 
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discretionary nature of HCBS indicates a potential susceptibility to economic pressures.  
As one respondent said: “Primarily I would say that the challenges are related to funding 
for the state match.  At this point, our state is still struggling economically, and any 
challenges that arise, for the most part, are based on simply the state match funding 
available.” 
 
Theme 4: HCBS Affected by Bureaucratic Requirements of Federal Government  
Most informants (12 out of 18) spoke about federal bureaucracy as an impediment 
to HCBS expansion. These barriers fall into three categories: those related to quality and 
cost reporting, impediments concerning eligibility for Medicaid long-term care, and those 
concerning too much oversight and/or a lack of flexibility in delivering HCBS.   
Because the federal government in every state pays for at least half of all 
Medicaid spending, states are required to report cost and quality of care data. State 
officials, however, believe that the requirements can inhibit HCBS expansion.  As one 
explained: 
 
“However, there’s the conflicting initiative underway associated with 
inappropriate Medicaid payments – something being pushed by the White House, 
the GAO, and everybody else – to eliminate improper payments in Medicaid, and 
the way that they’re going about doing that is really taking a hard look at state 
Medicaid policies associated with HCBS and holding these providers to standards 
on … billing standards, that are more appropriate to acute medical care.  And 
these providers, in general, are not as sophisticated as your general hospital would 
be, or your HMO would be, or etc.  So, oftentimes there are findings.  There’s 
audit findings, there are recoupments, and a lot of that creates havoc in the 
provider community because they don’t have the systems.  We basically give 
them billing systems.  We give them free billing systems.  And they just don’t 
have the sophistication to bill in a manner that auditors, at both the federal and 
state level, demand that they perform at in terms of documentation of medical 
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necessity, and etc., and notations in medical records.  They’re learning, but it’s a 
huge learning curve for a lot of those community-based providers.  And often 
times like I said, these initiatives on improper payments throw a wet blanket over 
the state’s other interest to expand home- and community-based care.”  
  
 Some respondents noted frustration (4 out of 18) about specific guidelines or rules 
concerning HCBS eligibility.  Many said that more HCBS could be provided with less 
restrictive or amended eligibility requirements. One official put it this way: “You have a 
NF [nursing facility] level of care in order to access a home- and community-based 
waiver instead of giving things more flexibility in creating programs and utilization 
criteria that help you get the biggest bang for your buck.”  
 Several state Medicaid officials posited that federal government imposed too 
much oversight leading, eroding state flexibility to administer HCBS. Not surprisingly, 
the state officials said that they would like more flexibility. An informant from a western 
state said: 
“They’re [the federal government] just kind of like this big brother, always 
looking over you and kind of not having… you’re always having to comply with 
them.  And then, I think if I was employed by the feds, I think I would see it 
differently because the feds are paying 63 cents of every dollar and it just happens 
to be that these programs are administered out in the states.  So, I think, it just 
feels like the big brother looking over you, telling you what you can and cannot 
do, and I think we prefer more freedom.” 
 
Greater flexibility would give states more independence to shape their state Medicaid 
programs. Building on this point, one informant alluded to stifling of creativity: 
“For a long time, it really was sort of convention community-based waivers.  Our 
biggest challenge has been trying to figure out how we can use waiver programs 
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in ways that might be not quite what CMS has always viewed waivers to be.  A 
little less vanilla – a little more creative.”   
 
Theme 5: The Expansion of HCBS Influenced by Non-Monetary Resources   
Respondents spoke about the non-financial factors that inhibit HCBS investment. 
These barriers fall into three areas: (1) the composition of a state’s current long-term care 
infrastructure and workforce, (2) the influences of LTC infrastructure investment, and (3) 
state demographics. Given this breadth of this theme, I describe each of these areas 
separately in further detail below.    
 
Composition of State’s Long-Term Care Infrastructure and Workforce 
Perceived barriers related to the composition of a state’s LTC infrastructure 
include imbalanced long-term care systems and a lack of adequate housing resources in 
states to provide HCBS care.  While HCBS investment has grown significantly over the 
last decade, an institutional long-term care infrastructure remains in place. Many 
interviewees (9 out of 18) spoke to an oversupply of beds.  As one put it:  “We have more 
than enough nursing facilities right now.  As a matter of fact, our occupancy rate I believe 
is somewhere hovering around about 60–61% of nursing facilities filled.  We have empty 
nursing facility beds in this state.” In contrast, state officials described HCBS 
infrastructure as presently inadequate or predict that it will no longer be adequate for 
coming increases.  One said: 
 
“…We do track occupancy rates in nursing homes for the Medicaid population, 
and we believe we’re at about an 80% occupancy rate in nursing facilities in terms 
of serving people who are Medicaid eligible, and we do believe that there is 
ample supply on the institutional side.  On the community side, I think we would 
believe we have steps that we have to make in order to serve this population and 
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we’ve engaged– if I can expand my answer just a little bit – We’re participating in 
a Money Follows the Person federal demonstration project and began our 
transitions in 2009 under that program.  And we are trying to take some of the 
lessons we’ve learned in terms of transitioning people out of nursing facilities to 
really inform future development on our home- and community-based services 
side.  Some of our waivers are old and need some retooling, so we’re trying to 
learn lessons from MFP of doing that.” 
And while a state’s infrastructure may presently be adequate, states will need to expand 
HCBS in anticipation of future demand for LTC. One informant noted: 
“ … this huge growth area is just starting to hit our system.  What happens when 
they start coming in in real force?  Are we going to have 20 more assisted living 
facilities?  Are we going to have enough adult foster homes?  Are we going to 
have enough in-home workers to meet that increased demand?  That’s my only 
concern, is the future – not today.” 
 
Inadequate housing resources (meaning Medicaid recipients do not have housing or 
access to programs that provide suitable housing) preclude community placement for 
many Medicaid recipients that qualify for HCBS. Thus, a lack of housing resources was 
often cited (8/18) as a barrier to greater HCBS provision. Speaking to challenges to 
HCBS expansion, an official from a Midwestern state said: 
“Probably not enough housing options for people that want to live in a 
community, and I don’t think we have done enough to provide options for 
dementia care.  You know, if you have dementia and need around the clock 
supervision to keep you safe, chances are you’re going to get that in a nursing 
home if your family can’t provide it…” 
 
 Interviewees also spoke about concerns with their long-term care workforce. Like 
the physical long-term care infrastructure concerns described above, many said (16 out of 
18) that the workforce was either presently inadequate or will be inadequate as the 
population ages. One Medicaid official said:  
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“No, we are actively working on trying to develop a better trained, a better-
equipped workforce.  That’s one of those areas I feel with regard to that 
infrastructure that we have to address.  Do we have individuals who are out there 
in provider… provider groups who are suppliers who are in the communities 
working?  Yes.  Do I think we have enough of them?  The answer would be no.  
Do I think we have individuals that are well trained and qualified?  That would be 
yes and no.  I think we have some really good providers out there who have been 
in the business for a number of years. I think we have a number of individuals 
who are kind of cropping up overnight and just want to get into the business 
because they think it would be great money.  And I think that we’re going to have 
to go a long way in assuring that there’s quality in that particular area in 
addressing the needs of… of safety and security for the individuals that we place 
out in the community.” 
  
 Almost half of the informants (8 out of 18) spoke to inadequate education 
resources for training a long-term care workforce. “I think there certainly is a need for 
continued training opportunities and having a workforce that is well trained.  I think that 
definitely is an issue, and I think that, again, that’s another area where we need to 
continue to work…” said one informant about the trend of inadequate education 
resources.    
Influences of States Long-Term Care Infrastructure and Provision 
  Interviewees (11 out of 18) spoke about two primary drivers of state LTC 
infrastructure/provision of services investment: payer mix and demand. The 
predominance of Medicaid as a payer for long-term care affects what services states 
offer. One Medicaid official said: 
“It’s predominantly Medicaid reimbursement that drives decision making in the 
marketplace.  There are a few – and a very few – non-Medicaid self-paid 
providers out there, whether you’re talking about personal care services, home 
health services, or other home- and community-based services.  But they are very 
limited in number, and so the majority of these providers are predominantly or 
wholly Medicaid providers.  And so, it’s really the reimbursement levels, the 
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availability of funds that we have in our programs for home- and community-
based care that drives investment.”  
 
Not just a shortage of funds (described in theme 3), but also how funds are provided can 
limit the breadth of LTC services. Speaking to this, an informant said: ”Well, certainly 
economics. Even the rate structure of various programs influences the availability of 
services where… Where a service is not, from the provider’s perspective, economically 
viable to provide, there’ll of course be a shortage of that service type.” 
 Given that states must expand HCBS because of the Olmstead ruling and that 
many are proactively increasing awareness, by educating Medicaid recipients and their 
families about home- and community-based options, demand for HCBS long-term care 
continues to increase. Demand exceeds supply of HCBS resources in many states and one 
official mentioned waitlists to receive HCBS. Another spoke about how demand 
influences HCBS supply by saying: “So, in long-term supports and services, what 
influences the building of additional service capacity is the demand for those services for 
people who choose not to be in nursing homes but choose to be in a community.” Any 
woodwork effect due to Olmstead was not a persistent theme across respondents. Some 
informants (6 out of 18) did speak of the increased demand for HCBS due to Olmstead, 
and indeed, one even called this increased demand the ‘woodwork effect’:  “And so the 
Olmstead decision created opportunities for receiving services that you actually want and 
bring people out of the woodwork, that’s the term we use in the field.” However, just as 
many (7 out of 18) officials spoke of different sources of demand independent of 
Olmstead. For example: 
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“I don’t think that the [Olmstead] decision per se is the real driver.  I think it’s 
actually more of an existing awareness of what consumers’ options are and a 
continued sort of a steady push for the state to refocus its finances away from 
institutional and toward community.  But I don’t think it’s a driver in terms of 
people seeking Medicaid services generally.”  
 
State Demographics 
 State geographic composition and aging populations are strong influences on state 
long-term care systems. Many informants (11 out of 18) spoke to the rural/urban divide 
as a barrier to providing more HCBS and the disparate infrastructure and workforce 
training resources in rural areas. In regards to a lack of adequate resources in rural areas, 
a respondent from an western state said:  
“Well, I’ll speak to just one thing particular to the waiver.  We have a huge 
portion of our state that is frontier…or very rural folks.  They still are eligible and 
want to access the waiver services, but the amount of resources or options 
available are much more limited than in our few urban areas.  So, sometimes 
there’s a shift in people in order to be able to go to where the services are 
available.” 
Thus, even when people are eligible for these services, it can be difficult to serve them 
given where they live in relation to HCBS resources. Geographic barriers also affect 
training of the HCBS workforce. As one state official said: 
“In different regions, certain services are harder to provide in certain parts of the 
states, certain professionals are hard to find or recruit and retain like nurses, 
speech occupational therapists.  They’re more available in urban areas than in 
rural areas or the rate that we pay them can sometimes make it hard for programs 
to get them.” 
The same official said the following about workforce issues:  
“the amount of professional services that are available in all parts of the state are, 
like we said, they’re limited geographically oftentimes by who’s out there.  Some 
of that’s not even a function of how much you pay them.  There’s some parts of 
our state where you can’t pay people enough to move there…” 
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 Interviewees spoke about the aging population and how it will affect the demand  
for HCBS. “But one thing that concerns me is the aging demographic and whether that 
infrastructure is going to be able to adapt to meet that growing need”, said one informant 
concerning demographic changes. Like the increase in demand explained above, state 
officials indicated that the demand is independent of Olmstead. For example, “This state 
is an aging state. So, in the sense that we have an aging population, that has a potential to 
really increase the demand for long-term care over time, but that’s not related to 
Olmstead.” Another supports this point by saying, “Oh. I do think that the demographics 
will continue to put pressure on us to expand home-based options.  I guess, yeah, and that 
just will continue, whether Olmstead is there or not.” 
 
Catalysts to HCBS Expansion 
Theme 6: State HCBS Programs Enjoy Political Support.  Medicaid HCBS programs 
enjoy considerable political support. Many informants noted that Medicaid HCBS is not a 
partisan issue and that state legislators strongly support Medicaid HCBS. Additionally, 
governors often favor these programs or, at worst, are neutral towards HCBS. Finally, no 
respondents identified political resistance to providing non-medical services with these 
programs.     
Almost every informant (17 out of 18) said that HCBS is not a partisan issue. 
Many reasons explain this lack of partisanship. Several said the HCBS are not subject to 
partisanship because legislators want to save money and/or avoid institutionalization. As 
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one respondent put it: "basically, it’s not a partisan issue because both Republicans and 
Democrats want to see people outside of nursing facilities and it saves money." Another 
added: "[Legislators on] the money committees, I think, understand the importance and 
the cost-effectiveness of HCBS care, and so they’ve been supportive."  
Interviewees reported that state legislators strongly support HCBS.  Reasons for 
this support include the presumed cost savings and deservingness of HCBS populations, 
as well as legislators, in some states, having a family or personal connection to 
constituents that use HCBS. In regards to this personal connection, one official put it this 
way: “They know these people and they know the families.  These are rural farming 
communities where people have had some pretty severe accidents or issues and are using 
services that we provide.  So, we’re not a big state and a lot of times everybody knows 
everybody in these small communities.”  
 Another example of support for HCBS from state legislatures comes in the form 
of legislative champions, who know HCBS recipients or their families. As one 
interviewee said, "I think like any state, [we] have key legislators that are more sensitive 
and more supportive.  So, there are some legislators that are especially champions of 
home- and community-based services and tend to be more in the forefront of legislative 
activities." These champions come from both parties: ”These tend to be Democrat female 
legislators...but they have really kind of been proponents for home- and community-
based services." Another added: "He’s a very conservative Republican, military guy, a 
very conservative Republican, but he’s also a reasonable and kindhearted person and he’s 
been concerned about not having enough access in the community for people [in need of 
long-term care].”   
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  Informants spoke of the support and/or interest of governors for HCBS.  None 
spoke about governors actively working against HCBS expansion.  However, their 
interest in HCBS varies. One interviewee put it this way:  
“I will tell you that our former governor was a staunch proponent of home- and 
community-based services.  It was something that was on his radar.  It was 
something that he would stand up any chance he got to support proponents that 
would enhance, not only home- and community-based services, but any long-term 
care services or services for the elderly.  It has not been a priority, again, for this 
current governor, and, again, she has a different agenda.” 
 
Heterogeneity between governors is not surprising. However, some informants noted 
continuity of HCBS expansion from governor to governor. As one said: 
 
“I mean, he [the former governor] championed the legislation.  This was his call 
for transformation and it was very much a part of what he wanted to accomplish 
in his last term, and did.  And interestingly enough, although we’ve now changed 
parties and have a governor, we still have a governor who is very supportive of 
home and community-based services.” 
  
 Medicaid HCBS provides many services that are not explicitly medical care (e.g. 
home modifications), but no officials perceived this being a barrier to HCBS expansion.  
When asked about possible opposition, respondents explained this lack of resistance is 
due to delivering care in the most appropriate setting, keeping recipients out of 
institutions, and possible cost savings associated with HCBS. From the perspective of the 
appropriate setting for care, one respondent noted: ”They [non-medical services] don’t 
affect cost neutrality, and certainly a wheelchair ramp or some minor modifications can 
really make a big difference in a person’s life that can keep them at home.” Addressing 
both cost-savings and the avoidance of institutionalization, one official said: “It is what 
we find that people need in order to live successfully out of an institution.  And I think 
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probably the reason there’s been no public, general public, opposition or attention to it is 
because it’s more cost-effective for us to support people in the community versus an 
institution.”  
 
Theme 7: Increased Funding Helps Expand HCBS All informants said that increased 
federal financial support allows for greater HCBS investment including a greater Federal 
Medical Assistance Percentage (FMAP, otherwise known as the “matching rate”) or 
specific programs that provide a higher FMAP. Such programs include the Money 
Follows the Person program and the State Balancing Incentive Program in the ACA. 
Speaking about the matching rate one interviewee said: “…in our state the federal match 
rate is roughly two-thirds of the cost of these services.  So we would either serve a much 
smaller population or provide a much lower level of services if we didn’t have the federal 
dollars to bring to bear in the provision of these services.“  Some respondents spoke 
about the support from the temporary, increased, matching rates provided under the 2009 
American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA).  As one succinctly put it: ”The 
ARRA funds were helpful, but the problem with ARRA was they came and then they 
went away, and there was nothing to sustain them.” In regards to the increased matching 
rates in the Money Follows the Person Program and the State Balancing Incentive 
Payments Program as part of the ACA, one official said:   
“We have tried to apply for as many federal grants and opportunities as we can, as 
we’re able to under both the… most recently, the Affordable Care Act 
opportunities that work at sort of prioritization of home- and community-based 
services over institutional services.  Using enhanced matched to try incentivize 
the community to grow a little bit.  Using some of our rebalancing funds through 
MFP to expand services.” 
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Catalysts and Barriers to HCBS Expansion 
Theme 8: Outside Groups Affect HCBS All informants spoke about outside groups 
affecting HCBS investment. This theme is unique since it is both a catalyst and a barrier 
to HCBS investment.  Medicaid or consumer advocacy groups, senior groups, and the 
nursing home lobbies in certain states were all cited as catalysts to HCBS investment. 
Nursing home and for-profit health care provider lobbies were cited as a barrier to HCBS 
investment.   
 Consumer advocacy groups play a strong role in HCBS investment. The 
OImstead ruling mandated that state increase their HCBS and these groups hold states 
accountable. Many times these groups work directly with states on their LTC programs. 
As one official said: 
 “…They’re very much a part of our planning process.  We partner with them on a 
lot of things like training and rule development.  We pilot things with them.  We 
brainstorm ideas with them.  We’re usually aware of any issues through their 
membership.  They’re pretty involved in this state.  I don’t know, in comparison, 
how we are, but for persons with disabilities or our aging population, their 
associations are right there at the table.”  
 
These groups are not just concerned with Olmstead, but in deinstitutionalization in 
general. Thus, these groups have been active, in some cases, before Olmstead.  
 “Well, the advocacy groups demand increased community services because the 
trend since Olmstead, in particular, and before Olmstead and a lot of other 
states…I mean, you know, Olmstead takes a lot of credit for…but in many states, 
I mean, you know, deinstitutionalization has been going on for a long time and the 
other states were well into building infrastructure that would support 
deinstitutionalization before Olmstead happened.”  
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 Senior groups also impact HCBS, but their influence varies across states. In some 
states, Medicaid officials believe that senior groups are just as vocal or active in shaping 
their state’s HCBS program as advocacy groups. In other states, a difference exists 
between the roles consumer or Medicaid advocacy groups (described above) and senior 
groups play. Speaking to the equivalent influence of these groups, one Medicaid official 
said: 
“Now, I will tell you that you have more advocacy groups that are vocal on 
certain areas.  For example, you will have those individuals who are representing 
our citizens who have special needs disabilities who are more vocal in their 
requests for home- and community-based services, but I assure you that groups 
like AARP, groups like our silver-head legislators here in this state, are just as 
passionate about having this opportunity for our citizens who would be classified 
as frail and elderly.” 
An informant from a state where senior groups play less of a role said: 
“There’s kind of two lobbies.  Interestingly, the seniors are less vocal than 
individuals with physical disabilities.  Our programs for people with 
developmental disabilities have well-established… and, as you probably know 
folks with mental retardation and developmental disabilities have had very, very 
active and mature advocacy community out there for a long, long time that have 
driven services in advance of other HCBS programs, which frankly was the basis 
of the Olmstead litigation.” 
   
 Nursing home lobbies act as both catalysts and inhibitors to HCBS expansion. A 
few informants said these lobbies worked to promote or strengthen HCBS programs. 
They said that is due to the nursing home lobby trying to protect their market share, 
without necessarily trying to poach the markets of HCBS providers. That nursing homes 
serve a different LTC population than HCBS providers neutralizes, according to these 
respondents, possible competition for state resources. One said this about the dynamics of 
lobbying in her state: 
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“They have, and I think surprisingly, not been anti home- and community-based 
services at all. While they are trying to, I think, maintain their share of the market, 
their share of the spending, and not see a lot of their members going out of 
business, they participate in our MFP stakeholders group.  They are on the Older 
Adults services advisory committee.  So you don’t see active negativity on their 
part. Yeah.  I think that they realize that the future is going to be home- and 
community-based services at some level for a large segment of the population, 
and so they found it in their best interest not to be negative.  But that said, like I 
mentioned earlier, they are very politically astute and powerful, and they’re 
working to, I think, maintain what they have. But they’re not throwing HCBS 
under the bus.”  
  
 Of course, many more informants spoke of nursing home lobbies being 
antagonistic towards HCBS expansion. One official put it this way:  
 “You know, always there’s an interesting dance with the nursing home industry 
when it comes to these [HCBS] services, and we continue to engage with them in 
that regard.  Right now, for example, there’s legislation pending to try to undo 
some of the things that were accomplished[for rebalancing] in [year redacted to 
protect anonymity].  That was introduced by the nursing home industry.” 
When asked how this legislation was received she pointedly said: “We’re in a battle.  
We’re in a battle that we’ll fight to the end.” This response and the many like it indicate 
that the struggle over rebalancing will continue.   
 
6.5 Discussion 
This study suggests that states experience several barriers as well as catalysts to 
HCBS expansion. State officials perceive political barriers to HCBS expansion such as 
opposition from the nursing home lobby. Bureaucratic impediments and the influence of 
non-monetary resources on HCBS illustrate the administrative barriers of HCBS 
expansion. Inadequate funding resources denote socio-demographic and economic 
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barriers to HCBS expansion.  However, this study found several catalysts in addition to 
the above barriers. Below, I discuss these barriers and then conclude with how states may 
take advantage of the facilitators in their efforts to rebalance.       
Interviews with state Medicaid officials suggest that the nursing home lobby 
continues to hold considerable political power in several states. However, these effects 
are tempered by the political support HCBS programs enjoy from state legislators and 
governors. In addition, the support of HCBS from other interest groups may not rival that 
of the nursing home lobby, but nonetheless serve as a counter balance to the influence of 
institutional care providers. Since the Obama administration has renewed its support to 
enforce the Olmstead ruling (Olmstead: Community Integration for Everyone, 2012), 
these advocacy groups have a strong ally.    
  State Medicaid officials perceive infrastructure and workforce shortages hamper, 
or will in the future, states’ abilities to provide more HCBS. While nursing home beds 
per capita have decreased since 2000 (Nursing Home Compendium, 2010), states 
continue to struggle with meeting the demand for HCBS. Thus, as the population ages, 
states will likely seek greater investment in HCBS infrastructure in order to “not lose 
ground”, as one informant put it, in their rebalancing efforts. In addition, concerns about 
an adequate workforce for long-term care will need to be addressed regardless of 
rebalancing efforts.  
 Economic barriers create a significant barrier to HCBS expansion. That all 
respondents spoke about state finances being a limiting factor in Medicaid expansion, 
while simultaneously stressing that federal financial support as a catalyst, speaks to the 
susceptibility of these programs to economic events. As the economy recovers from the 
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downturn of the last several years, fiscal constraints on HCBS may loosen. Moreover, in 
spite of these barriers, states are carrying out the Olmstead ruling and they are serving 
more seniors in home- and community-based settings.  
Despite the barriers to HCBS expansion, there are also several factors facilitating 
its growth. First, the political support these programs enjoy and the studies cited above 
showing some promise that HCBS saves money will help build support. These 
facilitating factors, in alliance with the support from interest groups and consumer 
preferences to receive long-term care in the least restrictive setting possible, will provide 
ongoing support for rebalancing. In other words, support and popularity for HCBS will 
likely grow because these trends. Savvy states are those that can best use these facilitators 
to expand their Medicaid HCBS. Moreover, that the ACA provides more support for 
HCBS will enable states to take advantage of these extra funds despite any economic 
downturns and the optional nature of HCBS expansion. And finally, the ACA amends the 
optional HCBS state plan benefit (1915(i) waivers) that may allow for lower 
administrative costs and burdens (Harrington, et al., 2012). Thus, states may be able to 
work around, or at least lessen, the federal requirements.  
This study has several limitations. First, the results are not generalizable to the 
entire country. All inferences pertain to the informants from the sample of states 
interviewed. However, the random sample of states drawn from all levels of HCBS 
spending addresses this limitation by providing a diverse sample. Second, only state 
Medicaid officials were interviewed for this study. Thus, a wider range of informants 
including federal officials, consumer advocates, and/or long-term care providers (to name 
just a few examples) could provide a different understanding of the barriers to HCBS 
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investment. Third, I used a convenience sample. While I approached each state/Medicaid 
director in the same way, it was ultimately out of convenience who responded to my 
requests for an interview. Fourth, the data collected are the perceptions of Medicaid 
officials in just a sample of states. The findings only represent their beliefs about the 
barriers and impediments to expanding HCBS.  
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Chapter 7: Conclusions 
7.1 Overview 
 This dissertation seeks to improve the understanding of Medicaid HCBS since the 
Olmstead ruling. The first study (Chapter 4) is a trend analysis that explores the political, 
socio-demographic, economic, policy, and supply influences on Medicaid home health, 
PCS, 1915(c) waiver, and total HCBS spending and utilization. The second study 
(Chapter 5) explores the impact of 1915(c) waiver spending on state institutional long-
term care spending. The final paper (Chapter 6) studies the perceptions of state Medicaid 
officials regarding the barriers to HCBS expansion. This concluding chapter summarizes  
the findings and discusses policy implications, limitations, and directions for further 
research.  
 
7.2 Summary of Findings 
Paper 1 (Chapter 4): Medicaid Home- and Community-Based Services in the Age of 
Olmstead: Spending and Utilization 1996-2008. 
 This paper uses a trend analysis to examine Medicaid HCBS spending per capita, 
recipients per capita, and spending per recipient for 1996-2008. The study analyzes the 
three largest Medicaid programs (home health, PCS, and 1915(c) Waiver programs) as 
well as the total of these programs. Given that the scope of HCBS is ultimately up to the 
state and that these programs are an expansion of the welfare state, I hypothesized 
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politics to be a robust driver for HCBS while controlling for economic, socio-
demographic, policy and supply factors. These hypotheses, however, are not consistently 
supported. The politics of HCBS expansion are not reliably partisan in state legislatures. 
However, some models show party control of governorships appearing to influence 
HCBS expansion.    
 Several additional factors were robust influences on HCBS. Depending on the 
program, state racial and ethnic minority populations have robust effects on HCBS. 
Furthermore, these effects have strong, but often dissimilar interactions with state 
metropolitan populations. Economic influences include greater state per capita income 
and more women in the workforce. Supply factors also appear to play a role, but provide 
a different influence depending on the HCBS program. For example, more home health 
agencies have a strong, positive association with home health spending per capita, but a 
strong, negative association with PCS spending per capita.  
 
Paper 2 (Chapter 5): The Impact of 1915(c) Medicaid Waiver Investment on State  
 Institutional Long-Term Care Expenditures, 1996-2008 
 Chapter 5 explores the impact of increased 1915(c) waiver spending on state 
institutional spending for 1996-2008. This impetus for this study is to contribute to the 
ongoing debate about savings reaped from greater HCBS investment. In order to address 
endogeneity, I use an array of statistical approaches to illustrate the relationship between 
waiver spending and institutional spending. Given the limitations of each type of model, I 
refrain from identifying an optimal model or set of models. Some models show that the 
waiver spending has a neutral relationship that is not statistically significant, regardless of 
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sign, with institutional spending. Two models, however, present a weak positive, 
statistically significant, relationship of small magnitude.  
 While this study controls for socio-demographic, economic, policy, and supply 
factors, the results present few distinct relationships with these influences and 
institutional spending. Per capita income has a positive relationship while greater 
Hispanic populations tended to have a negative relationship.  
 Supply and policy factors have, by far, the strongest association with institutional 
spending. Both nursing home supply and the average nursing home reimbursement rate 
are strong predictors of institutional spending..   
 
Paper 3 (Chapter 6): State Medicaid Officials’ Perceptions of Challenges to HCBS  
   Expansion Since Olmstead vs L.C. 
 The final aim explores Medicaid officials’ perceptions of barriers and catalysts to 
further HCBS investment. States are carrying out the requirements of the Olmstead ruling 
and are experiencing an increasing demand for HCBS from seniors. Barriers to HCBS 
expansion include limited funding, administrative burdens, lack of infrastructure, and the 
efforts of nursing home lobbies in some states to limit home- and community-based 
options. Yet, informants noted several forces that promote HCBS expansion. Catalysts 
for HCBS expansion include increased funding from state and federal governments, 
broad political support from policy makers, and support from advocacy groups.   
The findings from all three papers suggest two broad conclusions. First, the 
politics of HCBS are not predictably partisan. The findings concerning state politics in 
chapter 6 help explain the mixed quantitative results in chapter 4. And second, policy and 
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supply factors are strong predictors of long-term care delivery at the state level. The 
effects of supply and policy factors affecting HCBS in chapter 4, and the clear results of 
these effects on institutional care in chapter 5, are affirmed by the findings of chapter 6. 
In sum, the limited but growing HCBS infrastructure coexists with an institutional care 
infrastructure and policies that support institutional services.  
 
7.3 Policy Implications 
 This dissertation has several policy implications. First, as chapter 4 illustrates, 
state racial/ethnic minority composition and state metropolitan population have a strong 
influence on HCBS investment. The differences between these effects among the three 
different HCBS programs (e.g. the home health versus PCS) studied suggest that different 
populations may be using different HCBS programs differently.   
The debate continues about whether HCBS programs save states money. While 
previous work does show savings (Kaye, 2012), the results of chapter 5 indicate 
otherwise. Indeed, waiver and institutional expenditures appear to grow together. This 
could be due the “woodwork effect”, that is the propensity for people to consume 
services they would not have otherwise due their availability. The increased use of 
institutional care by racial/ethnic minorities that historically have been underserved 
populations could also explain this pattern (Feng, Fennell, Tyler, Clark, & Mor, 2011). 
Policy makers should be aware that growth in HCBS might create demand for 
institutional care for consumers who previously received informal care.  
The crucial impact of supply factors on HCBS and long-term care policy is 
apparent across all three aims. In short, the relative lack of HCBS infrastructure and the 
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preponderance of nursing homes and/or nursing home-centric policies constrain states 
from further expanding HCBS. While chapter 4 shows mixed results of long-term care 
supply’s influence on HCBS, the second two papers present strong findings about the 
strength of the nursing home industry. Many analysts argue that LTC policy has an 
institutional bias (Bishop, 1999; Blaser, 2008). My results illustrate a variation of this 
theme: a tendency to rely on institutional care due to an existing institutional 
infrastructure regardless of greater HCBS investment. In other words, there is 
substantial inertia surrounding institutional care because it continues to hold a dominant 
place in the long-term care system.  For example, while HCBS investment has continued 
to increase, the results show that institutional spending grows with HCBS (Chapter 5) and 
that the nursing home lobby can still limit HCBS expansion (Chapter 6).  This inertia 
provides a new perspective on state resource allocation in light of the growing demand 
for long-term care. 
  
7.4 Limitations 
The quantitative chapters have several limitations. The vagueness of the Olmstead 
ruling fails to provide a distinct policy shock. States were free to expand their HCBS 
programs under broad guidelines. Thus, there was no distinct policy shift to create the 
type of natural experiment preferred in studying panel data.  These are only trend 
analyses. Any relationships are associative and not causal. While I controlled for 
geographic composition of states, there is no way to control for urban/rural differences 
within states. Furthermore, this state-level analysis allows for only a state-to-state 
comparison meaning the results denote differences between Florida and Minnesota, not 
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Miami and Minneapolis. While I controlled for average home health wage by state, 
differences in the costs of care may not be adequately controlled for within states across 
geographic areas. Furthermore, waivers are not used statewide like PCS and HH services 
meaning limiting the inferences made about these services.  
While assisted living facilities are being used to provide some HCBS, I was not 
able to include a measure in the analysis for two primary reasons. Assisted living 
facilities are not regulated by the federal government, meaning that no interstate 
examination of these facilities is possible.  What constitutes “assisted living” also varies 
widely between states. In addition, no known resources provide a census for assisted 
living facilities in each state for every year in the above analysis. The statistical methods, 
in this case the state fixed effects, difference out these state-specific factors in addition to 
any other state-level effects that cannot be operationalized.   
The analyses do not include lobbying efforts. Lobbying efforts by the nursing 
home industry (or any industry) are not controlled for due to the lack of available data or 
means to operationalize any such effects on HCBS. Like the limitation concerning 
assisted living above, the state effects address this limitation. If a state has a particularly 
strong, or weak, nursing home lobby across this time period, these influences are 
differenced out with the state fixed effects.  
While sound, the fixed effects analysis has some unique limitations. Given that 
time-invariant characteristics are differenced out of the equation, such variables could not 
be included. For example, there was no way to adequately control for a state being 
southern state since such a characteristics are stable over time. In addition, the limited 
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sample size might promote larger standard errors than studies with more years of data and 
thus larger sample sizes.  
Chapter 5 presents some additional challenges. Again the relationships are only 
associative and not causal, but the FE and IV analyses control for other explanations of 
increased institutional spending as well for endogeneity. In addition, more data would be 
optimal. Given the narrowness of the panel (46 states), it would be better to have a panel 
longer than 13 years.  
 The data present additional limitations. The expenditures data and the 
expenditures per recipient data are from two different sources. Because the recipient data 
are only reported on CMS form 372, which includes expenditure data to demonstrate cost 
neutrality, expenditures from this form were used to create the expenditures per recipient 
variables. In addition, the recipient data are somewhat crude. If a person uses these 
services more than twice a year they will counted as two recipients. 
This qualitative study also has several limitations. The results are not 
generalizable to the entire country and all inferences pertain to the informants from the 
sample of states interviewed. However, the random sample of states drawn from all levels 
of HCBS spending addresses this limitation by providing a diverse sample. Furthermore, 
only state Medicaid officials were interviewed for this study, a wider range of informant 
could provide a different understanding of the barriers to HCBS investment.  
 
7.5 Future Research 
The three papers presented in this dissertation each provide a strong foundation 
for future research. Trend analyses, similar to chapter 4, can be expanded as new years of 
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data become available. Such analyses may present interesting findings, especially 
concerning the economic factors, as state economies recover from the recent recession.  
Even before new years of data become available, the analyses in chapter 5 can be 
expanded. For this chapter, all waivers were lumped together as were all institutional 
expenditures. Separate analyses examining MRDD waivers and their relationship with 
ICFMR spending alone would be a contribution. Likewise, an examination of Aged 
and/or Aged/Disabled waivers and their impact on nursing home expenditures would 
provide a similar contribution.  
While informative, the qualitative chapter is just a first step to understanding the 
perceptions of barriers to HCBS. Interviews with other state officials, others in the long-
term care sectors (e.g. social workers that place long-term care recipients), and/or federal 
officials would provide a deeper understanding of barriers to HCBS.  
As states implement the optional incentives to expand HCBS under the ACA, 
several research opportunities will emerge. First, the enlargement of the 1915(i) option 
will provide a new piece to understanding HCBS. These services have not received the 
scholastic attention anywhere near equal to the three programs studied in chapters 4 and 
5. Finally, as states are encouraged to expand their PCS programs, studies looking into 
how, when, why these expansions occurred will be vital to the understanding of Medicaid 
HCBS in general and differences between HCBS programs.   
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Appendix A- Medicaid Assisted Living Financing Structure, 2007 
Source of Funding Source of Funding State 
  Medicaid   
Waiver 
Medicaid 
  State 
Plan   
State 
  Funds   
State 
  Medicaid   
Waiver 
Medicaid 
  State 
Plan   
State 
  Funds   
Alabama a     Missouri Planned X   
Alaska 1915 (c)     Montana 1915 (c)     
Arizona 1115     Nebraska 1915 (c)     
Arkansas 1915 (c) X   Nevada 1915 (c)     
California 1915 (c)b     New 
Hampshire   
1915 (c)     
Colorado 1915 (c)   X New Jersey 1915 (c)     
Connecticut 1915 (c)   X New Mexico 1915 (c)     
Delaware 1915 (c)     New York   X   
DC d     North 
Carolina 
  X   
Florida 1915 (c) X   North Dakota 1915 (c)     
Georgia 1915 (c)     Ohio 1915 (c)     
Hawaii 1915 (c)     Oregon 1915 (c)     
Idaho 1915 (c) X X Pennsylvania d     
Illinois 1915 (c)     Rhode Island 1915 (c)     
Indiana 1915 (c)   X South 
Carolina 
  X   
Iowa 1915 (c)     South Dakota 1915 (c)   X 
Kansas 1915 (c)     Texas 1915 (c)     
Maine   X   Utah 1915 (c)     
Maryland 1915 (c)   X Vermont 1915 (c) X   
Massachusetts     X   Virginia     X 
Michigan c X   Washington 1915 (c)     
Minnesota 1915 (c) X   West Virginia       
Mississippi 1915 (c)     Wisconsin 1915 (c) X   
        Wyoming 1915 (c)     
  Total 35 13 7 
a. A waiver was approved by CMS but not implemented. 
b. Limited pilot program. 
c. Waiver services can be delivered to residents in unlicensed buildings that are called ALRs. The 
state is considering a waiver amendment to provide services in licensed settings. 
d. Waiver coverage was authorized by the legislature. 
 
Mollica, R., Sims-Kastelein, K., & O’Keefe, J. (2007). Residential Care and Assisted  
Living Compendium: 2007. Washington, D.C.: United States Department of 
Health and Human Services. Retrieved February 12, 2011, from 
http://aspe.hhs.gov/daltcp/reports/2007/07alcom.htm  
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Appendix B- Missing Data for Independent Variables 
 
Variable  
Missing 
States? 9542 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 
Wright Ideology AK,HI                           
Berry Ideology DC                           
Democratic Governor 
DC                           
Percentage of 
Democratic Seats None                           
Women in the 
Legislature Yes                           
Population 85+ None             I             
Poverty Rate None                           
Percent African-
American None I I         I             
Percent Hispanic None I I         I             
Percent Unionized 
Work Force                             
Per Capita Income None                           
Average Home Health 
Aide Wage None I I                       
FMAP                             
Percent Metropolitan 
Population                             
Percent 65+ 
Population with Self-
Care Limitations None I I I I                   
Female Labor Force 
Participation None                           
Medicare Home 
Health Users/1000 
Population   I I I I                   
NH Beds/1000 
Population None                           
HH Agencies/100000 
Population   I I I I                   
Medicaid 
Reimbursement Rate 
AK, 
HI, DC                     I I I 
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
42 To save space, only the last two digits of the ear are presented. “I” denotes an imputed data point.  
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Appendix C-First Stage Output for Aim 2 Analyses 
First Stage Output: 2SLS, Contemporaneous Waiver Expenditures 
N=595 F( 33,   562) =  45.57 
Prob > F = 0.0000 
Centered R-squared=0.7095 
Uncentered R-squared=0.9988 
 Coefficient 
Robust 
Standard 
Error t 
P-
Value 
State Ideology 0.010 0.002 5.89 0.000 
Over 85 Population (%) 0.246 0.096 2.57 0.010 
African American Population (%) -0.112 0.018 -6.33 0.000 
Hispanic Population (%) 0.0218 0.024 1.17 0.242 
Metropolitan Population (%) 0.006 0.002 2.64 0.009 
African American * Metro 0.001 0.000 2.95 0.003 
Hispanic*Metro -0.001 0.000 -8.59 0.000 
Population with a Self-Care Limitation Over 65 (%) -0.013 0.018 -0.73 0.469 
Medicare Home Health Users Per 1000 Population 0.002 0.002 1.24 0.216 
Per Capita Income 0.000 0.000 4.55 0.000 
Poverty Rate (5) 0.029 0.018 1.64 0.101 
African American*Poverty 0.003 0.001 5.48 0.000 
Hispanic*Poverty 0.003 0.001 3.07 0.002 
Unemployment Rate(%) 0.023 0.027 0.85 0.398 
Female Labor Force Participation Rate (%) 0.018 0.008 2.17 0.031 
FMAP -0.008 0.005 -1.73 0.085 
Average Home Health Aide Wage -0.060 0.024 -2.52 0.012 
Unionized Workforce (%) -0.018 0.006 -3.28 0.001 
Nursing Home Beds Per 1000 Population -0.025 0.017 -1.50 0.135 
Home Health Agencies Per 100,000 Population 0.042 0.018 2.27 0.024 
Average Medicaid Nursing Home Reimbursement Rate 0.005 0.001 5.83 0.000 
1995 0.130 0.109 1.20 0.231 
1996 0.231 0.110 2.09 0.037 
1997 0.341 0.112 3.04 0.002 
1998 0.466 0.115 4.06 0.000 
1999 0.582 0.137 4.26 0.000 
2000 0.575 0.108 5.33 0.000 
2001 0.548 0.112 4.90 0.000 
2002 0.501 0.119 4.21 0.000 
2003 0.417 0.122 3.42 0.001 
2004 0.389 0.130 3.00 0.003 
2005 0.367 0.158 2.32 0.021 
2006 0.373 0.167 2.23 0.026 
Constant  7.904 0.987 8.01 0.000 
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First Stage Output: 2SLSFE, Contemporaneous Waiver Expenditures 
N=595 
F( 33,   562) =  44.75 
Prob > F = 0.0000 
R-squared  within =  0.7410 
R-squared between= 0.0569 
R-squared overall= 0.026 
	  
 Coefficient 
 Standard 
Error t 
P-
Value 
State Ideology 0.003 0.002 1.34 0.180 
Over 85 Population (%) -0.084 0.143 -0.58 0.560 
African American Population (%) -0.074 0.042 -1.78 0.075 
Hispanic Population (%) 0.001 0.053 0.03 0.979 
Metropolitan Population (%) 0.014 0.004 3.43 0.001 
African American * Metro 0.002 0.000 6.31 0.000 
Hispanic*Metro 0.000 0.000 -0.80 0.425 
Population with a Self-Care Limitation Over 65 (%) -0.019 0.013 -1.46 0.146 
Medicare Home Health Users Per 1000 Population -0.001 0.002 -0.41 0.681 
Per Capita Income 0.000 0.000 -0.66 0.513 
Poverty Rate (5) 0.018 0.021 0.85 0.398 
African American*Poverty 0.000 0.001 0.41 0.681 
Hispanic*Poverty -0.002 0.001 -2.23 0.026 
Unemployment Rate(%) -0.052 0.019 -2.70 0.007 
Female Labor Force Participation Rate (%) -0.001 0.008 -0.12 0.902 
FMAP 0.001 0.008 0.18 0.856 
Average Home Health Aide Wage -0.069 0.016 -4.36 0.000 
Unionized Workforce (%) -0.016 0.009 -1.78 0.075 
Nursing Home Beds Per 1000 Population -0.023 0.024 -0.98 0.326 
Home Health Agencies Per 100,000 Population 0.048 0.020 2.39 0.017 
Average Medicaid Nursing Home Reimbursement Rate 0.002 0.001 2.80 0.005 
1995 0.209 0.045 4.62 0.000 
1996 0.345 0.053 6.48 0.000 
1997 0.451 0.060 7.51 0.000 
1998 0.567 0.073 7.74 0.000 
1999 0.678 0.098 6.93 0.000 
2000 0.688 0.083 8.30 0.000 
2001 0.769 0.094 8.15 0.000 
2002 0.800 0.101 7.89 0.000 
2003 0.767 0.111 6.92 0.000 
2004 0.826 0.121 6.85 0.000 
2005 0.882 0.145 6.09 0.000 
2006 0.943 0.158 5.97 0.000 
Constant  10.400 1.105 9.41 0.000 
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First Stage Output: 2SLS, Lagged Waiver Expenditures 
N=596 
F( 33,   562) =  43.15 
Prob > F = 0.0000 
R-squared  =  0.7170 
Adjusted R-squared =  0.7004 
      
	  
	  
 Coefficient 
Robust 
Standard 
Error t 
P-
Value 
State Ideology 0.013 0.002 6.63 0.000 
Over 85 Population (%) 0.238 0.093 2.57 0.010 
African American Population (%) -0.124 0.019 -6.69 0.000 
Hispanic Population (%) 0.033 0.027 1.22 0.224 
Metropolitan Population (%) 0.006 0.002 2.79 0.005 
African American * Metro 0.001 0.000 3.92 0.000 
Hispanic*Metro -0.001 0.000 -7.22 0.000 
Population with a Self-Care Limitation Over 65 (%) -0.015 0.018 -0.82 0.411 
Medicare Home Health Users Per 1000 Population 0.001 0.003 0.32 0.746 
Per Capita Income 0.000 0.000 4.62 0.000 
Poverty Rate (5) 0.033 0.020 1.67 0.096 
African American*Poverty 0.003 0.001 4.56 0.000 
Hispanic*Poverty 0.003 0.001 2.82 0.005 
Unemployment Rate(%) 0.032 0.028 1.11 0.266 
Female Labor Force Participation Rate (%) 0.019 0.009 2.06 0.040 
FMAP -0.010 0.006 -1.61 0.107 
Average Home Health Aide Wage -0.057 0.023 -2.43 0.016 
Unionized Workforce (%) -0.022 0.005 -3.95 0.000 
Nursing Home Beds Per 1000 Population -0.030 0.016 -1.9 0.058 
Home Health Agencies Per 100,000 Population 0.049 0.019 2.49 0.013 
Average Medicaid Nursing Home Reimbursement Rate 0.005 0.001 4.95 0.000 
1995 0.125 0.089 1.41 0.160 
1996 0.326 0.091 3.58 0.000 
1997 0.399 0.095 4.18 0.000 
1998 0.485 0.104 4.68 0.000 
1999 0.753 0.134 5.61 0.000 
2000 0.639 0.104 6.14 0.000 
2001 0.682 0.109 6.25 0.000 
2002 0.645 0.115 5.59 0.000 
2003 0.573 0.121 4.74 0.000 
2004 0.485 0.127 3.84 0.000 
2005 0.565 0.161 3.51 0.000 
2006 0.507 0.168 3.02 0.003 
Constant  7.638 1.044 7.32 0.000 
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First Stage Output: 2SLSFE, Lagged Waiver Expenditures 
N=596, F( 33,   562) =  46.23, Prob > F = 0.0000 
R-squared  within =  0.7469 
R-squared between= 0.0494 
R-squared overall= 0.000 
	  
 Coefficient 
Standard 
Error t 
P-
Value 
State Ideology 0.006 0.002 2.77 0.006 
Over 85 Population (%) -0.154 0.162 -0.95 0.344 
African American Population (%) -0.077 0.047 -1.63 0.104 
Hispanic Population (%) 0.064 0.060 1.06 0.290 
Metropolitan Population (%) 0.020 0.005 4.18 0.000 
African American * Metro 0.002 0.000 5.13 0.000 
Hispanic*Metro -0.001 0.001 -1.91 0.057 
Population with a Self-Care Limitation Over 65 (%) -0.009 0.014 -0.60 0.546 
Medicare Home Health Users Per 1000 Population -0.001 0.003 -0.49 0.625 
Per Capita Income 0.000 0.000 -2.34 0.020 
Poverty Rate (5) 0.009 0.024 0.37 0.709 
African American*Poverty 0.001 0.001 1.08 0.281 
Hispanic*Poverty -0.003 0.001 -2.50 0.013 
Unemployment Rate(%) -0.048 0.022 -2.21 0.027 
Female Labor Force Participation Rate (%) -0.009 0.010 -0.94 0.350 
FMAP -0.012 0.009 -1.31 0.191 
Average Home Health Aide Wage -0.069 0.018 -3.83 0.000 
Unionized Workforce (%) -0.010 0.010 -1.02 0.308 
Nursing Home Beds Per 1000 Population -0.007 0.027 -0.26 0.797 
Home Health Agencies Per 100,000 Population 0.074 0.023 3.26 0.001 
Average Medicaid Nursing Home Reimbursement Rate 0.002 0.001 2.35 0.019 
1995 0.206 0.051 4.04 0.000 
1996 0.437 0.059 7.37 0.000 
1997 0.531 0.067 7.86 0.000 
1998 0.703 0.085 8.26 0.000 
1999 0.844 0.109 7.76 0.000 
2000 0.857 0.095 9.03 0.000 
2001 1.000 0.106 9.41 0.000 
2002 1.043 0.113 9.19 0.000 
2003 1.043 0.124 8.41 0.000 
2004 1.064 0.136 7.85 0.000 
2005 1.156 0.160 7.21 0.000 
2006 1.181 0.176 6.70 0.000 
Constant  11.493 1.253 9.18 0.000 
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Appendix D-Letter of Consent 
Dear [Insert Name Here] 
 
I am graduate student at The University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill studying 
Medicaid Home-and Community-Based long-term care services (HCBS). As part of my 
dissertation, I am conducting interviews with 20-25 state Medicaid officials that have 
been randomly chosen from across the country. I am seeking your support by allowing 
me to interview you to better understand state long-term care systems and challenges to 
Medicaid Home-and Community-Based long-term care expansion since the 1999 
Olmstead ruling.  
 
For my study, I am looking for informants that have an understanding of their state’s 
Medicaid long-term care system and have worked in their state for five years. If you are 
not the appropriate person for such an interview in your state, I welcome your suggestion 
of a better informant. Your participation in this study is voluntary. 
 
To participate in the study you would agree to: 
• Being interviewed (via telephone between 30 to 60 minutes) about your state’s 
long-term care system.  
• Allow the interview to be audio-recorded for accurate transcription of your 
comments.  
 
All Responses are confidential. I am the only person (Gregory Boyer) who will have 
access to the identified data. You may answer or refuse to answer any particular 
question and may choose to end the interview at any time. 
 
Should you participate in this study there are no direct risks anticipated, nor any 
anticipated direct benefits from being involved with it.  However, there will be an indirect 
professional benefit from this study, as the information obtained will be communicated 
through publication in the literature, presentation at professional meetings and direct 
dissemination to professional associations. You may contact me with any questions at 
(919) 768-3737 or by email (gboyer@email.unc.edu). 
 
All research on human volunteers is reviewed by a committee that works to protect your 
rights and welfare.  If you have questions or concerns about your rights as a research 
subject you may contact, anonymously if you wish, the University of North Carolina 
Institutional Review Board at 919-966-3113 or by email (IRB_subjects@unc.edu).  
 
Sincerely, 
 
Gregory J. Boyer, Principal Investigator 
Doctoral Candidate  
Department of Health Policy and Management 
Gillings School of Public Health 
Pre-Doctoral Fellow, Carolina Program in Health and Aging Research  
Institute on Aging 
University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill  
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Appendix E-Qualitative Interview Guide 
 
 
 
Interview Script 
Introduction and Consent 
Hello and thank you for taking the time to speak with me today. My name is Greg Boyer 
and I am conducting this interview as part of my dissertation research at the University of 
North Carolina at Chapel Hill. Your state has been randomly selected to take part in this 
study, which is designed to gather information about state Medicaid home- and 
community-based (HCBS) long-term care services/long-term services and supports since 
the 1999 Olmstead ruling. I will remind you that your participation is voluntary. The 
interview should last between 30 minutes and 1 hour. All information will remain 
confidential and I will remove any identifying information in accordance with the UNC 
IRB. You will be given an identification number to identify this recording.  At no time 
will I say your name, your title/position, or your state’s name. If you or I accidentally say 
your name or your state’s name, that information will be redacted from the transcript. To 
ensure that I am able to accurately capture all of your comments, the interview is being 
audio recorded and will be transcribed. Please be sure to speak up so that I don’t miss any 
of your comments. 
 
 
1. Do you consent to participate in this interview? 
If informant answers yes, continue. If they answer no, thank them for their time and say 
good-bye. 
-For multiple people being interviewed, make sure to get consent from both. 
 
2. Do you have any questions at this time?  
After questions have been answered, continue 
 
3. Before we begin, I would like to get some background information.  
1. What is your current position/title? 
2. How long have you held this position? 
-For multiple people being interview, obtain the information from all people. 
 
 
4. Do I have your permission to turn on the recorder? (Wait for yes or no response). 
If yes, turn on the recorder. If no, thank them for their time and say good-bye. 
 
 
For the recording, I say their identification number, give the date and time and start with 
the interview. 
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Community and Infrastructure Challenges 
I would like to start with questions about the definition of “community” (in terms of 
long-term care) in your state and your state’s long-term care infrastructure.  
 
1. For the purposes of Medicaid long-term care, how does your state define “community” 
care (as opposed to institutional care)? 
 
Probe #1 
Does your state consider any long-term care outside the nursing home to be “the 
community?”  
 
Probe #2 
Is this definition influenced by your supply of long-term care infrastructure resources 
(such as the supply of nursing homes, assisted living facilities, home health agencies)? 
-If interviewing multiple people make sure to obtain one unanimous answer. 
 
2. Has the definition of “community” affected Medicaid HCBS investment since the 
Olmstead ruling? 
 
Probe #1 
How has this definition promoted HCBS investment? 
 
Probe #2  
How has this definition inhibited HCBS investment? 
-If interviewing multiple people make sure to obtain one unanimous answer. 
 
3. Does your state presently have adequate infrastructure (such as nursing homes, assisted 
living facilities, home health agencies, etc.) for the anticipated increased need for long-
term care in the future? 
 
Probe #1 
Will more long-term care facilities/services have to be built and/or expanded to 
accommodate the growing need for long-term care?  
 
Probe #2 
What influences the building of long-term care facilities/services in your state? 
-If interviewing multiple people make sure to obtain one unanimous answer. 
 
Probe #3 
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Does your state have adequate housing for those receiving long-term care in the 
community? 
-If interviewing multiple people make sure to obtain one unanimous answer. 
 
 
 
General Challenges  
Next, I would like ask you questions about any general challenges to HCBS expansion to 
get an idea of your state’s long-term care program since the 1999 OImstead ruling.  
 
1. Does your state place Medicaid recipients needing long-term care in a particular 
setting? 
 
Probe 1: 
Why does your state tend to use one form of long-term care more than another type? 
-If interviewing multiple people make sure to obtain one unanimous answer. 
 
2. Has the Olmstead ruling affected the placement of Medicaid recipients into different 
forms of long-term care in your state? 
 
Probe 1: 
Has the Olmstead ruling affected the number of people trying to access Medicaid HCBS 
in your state? 
-If interviewing multiple people make sure to obtain one unanimous answer. 
 
3. How has the Olmstead ruling changed the demand for long-term care in your state? 
 
Probe 1:  
Has the Olmstead ruling (increased, decreased, or had no effect depending on their 
response) on the demand for home- and community-based services in your state? 
 
Probe 2: 
Why do you think this effect (increase, decrease, no effect) occurred ? 
-If interviewing multiple people make sure to obtain one unanimous answer. 
 
 
4. How has your state performed in carrying out the requirements of the Olmstead ruling? 
 
Probe 1: 
What factors have enabled your state to provide more HCBS? 
 
Probe 2: 
What factors have inhibited your state from providing more HCBS? 
-If interviewing multiple people make sure to obtain one unanimous answer. 
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5. Is your state ready to implement any changes required by the Patient Protection and 
Affordable Care act of 2010(ACA) related to HCBS? 
 
Probe 1: 
How is your state ready to carry out required changes under ACA? 
 
Probe 2: 
How is your state not ready to carry out required changes under ACA?  
-If interviewing multiple people make sure to obtain one unanimous answer. 
 
6. What has been the reaction to providing any non-medical care (I define medical care as 
acute care, ambulatory care, etc.) in your state’s Medicaid HCBS program? 
 
Probe 1: 
Why has there been this reaction?  
 
Probe 2: 
Why has there not been a reaction? 
-If interviewing multiple people make sure to obtain one unanimous answer. 
 
Economic and Socio-Demographic Challenges 
Thank you for those responses. The next questions concern the economic and socio-
demographic aspects of state long-term care systems.  
 
1. What has been the fiscal impact in your state since the Olmstead ruling? 
 
Probe 1: 
Have there been new expenses associated with expanding your state’s HCBS program? 
 
Probe 2:  
Has your state raised taxes in reaction to the Olmstead ruling? 
-If interviewing multiple people make sure to obtain one unanimous answer. 
 
2. Does your state have the adequate workforce to provide HCBS? 
 
Probe 1: 
Are there problems educating a workforce to provide HCBS in your state? 
-If interviewing multiple people make sure to obtain one unanimous answer. 
  
 
3. How have your state’s demographics affected demand for HCBS since the Olmstead 
ruling? 
 
Probe 1: 
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Do certain groups or populations in need of long-term care use HCBS (as opposed to 
institutional care) more than other groups? 
-If interviewing multiple people make sure to obtain one unanimous answer. 
 
4. How has the federal government affected your state’s Medicaid HCBS program? 
 
Probe 1: 
Does federal aid, in the form of the matching rate or other forms of federal aid, enable 
HCBS expansion? 
 
Probe 2: 
How have policy changes or requirements from the federal government affected HCBS in 
your state? 
-If interviewing multiple people make sure to obtain one unanimous answer. 
 
Political and Policy Challenges 
Thank you for those responses. Now I will move on to the last section referring to policy, 
supply, and political challenges for greater HCBS expansion. I realize that this may be a 
sensitive topic so I remind you that your responses are confidential.   
 
1. In general, how visible has the debate over HCBS been in your state since the 
Olmstead ruling? 
 
Probe 1: 
To what extent has HCBS been a visible or priority issue for your state’s legislature? 
 
Probe 2: 
To what extent has HCBS been a visible or priority issue for your state’s governor’s 
office? 
 
Probe 3:  
To what extent has HCBS been visible in your state’s media/press? 
-If interviewing multiple people make sure to obtain one unanimous answer. 
 
2. What level of support has your state’s legislature provided HCBS programs since the 
Olmstead ruling? 
 
Probe 1: 
Have certain legislators or officers (such as committee chairs) affected your state’s 
Medicaid HCBS program? 
-If interviewing multiple people make sure to obtain one unanimous answer. 
 
 
3. What level of support has the governor’s office given Medicaid HCBS since 
Olmstead? 
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Probe 1: 
Have you noticed a difference between governors’ (that is, from governor to governor) 
Medicaid priorities since Olmstead? 
 
Probe 2: 
Have cabinet members affected your state’s HCBS program?  
-If interviewing multiple people make sure to obtain one unanimous answer. 
 
4. Has HCBS been a partisan issue in your state? 
 
Probe 1: 
How has HCBS investment been used as a partisan issue in your state? 
 
Probe 2: 
Why has/not HCBS been a partisan issue in your state? 
-If interviewing multiple people make sure to obtain one unanimous answer. 
 
 
5. What influence have groups, lobbying organizations, and health system stakeholders, 
had on your state’s Medicaid HCBS program? 
 
Probe 1: 
How have any particular (industry or professional) lobbies affected your state’s Medicaid 
HCBS program? 
 
Probe 2: 
Have Medicaid advocacy groups affected HCBS your state? 
-If interviewing multiple people make sure to obtain one unanimous answer. 
 
6. Have you found that policy discussion or debate around changes to Medicaid HCBS 
has drawn interest from seniors or senior groups? 
 
Probe 1: 
Have there been different attitudes from Medicaid recipients and/or their families about 
different settings for long-term care? 
-If interviewing multiple people make sure to obtain one unanimous answer. 
 
7. What impact has your state’s health facility regulatory structure, such as Certificate of 
Need laws, had on your state’s HCBS program? 
 
Probe 1: 
Since select services are regulated, do you think that’s lead to and expansion in other 
areas? For example, if your state has a CON law for nursing homes, but not for home 
health agencies, there may be an expansion of HCBS.  
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-If interviewing multiple people make sure to obtain one unanimous answer. 
 
 
8. Thank you for all of those responses. Are there any other challenges to HCBS 
expansion that we haven’t already discussed? 
 
Probe 1: 
Is there anything you find unique about your state that’s a barrier to HCBS expansion that 
we haven’t discussed already? 
 
9. For multiple informants only: 
1. Why did you decide to do this interview together? 
 
Probe 1: 
Were there any issues, in particular, that could not have been answered by interviewing 
just one of you? 
 
Concluding Remarks: 
 
Thank you for all of those responses. Those are all of the questions that I have for you at 
this time. Before we finish up is there anything else you’d like to add? Thank you again 
for your participation! 
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Appendix F-Codebook 
Community Questions 
 
1. Code: Community Care is extra-institutional care 
Description: Community care (as opposed to institutional care) is defined as care outside 
of an institution (e.g. nursing home or ICFMR/ICFDD) 
 
When to use:  
“In general, with community care it would be defined as that setting that is not 
institutional care, which really means when someone is living in their home, the home of 
another, or it could be a group home or a congregate living facility.” 
 
When not to use: N/A 
 
2. Code: Definition of community not influenced by the supply of LTC 
infrastructure resources 
Description: A state’s definition of community care (as opposed to institutional care) is 
not influenced by the supply of LTC infrastructure resources  
 
When to use:  
 
“I: Would you say that how you define community in your state influences how you 
would invest Medicaid dollars into HCBS? 
R: No.” 
 
When not to use: N/A 
 
3. Code: Community definition has no effect on HCBS investment. 
Description: The definition of community care (as opposed to institutional care) has not 
influenced HCBS investment. 
 
When to use: 
“I: Has the definition of community affected Medicaid HCBS investment since the Olmstead ruling? 
R: I really don’t think it has.” 
 
When not to use: N/A 
 
4. Code: LTC Infrastructure is adequate 
Description: LTC infrastructure is deemed to be adequate 
 
When to use: 
“ That’s a very debatable question.  From where I sit, we’re currently trying to do some 
rebalancing of our long-term care system, and we are reducing the number of Medicaid 
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folks may say we have an access problem – well, I need the nursing home.  To me, I 
think what we’re doing is the correct thing.  So I would answer your question by saying 
that I don’t think we have any real capacity issues in long-term care services at this time.” 
 
When not to use:  
 
“I: Okay.  Does your state presently have adequate infrastructure for the anticipated 
increased need for long-term care in the future? 
R: I have no idea.  I don’t believe we’ve conducted an analysis of that yet.” 
 
5. Code: LTC Infrastructure is adequate in some areas, but needs improvement in 
other areas 
Description: LTC infrastructure is deemed adequate in some aspects/settings for long-
term care, but not in other areas of provision 
 
When to use:  
“We have more than enough nursing facilities right now.  As a matter of fact, our 
occupancy rate I believe is somewhere hovering around about 60–61% of nursing 
facilities filled.  We have empty nursing facility beds in this state.  In terms of home- and 
community-based services currently, we have… what we have now is adequate for the 
state.  But we are actively working to beef up that structure for the stream of retirees, the 
stream of baby boomers that are going to be flooding the markets here in this state.  We 
want to have an inner system in place for them [03:59] over the next 20–25 years.” 
 
When not to use:  
“I: Okay.  Does your state presently have adequate infrastructure for the anticipated 
increased need for long-term care in the future? 
R: I have no idea.  I don’t believe we’ve conducted an analysis of that yet.” 
 
6. Code: LTC infrastructure needs unknown 
Description: The needs for LTC infrastructure are unknown.  
 
When to use:  
“I: Okay.  Does your state presently have adequate infrastructure for the anticipated 
increased need for long-term care in the future? 
R:I have no idea.  I don’t believe we’ve conducted an analysis of that yet.” 
 
When not to use:  
“ That’s a very debatable question.  From where I sit, we’re currently trying to do some 
rebalancing of our long-term care system, and we are reducing the number of Medicaid 
nursing home beds in our state.  And for right now, depending on whom you ask, some 
folks may say we have an access problem – well, I need the nursing home.  To me, I 
think what we’re doing is the correct thing.  So I would answer your question by saying 
that I don’t think we have any real capacity issues in long-term care services at this time.” 
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7. Code: Demand drives LTC infrastructure investment 
Description: Demand for LTC drives investment  
 
When to use:  
“I: What influences the building or the expansion of long-term care services or facilities 
in your state? 
R: It would be demand.” 
 
When not to use: N/A 
 
8. Code: Payer mix drives LTC infrastructure investment 
Description: Payers of long-term care, whether they are public or private, drive the 
investment/construction of LTC infrastructure  
 
When to use:  
“I think it is highly driven by funding and what funders are available.  Medicare, 
Medicaid, private pay, and if it’s on the private pay end, what kind of private pay market 
exists.  For example, in some of the coastal regions of this state, we have a more affluent 
retiree population that would attract private pay services, so in those areas there often is 
more marketing of services for that particular population.” 
 
When not to use: N/A 
 
9. Code: Oversupply of nursing home beds 
Description: There is excess NH capacity and the respondent usually cites a figure of 
capacity well under 100%.  
 
When to use:  
“We have more than enough nursing facilities right now.  As a matter of fact, our 
occupancy rate I believe is somewhere hovering around about 60–61% of nursing 
facilities filled.  We have empty nursing facility beds in this state.” 
 
When not to use: N/A 
 
10. Code: Housing resources are inadequate 
Description: Housing resources are inadequate to move people from nursing homes to the 
community or to invest more in HCBS.  
 
When to use:  
“I would say no, because there are certain people that have trouble staying in that… you 
know, leaving the nursing home right now who might want to.” 
 
When not to use: N/A 
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General Challenges/Questions 
11. Code: No tendency to place in a particular setting 
Description: There does not seem to be a tendency in a state to place residents in 
particular setting (e.g. nursing home versus HCBS) 
 
When to use: “No.  Participants can apply for a particular waiver based on their disability 
or their need.” 
 
When not to use:  
“We tend to utilize nursing facilities and institutions pretty heavily in this state.  This 
state has been for a long time a very institutional state.” 
 
12. Code: Institutional bias 
Description: A bias towards nursing homes or institutions (or institutional care) is present 
in the state.  
 
When to use:  
“We tend to utilize nursing facilities and institutions pretty heavily in this state.  This 
state has been for a long time a very institutional state.” 
 
When not to use:  
“No.  Participants can apply for a particular waiver based on their disability or their 
need.” 
 
 
13.Code: Lack of HCBS leads to unwanted/unintended/unnecessary/or otherwise 
increased institutionalization.  
Description: Greater HCBS resources would prevent unwanted/unintended/unnecessary 
or otherwise increased institutionalization.   
 
When to use:  
“We tend… I mean, we’re certainly making a lot of effort to sort of reverse that to the 
extent possible and move toward more home- and community-based options.  I think 
some of it has just been, truthfully, the lack of services on the home- and community-
based side.  Our service packages aren’t as robust as they may need to be to really serve 
somebody that is truly in danger of going to a nursing home.” 
 
When not to use:  
“So we try and educate them on where the best place is for them to get their needs met 
and then really try and advocate for non-institutional settings.” 
 
14. Code: Olmstead ruling had no effect on placement of recipients 
Description: The Olmstead ruling did not affect where Medicaid recipients were placed 
for LTC. 
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When to use:  
“I would tend to say that more people prefer their care to be provided in the least 
restrictive setting, and I don’t know… I would tend to think that that’s more related to 
individual preference than it is a particular court decision like Olmstead.” 
 
When not to use:  
“I: So you would say the Olmstead ruling has affected the placement of Medicaid 
recipients into different forms of long-term care? 
R: Absolutely.” 
 
15. Code: Olmstead ruling had an effect on placement of recipients 
Description: The Olmstead ruling did affect where Medicaid recipients were placed for 
LTC. 
 
When to use:  
 
“I: So you would say the Olmstead ruling has affected the placement of Medicaid 
recipients into different forms of long-term care? 
R: Absolutely.” 
 
When not to use:  
“I: Has the Olmstead ruling affected the placement of Medicaid recipients into different 
forms of long-term care in your state? 
R: No. 
I: No.  And why is that? 
R: Because we were already there.” 
 
16.Code: Olmstead ruling had no effect, because state was moving towards greater 
HCBS already 
Description: The Olmstead ruling did not affect placement of Medicaid recipients into 
different forms of LTC, because the state was moving towards deinstitutionalization 
(more HCBS) anyway.  
 
When to use:  
 
“I: Has the Olmstead ruling affected the placement of Medicaid recipients into different 
forms of long-term care in your state? 
R: No. 
I: No.  And why is that? 
R: Because we were already there.” 
 
When not to use:  
“I: So you would say the Olmstead ruling has affected the placement of Medicaid 
recipients into different forms of long-term care? 
R: Absolutely.” 
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17. Code: Olmstead ruling increased people trying to access HCBS 
Description: Olmstead ruling has increased people trying to access HCBS 
 
When to use:  
“I: I think we’ve touched a bit on this already.  Has the Olmstead ruling affected the 
number of people trying to access Medicaid HCBS in your state? 
R: Yes. 
I: Could you go into a little more detail? 
R: Well, you know, here’s the thing.  What Olmstead did especially was it gave 
people the opportunity to say, look, we’re not going to use just nursing facilities as our 
only choice.  We want more opportunity.  And resources of course drive that, as you’re 
aware our economy drives that.” 
 
When not to use: N/A 
 
18. Code: Olmstead has increased demand for HCBS 
Description: The Olmstead ruling increased demand for HCBS 
 
When to use:  
“I: I think we’ve touched a bit on this already.  Has the Olmstead ruling affected the 
number of people trying to access Medicaid HCBS in your state? 
R: Yes. 
I: Could you go into a little more detail? 
R: Well, you know, here’s the thing.  What Olmstead did especially was it gave 
people the opportunity to say, look, we’re not going to use just nursing facilities as our 
only choice.  We want more opportunity.  And resources of course drive that, as you’re 
aware our economy drives that.” 
 
 
When not to use:  
“I would tend to say that more people prefer their care to be provided in the least 
restrictive setting, and I don’t know… I would tend to think that that’s more related to 
individual preference than it is a particular court decision like Olmstead.” 
 
19. Code: Olmstead has not affected demand for HCBS 
Description: Demand for HCBS did not change with Olmstead ruling. 
 
When to use:  
“I would tend to say that more people prefer their care to be provided in the least 
restrictive setting, and I don’t know… I would tend to think that that’s more related to 
individual preference than it is a particular court decision like Olmstead.” 
 
When not to use:  
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“I:I think we’ve touched a bit on this already.  Has the Olmstead ruling affected the 
number of people trying to access Medicaid HCBS in your state? 
R:Yes. 
I:Could you go into a little more detail? 
R:Well, you know, here’s the thing.  What Olmstead did especially was it gave people the 
opportunity to say, look, we’re not going to use just nursing facilities as our only choice.  
We want more opportunity.  And resources of course drive that, as you’re aware our 
economy drives that.” 
 
20. Code: Respondent not sure of effect of Olmstead on HCBS 
Description: Effects of HCBS demand because of Olmstead are unknown.  
 
When to use:  
 
“I: Okay.  Just making sure I’m hearing you correctly.  Has the Olmstead Ruling 
increased, decreased, or had no effect on the demand for home and community-based 
services in your state? 
R: You know, we’ve never done that assessment, to be quite honest with you.” 
 
When not to use:  
 
“I: I think we’ve touched a bit on this already.  Has the Olmstead ruling affected the 
number of people trying to access Medicaid HCBS in your state? 
R: Yes. 
I: Could you go into a little more detail? 
R: Well, you know, here’s the thing.  What Olmstead did especially was it gave people 
the opportunity to say, look, we’re not going to use just nursing facilities as our only 
choice.  We want more opportunity.  And resources of course drive that, as you’re aware 
our economy drives that.” 
 
21. Code: States feel that they’ve followed Olmstead ruling (performed well) 
Description: Respondent feels that their state’s response to Olmstead ruling has been 
adequate. 
 
When to use:  
 
“For example, I told you that we’re serving more people in the community now than we 
are in institutions, and we actually have a very neat graph that plots over a number of 
years the number of people served in institutions versus the number in home care.  And 
you see the lines cross some years’ back, and the gap widening between the number of 
people who are receiving home care services versus those in institutions.  So that is 
directly a result of funding and deliberate decisions to increase capacity and waivers and 
other home- and community-based services, and trying to balance access to nursing home 
care at the same time.” 
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When not to use:  
 
“I: Okay.  Just making sure I’m hearing you correctly.  Has the Olmstead Ruling 
increased, decreased, or had no effect on the demand for home and community-based 
services in your state? 
R:You know, we’ve never done that assessment, to be quite honest with you.” 
 
22. Code: States feel that they are still working towards meeting requirements of 
Olmstead ruling 
Description: Respondent feels that their state is still working towards meeting the 
requirements of the Olmstead ruling.  
 
When to use:  
“You know, the ideas that work group had is not longer active and that’s unfortunate, but 
it met its responsibility, and that was to work and create recommendations to our 
legislature, our senate, to our Governor’s Office, and that’s what we did.  Now, in terms 
of how that’s being carried out, it’s being carried out in programs like opportunities for 
Living Life within this state’s Health Care Authority.  It’s being carried within division 
like Aging Services with the Department of Human Services.  It’s being carried out 
within the Division of Developmental Services, with the Department of Human Services, 
where they handle our citizens that have developmental disabilities, including acquired 
[10:21] brain injuries, and traumatic brain injuries.  So, the work continues to move 
forward.  We understand what each of us has as a responsibility.  For example, our 
responsibility within [10:38], as I touched on earlier, is to broaden the level of services 
that are available and, again, are across that long-term care spectrum, and certainly we’ve 
been doing active work in meeting that responsibility.” 
 
When not to use:  
“I: Okay.  Just making sure I’m hearing you correctly.  Has the Olmstead Ruling 
increased, decreased, or had no effect on the demand for home and community-based 
services in your state? 
R: You know, we’ve never done that assessment, to be quite honest with you.” 
 
23. Code: Increased state funding enables HCBS expansion 
Description: Greater funding at the state level has enabled HCBS expansion. 
 
When to use:  
“I: And what factors have enabled your state to provide more HCBS? 
R: Legislative funding.” 
 
When not to use: N/A 
 
24. Code: Decreased state funding inhibits HCBS expansion (budget crises) 
Description: Funding decreases at the state level have inhibited HCBS expansion.  
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When to use:  
“I: And what factors have inhibited your state from providing more HCBS? 
R: Money. 
I: Money?   
R: Yes. 
I: Could you go into a little detail? 
R: Let’s face it.  I don’t think there is a state in this union that is not feeling the economic 
crunch.  We fell woefully short as a state last year in our budget.  We had to do some 
cutting.  Every agency in our state did, and we were no different.  So, it’s just always 
going to be resources.  Where does the money come from?  If you don’t have any new 
revenue coming in, it’s hard to spend money that you don’t have.” 
 
When not to use: N/A 
 
25. Code: States are implementing ACA changes/incentives 
Description: States are implementing, taking action, or considering changes/incentives 
included in the ACA 
When to use:  
 
“Yeah, let’s see… there’s a couple of options that we’re still evaluating.  We’re still 
evaluating the balancing incentive program.  We’re still taking a look at that.  They have 
actually just received notice that – and this just may be [22:56] related – we did receive 
the psychiatric hospital demonstration grant.  We just received notice… formal 
notification of that just last week, that we were one of the states that did receive that 
opportunity.  And so there are a couple of things we’re looking at.  The Health Home 
option.  We’ve got a few things in the hopper.  But yes, we’re still kind of evaluating a lot 
of it right now.  But our agency director has been very tuned into those offerings, and 
we’ve actually had staff evaluating each one of them systemically as they’ve become 
available.” 
 
When not to use:  
“Let me share with you that I don’t want to have a discussion about the ACA fight in this 
state.  That is a very, very hot topic.  Whatever my personal feelings are about it, that’s 
one thing.  And in representing this agency and in having a discussion about Affordable 
Care Act, this state’s a bit of a hot state on that topic.” 
 
26. Code: States are not implementing ACA changes/incentives 
Description: States are not implementing or taking action on changes/incentives 
including in the ACA.  
 
When to use:  
“Let me share with you that I don’t want to have a discussion about the ACA fight in this 
state.  That is a very, very hot topic.  Whatever my personal feelings are about it, that’s 
one thing.  And in representing this agency and in having a discussion about Affordable 
Care Act, this state’s a bit of a hot state on that topic.” 
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When not to use:  
“Yeah, let’s see… there’s a couple of options that we’re still evaluating.  We’re still 
evaluating the balancing incentive program.  We’re still taking a look at that.  They have 
actually just received notice that – and this just may be [22:56] related – we did receive 
the psychiatric hospital demonstration grant.  We just received notice… formal 
notification of that just last week, that we were one of the states that did receive that 
opportunity.  And so there are a couple of things we’re looking at.  The Health Home 
option.  We’ve got a few things in the hopper.  But yes, we’re still kind of evaluating a lot 
of it right now.  But our agency director has been very tuned into those offerings, and 
we’ve actually had staff evaluating each one of them systemically as they’ve become 
available.” 
 
 
27. Code: ACA changes/incentives not affecting states 
Description: Changes or incentives in the ACA are not affecting states. 
 
When to use:  
“Right.  Yeah, we don’t qualify for that[Program in the ACA].  We already have more 
than 50% of people eligible for home-based care in the community.  And they look at it 
across all our long-term care groups.  So, we definitely don’t qualify.  We’ve looked at it 
and we don’t” 
 
 
When not to use:  
“Yeah, let’s see… there’s a couple of options that we’re still evaluating.  We’re still 
evaluating the balancing incentive program.  We’re still taking a look at that.  They have 
actually just received notice that – and this just may be [22:56] related – we did receive 
the psychiatric hospital demonstration grant.  We just received notice… formal 
notification of that just last week, that we were one of the states that did receive that 
opportunity.  And so there are a couple of things we’re looking at.  The Health Home 
option.  We’ve got a few things in the hopper.  But yes, we’re still kind of evaluating a lot 
of it right now.  But our agency director has been very tuned into those offerings, and 
we’ve actually had staff evaluating each one of them systemically as they’ve become 
available.” 
 
 
28. Code: No negative reaction to non-medical care provision.  
Description: The provision of non-medical care has created a no negative reaction 
 
When to use:  
“There’s been no opposition.  I mean, that’s what our system is.  It’s mainly helping 
people go to the grocery store, helping people take a bath, helping people transfer – those 
types of things.  It’s assisting with money management, meal preparation, eating.  These 
are all non-medical things.” 
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When not to use: N/A 
Economic and Socio-Demographic Challenges 
29. Code: States invested more in HCBS(increased expenses) 
Description: States have invested more in their HCBS programs 
 
When to use:  
“We actually… as I said to you, we’ve invested more in home- and community-based 
services, and I think policy makers are more aware of the balance and the spending of 
institutional services versus home care services.  So, I think it’s sort of heightened the 
awareness of that.” 
 
When not to use: N/A 
 
30. Code: States have not raised taxes due to HCBS expansion. 
Description: States have not raised taxes in response to the Olmstead ruling or HCBS 
expansion 
 
When to use: 
 
“No.  No it has not.  Not in terms of generating funding for Medicaid.” 
 
When not to use: N/A 
 
31.Code: Workforce is inadequate 
Description: State LTC workforce is inadequate or will be inadequate in the future. 
 
When to use:  
“No, we are actively working on trying to develop a better trained, a better-equipped 
workforce.  That’s one of those areas I feel with regard to that infrastructure that we have 
to address…” 
 
When not to use: N/A 
 
32.Code: Workforce education is adequate 
Description: Educating LTC/direct care workforce is adequate 
 
When to use:  
“No.  We require providers and managed care organizations to do that.” 
 
When not to use:  
“I think there certainly is a need for continued training opportunities and having a 
workforce that is well trained.  I think that definitely is an issue, and I think that, again, 
that’s another area where we need to continue to work.” 
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33.Code: Workforce education is a challenge 
Description: Educating state LTC/direct care workforce is a challenge or problem.  
 
When to use:  
“I think there certainly is a need for continued training opportunities and having a 
workforce that is well trained.  I think that definitely is an issue, and I think that, again, 
that’s another area where we need to continue to work.” 
 
When not to use:  
“No.  We require providers and managed care organizations to do that.” 
 
34. Code: Aging population has increased demand for HCBS 
Description: The increasing number of aged/elderly has increased the demand for HCBS 
 
When to use:  
“This state… to be honest, I’m not exactly sure of our current ranking, but we do have a 
very large and growing 85 and older population in our state.  That certainly is a major 
consideration.” 
 
When not to use: example 
 
35.Code: Poverty has increased demand for HCBS 
Description: The increasing number of those in poverty has increased the demand for 
HCBS. 
 
When to use:  
“Well we have an extremely high poverty rate in our state so I think with that we could 
phase the increase for HCBS services is also higher than most states.” 
 
When not to use: N/A 
 
36. Code: Migration has increased demand for HCBS  
Description: Migration into the state has increased the demand for HCBS 
 
When to use:  
“We also do have… we’re [25:15] a growing state for attracting state for attracting 
retirees, especially in certain geographical areas.  And that attraction varies.  For 
example, around ______ and ________, we tend to attract the more affluent retired 
population.  Around the ________ area, that tends to attract a lot more of the snowbirds, 
the folks who are middle income to lower-middle income, who are working and retires 
to… and have more modest means.” 
 
When not to use: N/A 
 
37. Code: Different groups use HCBS differently (MR/DD) 
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Description: Different groups (elderly versus MR/DD) are using HCBS differently. Or 
some are using HCBS while others are not.  
 
When to use:  
“Oh definitely.  In our state, we have the developmentally disabled population, which 
makes up a large portion of our…it’s probably the largest portion of our budget and then 
next in line would be our disabled and elderly, specifically disabled and elderly 
population.”   
 
When not to use:  
“I: So you wouldn’t say certain groups or populations in need of long-term care use 
HCBS more than other groups? 
R: No. 
I: No? 
R: I sure would not.  No.” 
 
38. Code: Different groups do not use HCBS differently.  
Description: There does not appear to be differences in utilization among groups that use 
HCBS.  
 
When to use:  
“I: So you wouldn’t say certain groups or populations in need of long-term care use 
HCBS more than other groups? 
R: No. 
I: No? 
R: I sure would not.  No.” 
 
When not to use:  
“Oh definitely.  In our state, we have the developmentally disabled population, which 
makes up a large portion of our…it’s probably the largest portion of our budget and then 
next in line would be our disabled and elderly, specifically disabled and elderly 
population.”   
 
39. Code: Greater federal aid/funding enables HCBS expansion (including matching 
rate or FMAP) 
Description: Increasing federal assistance in the form of money or other aid helps expand 
HCBS such as Money Follows the Person.  
 
When to use:  
 
“Yes, definitely.  Especially I think when the ARRA [Recovery Act/Stimulus Package] 
rates were in place.  And while those didn’t directly benefit home- and community-based 
services, they freed up other resources to be dedicated to home- and community-based 
resources.” 
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When not to use: 
 
“I: Okay.  Just to back up for a bit, back to the matching rate.  You talked about dental 
care for adults being cute.  Were there any specific HCBS cuts that were made because of 
the lower FMAP? 
R: We did modify the amount of [inaudible 17:54-respite?] services that an individual 
could access.  I couldn’t give you the exact number but that limit was brought down 
some.  And then we implemented a new assessment form for personal care options that 
has resulted in fewer hours for individuals receiving that service.  The other change with 
the waiver is the state used to pay for emergency response and the state no longer 
provides for that but they do pay for the monthly charge.” 
 
40. Code: Cutting federal aid/funding inhibits HCBS expansion (including matching 
rate or FMAP) 
Description: Cutting federal assistance in the form of money or other aid inhibits HCBS 
expansion. 
 
When to use: 
  
“I: Okay.  Just to back up for a bit, back to the matching rate.  You talked about dental 
care for adults being cute.  Were there any specific HCBS cuts that were made because of 
the lower FMAP? 
R: We did modify the amount of [inaudible 17:54-respite?] services that an individual 
could access.  I couldn’t give you the exact number but that limit was brought down 
some.  And then we implemented a new assessment form for personal care options that 
has resulted in fewer hours for individuals receiving that service.  The other change with 
the waiver is the state used to pay for emergency response and the state no longer 
provides for that but they do pay for the monthly charge.” 
 
When not to use:  
“Yes, definitely.  Especially I think when the ARRA [Recovery Act/Stimulus Package] 
rates were in place.  And while those didn’t directly benefit home- and community-based 
services, they freed up other resources to be dedicated to home- and community-based 
resources.” 
 
 
41. Code: Federal actions, other than funding have enabled HCBS expansion 
Description: Federal changes other than funding, such as changes in policy, have enabled 
HCBS expansion.  
 
When to use:  
“Tremendously.  They gave us permission to eliminate the institutional bias and go 
forward with a waiver for our aging and disabilities population that supports people to 
make a choice of whether they want to be in a nursing home or in a non-institutionalized 
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setting.  And they also approved the waiver that supports all the developmental 
disabilities people to be supported in communities, their communities.”   
 
When not to use:  
“The one thing it did – the Affordable Care Act – is it prohibited states from making any 
changes to eligibility standards until January 2014. And the timing being in with the 
worse recession ever was just awful.  Because the only thing you can do is reduce 
benefits for in-home population – and these are what clients actually get – but you don’t 
want to do that because that’s the best setting and the least expensive.  So, you have that 
option or you can cut rates to providers.  If you start going too deep, then you’re going to 
lose providers and they’re all going to end up in institutions or what-not.  So it has been 
like everywhere we turn it’s just like bad option after bad option.  Because where a more 
reasonable option during this time period would have been to tackle some of the 
eligibility issues, but we’re specifically prohibited from doing that under the ACA.” 
 
 
42. Code: Federal actions, other than funding have inhibited HCBS expansion 
Description: Federal changes other than funding, such as changes in policy, have 
inhibited HCBS expansion.  
 
When to use:  
“The one thing it did – the Affordable Care Act – is it prohibited states from making any 
changes to eligibility standards until January 2014. And the timing being in with the 
worse recession ever was just awful.  Because the only thing you can do is reduce 
benefits for in-home population – and these are what clients actually get – but you don’t 
want to do that because that’s the best setting and the least expensive.  So, you have that 
option or you can cut rates to providers.  If you start going too deep, then you’re going to 
lose providers and they’re all going to end up in institutions or what-not.  So it has been 
like everywhere we turn it’s just like bad option after bad option.  Because where a more 
reasonable option during this time period would have been to tackle some of the 
eligibility issues, but we’re specifically prohibited from doing that under the ACA.” 
 
When not to use:  
“Tremendously.  They gave us permission to eliminate the institutional bias and go 
forward with a waiver for our aging and disabilities population that supports people to 
make a choice of whether they want to be in a nursing home or in a non-institutionalized 
setting.  And they also approved the waiver that supports all the developmental 
disabilities people to be supported in communities, their communities.”   
 
43. Code: Federal government policy changes or requirements affect HCBS 
Description: Federal government changes in policy affect HCBS  
 
When to use:  
“So certainly from an oversight and monitoring perspective, that’s really kind of… those 
new federal requirements have really stuffed things up.  And a lot of, you know, really 
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trying to educate our sister agencies and get that focused on some of these new federal 
requirements.” 
 
When not to use: N/A 
 
Political and Policy Challenges 
44. Code: HCBS (debate) has been visible 
Description: The debate over HCBS has been visible in the state. 
 
When to use:  
“Very visible.  We cannot go a session, a legislative session, without some representative 
or senator asking for a hearing to discuss how we can better use home- and community-
based services to meet the needs of our Olmstead population, or our citizens who have 
special needs.” 
 
When not to use:  
“I would say not at all.” 
 
45.Code: HCBS has not been very visible 
Description: The debate over HCBS has not been very visible in the state. 
 
When to use:  
“I would say not at all.” 
 
When not to use:  
“Very visible.  We cannot go a session, a legislative session, without some representative 
or senator asking for a hearing to discuss how we can better use home- and community-
based services to meet the needs of our Olmstead population, or our citizens who have 
special needs.” 
 
 
46.Code: Governor interested about HCBS investment 
Description: Governor shows interest in HCBS investment 
 
When to use:  
“If I can speak maybe of our governor – not the one that just went to jail – we’ve had a 
governor in place now for two years that was a successor, or was it three?  That was a 
success to _________.  His name is __________.  He was a lieutenant governor.  He 
came in as a kind of a reformer, and he’s also been elected as our governor as well. So if I 
focus just on him, I do think it has gotten really quite a bit of attention.” 
 
When not to use: 
“ I don’t think that it has been the top priority in her office.  I will say that she is 
generally concerned about the needs of our citizens that have special needs, but I will say 
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that our governor is actually more focused on business and private industry.  That’s kind 
of the wave on which she rode into office, was business and private industry.” 
 
47. Code: Governor not interested in HCBS investment 
Description: Governor does not show interest in HCBS investment 
 
When to use:  
“I don’t think that it has been the top priority in her office.  I will say that she is generally 
concerned about the needs of our citizens that have special needs, but I will say that our 
governor is actually more focused on business and private industry.  That’s kind of the 
wave on which she rode into office, was business and private industry.” 
 
When not to use:  
 
“If I can speak maybe of our governor – not the one that just went to jail – we’ve had a 
governor in place now for two years that was a successor, or was it three?  That was a 
success to _________.  His name is __________.  He was a lieutenant governor.  He 
came in as a kind of a reformer, and he’s also been elected as our governor as well. So if I 
focus just on him, I do think it has gotten really quite a bit of attention.” 
 
48. Code: Governor supports HCBS investment 
Description: Governor supports HCBS investment 
 
When to use:  
“Oh, I think people are pretty proud of this state’s healthcare system in general.  So, it’s 
something that the administration has been very supportive of, even through changes of 
administration.” 
 
When not to use:  
“Since she’s kind of a new governor and she’s had to be educated with regard to it, as 
I’ve said, I would say that it has not been a priority on her radar.” 
 
49. Code: Governor indifferent about HCBS investment 
Description: Governor shows indifference/no interest in HCBS investment 
 
When to use: 
“Since she’s kind of a new governor and she’s had to be educated with regard to it, as 
I’ve said, I would say that it has not been a priority on her radar.” 
 
When not to use:  
“Oh, I think people are pretty proud of this state’s healthcare system in general.  So, it’s 
something that the administration has been very supportive of, even through changes of 
administration.” 
 
50. Code: Differences between governors about HCBS 
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Description: Differences persist between governors in their 
approach/interest/involvement with HCBS 
 
When to use:  
 
“I will tell you that our former governor was a staunch proponent of home- and 
community-based services.  It was something that was on his radar.  It was something 
that he would stand up any chance he got to support proponents that would enhance, not 
only home- and community-based services, but any long-term care services or services 
for the elderly.  It has not been a priority, again, for this current governor, and, again, she 
has a different agenda.” 
 
When not to use:  
“I’m not sure that the governors themselves were aware of what the Olmstead ruling is or 
remains, but they’re aware of our program and that the program is one that they support.” 
 
51.Code: No differences between governors about HCBS 
Description: No differences persist between governors in their 
approach/interest/involvement with HCBS 
 
When to use:  
“I’m not sure that the governors themselves were aware of what the Olmstead ruling is or 
remains, but they’re aware of our program and that the program is one that they support.” 
 
When not to use:  
“I will tell you that our former governor was a staunch proponent of home- and 
community-based services.  It was something that was on his radar.  It was something 
that he would stand up any chance he got to support proponents that would enhance, not 
only home- and community-based services, but any long-term care services or services 
for the elderly.  It has not been a priority, again, for this current governor, and, again, she 
has a different agenda.” 
 
52. Code: State legislature supports HCBS investment 
Description: Legislature supports HCBS investment 
 
When to use:  
“I think they have been supportive.  Like I said, there has been a growth in home- and 
community-based services’ spending.  Over the past 10 or 12 years, that’s been where 
most of the growth in long-term care has come from, both from strictly the budgetary 
perspective and in utilization.  So there has been support.  But at the same time, I can’t 
say that there has been much in the way of declining support for nursing homes.” 
 
When not to use: N/A 
 
53. Code: HCBS is highly visible in the press 
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Description: HCBS has been an issue in the press  
 
When to use:  
 
“I: And to what extent has HCBS been visible in your state’s media or press? 
R: Very. 
I: In what ways? 
R: It’s like anytime a reduction gets close, there’s always newspaper stories about how 
grandma is not going to have… be able to live where she wants, and she’s going to end 
up in a nursing facility.  It’s like the same story every time, but it always comes out like 
at a very strategic time right before to get the maximum legislative interest, and then it 
kind of like turns the whole conversation.” 
 
When not to use:  
 
“I think pretty low.  It hasn’t been…we don’t see a lot of media come across our desk and 
we have our public information offices that track that, and I would say the number of 
articles that come across about HCBS are low.” 
 
54. Code: HCBS not very visible in the press 
Description: HCBS has not been an issue in the press. 
 
When to use:  
“I think pretty low.  It hasn’t been…we don’t see a lot of media come across our desk and 
we have our public information offices that track that, and I would say the number of 
articles that come across about HCBS are low.” 
 
When not to use:  
I: And to what extent has HCBS been visible in your state’s media or press? 
R: Very. 
I: In what ways? 
R: It’s like anytime a reduction gets close, there’s always newspaper stories about how 
grandma is not going to have… be able to live where she wants, and she’s going to end 
up in a nursing facility.  It’s like the same story every time, but it always comes out like 
at a very strategic time right before to get the maximum legislative interest, and then it 
kind of like turns the whole conversation. 
 
 
55. Code: HCBS visibility in press is ongoing.  
Description: HCBS coverage in the press is ongoing or persistent.  
 
When to use:  
“It has become more of an issue.  For example, the core group of advocates that I just 
mentioned to you, one of the things that they did last year was to go around the state to 
meet with local media outlets – and, in particular, the editorial boards of the larger 
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newspapers in this state – to talk about the positives of home care, and that was a very 
successful effort in our state and did bring a lot of attention to home- and community-
based services.  So I think it’s an ongoing effort.  I think there’s a lot more that could be 
done in that area, but we have made some significant strides with that.” 
 
When not to use:  
“I: And to what extent has HCBS been visible in your state’s media or press? 
R: Very. 
I: In what ways? 
R: It’s like anytime a reduction gets close, there’s always newspaper stories about how 
grandma is not going to have… be able to live where she wants, and she’s going to end 
up in a nursing facility.  It’s like the same story every time, but it always comes out like 
at a very strategic time right before to get the maximum legislative interest, and then it 
kind of like turns the whole conversation.” 
 
56. Code: HCBS visibility in the  press is episodic 
Description: HCBS coverage in the press is irregular or sporadic 
 
When to use:  
“I: And to what extent has HCBS been visible in your state’s media or press? 
R: Very. 
I: In what ways? 
R: It’s like anytime a reduction gets close, there’s always newspaper stories about how 
grandma is not going to have… be able to live where she wants, and she’s going to end 
up in a nursing facility.  It’s like the same story every time, but it always comes out like 
at a very strategic time right before to get the maximum legislative interest, and then it 
kind of like turns the whole conversation.” 
 
 
When not to use:  
“It has become more of an issue.  For example, the core group of advocates that I just 
mentioned to you, one of the things that they did last year was to go around the state to 
meet with local media outlets – and, in particular, the editorial boards of the larger 
newspapers in this state – to talk about the positives of home care, and that was a very 
successful effort in our state and did bring a lot of attention to home- and community-
based services.  So I think it’s an ongoing effort.  I think there’s a lot more that could be 
done in that area, but we have made some significant strides with that.” 
 
57. Code: Cabinet members influence HCBS because they’re carrying out 
governor’s agenda. 
Description:  
Cabinet members do affect or influence HCBS because they’re carrying out governor’s 
agenda. 
 
When to use: 
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“Those working under the governor are usually going to do what the governor says, and 
that’s pretty much standard.” 
 
When not to use: 
“We’ve been fortunate to have cabinet members in the last, I would say, 3 to 5 years that 
came from positions where they operated the waivers.  So, that certainly makes a big 
difference to have the work is understood and supported.” 
 
 
58. Code: Cabinet members do not influence HCBS.  
Description: Cabinet members do not affect HCBS 
 
When to use: 
 
When not to use: 
 
59. Code: Cabinet members influence HCBS outside of governor’s influence. 
Description: 
Cabinet members affect HCBS, but outside the influence of the governor 
 
When to use: 
“We’ve been fortunate to have cabinet members in the last, I would say, 3 to 5 years that 
came from positions where they operated the waivers.  So, that certainly makes a big 
difference to have the work is understood and supported.” 
 
When not to use: 
“Those working under the governor are usually going to do what the governor says, and 
that’s pretty much standard.” 
 
60. Code: Specific legislators have affected HCBS (champions). 
Description: Specific legislators have affected HCBS.  
 
When to use: 
“ Well, we certainly, I think like any state, have key legislators that are more sensitive 
and more supportive.  So, there are some legislators that are especially champions of 
home- and community-based services and tend to be more in the forefront of legislative 
activities.” 
 
When not to use: N/A 
 
61. Code: HCBS has been a partisan issue. 
Description:  HCBS has been a partisan issue at the state level.  
 
When to use:  
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“Absolutely I would say that it’s an issue.  And again, like I said, to what degree I have 
discussed that, you know, the idea is again, if your party comes in with a different agenda 
other than expanding social service programs, then it’s obviously is going to be an 
agenda.  I mean, it’s obvious that it’s going to be an issue.” 
 
When not to use: 
 
“I: Interesting.  Has HCBS been a partisan issue in your state? 
R: No, I wouldn’t say it has been.  No, I would not say that.” 
 
62. Code: HCBS has not been partisan issue 
Description: HCBS has not been a partisan issue at the state level.  
 
When to use:  
“I: Interesting.  Has HCBS been a partisan issue in your state? 
R: No, I wouldn’t say it has been.  No, I would not say that.” 
 
When not to use: 
“Absolutely I would say that it’s an issue.  And again, like I said, to what degree I have 
discussed that, you know, the idea is again, if your party comes in with a different agenda 
other than expanding social service programs, then it’s obviously is going to be an 
agenda.  I mean, it’s obvious that it’s going to be an issue.” 
 
63. Code: NH lobby has affected HCBS positively. 
Description: NH lobby appear to support HCBS 
 
When to use:  
 
“In some states the nursing home industry actually has advocated against the expansion 
of home- and community-based services.  That has not necessarily been the case in our 
state.” 
 
When not to use: 
“If you look at our state’s Association of Healthcare Providers, they are a for-profit 
group.  They are always going to be staunchly supportive of nursing home and nursing 
and institutionalized settings.” 
 
64. Code: NH lobby has affected HCBS negatively. 
Description: NH lobby works against HCBS expansion.  
 
When to use:   
“If you look at our state’s Association of Healthcare Providers, they are a for-profit 
group.  They are always going to be staunchly supportive of nursing home and nursing 
and institutionalized settings.” 
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When not to use: 
“In some states the nursing home industry actually has advocated against the expansion 
of home- and community-based services.  That has not necessarily been the case in our 
state.” 
 
65. Code: HCBS lobby as affected HCBS positively.  
Description: HCBS lobby has affected HCBS programs in a positive way. 
 
When to use: 
“If you look at our state’s Association of Healthcare Providers, they are a for-profit 
group.  They are always going to be staunchly supportive of nursing home and nursing 
and institutionalized settings.  They also have a few members who happen to have home- 
and community-based service provider groups.  So, they are equal across the board.  
Whoever’s paying them, they’re going to stand up for it.” 
 
When not to use: N/A 
 
66. Code: Unions have affected HCBS 
Description: Unions affect HCBS 
 
When to use: 
“I: To what extent has HCBS been a visible or priority issue in your state’s legislature? 
R: It’s been both visible and high priority. 
I: In what ways?  Is it always on the docket?  Is it always contentious?  Or, in what ways 
is it… 
R: A couple of things.  First of all, it’s very nonpartisan.  And then the politics have been 
that our three most powerful lobbying groups – which is our state’s Health Care 
Association, AARP, and SEIU – joined forces and lobby as a group, and they have 
practically every constituency covered amongst those three.  And they just have 
tremendous power.” 
 
When not to use: N/A 
 
67. Advocacy groups (Aging and MR/DD) have affected HCBS. 
Description: Advocacy groups affect HCBS/ 
 
When to use: 
“Now, I will tell you that you have more advocacy groups that are vocal on certain areas.  
For example, you will have those individuals who are representing our citizens who have 
special needs disabilities who are more vocal in their requests for home- and community-
based services, but I assure you that groups like AARP, groups like our silver-head 
legislators here in this state, are just as passionate about having this opportunity for our 
citizens who would be classified as frail and elderly.” 
 
When not to use: N/A 
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68. Senior groups less active/vocal than other groups. 
Description: Senior groups appear to be less active or vocal with their activity in HCBS 
compared to other groups.  
 
When to use: 
“There’s kind of two lobbies.  Interestingly, the seniors are less vocal than individuals 
with physical disabilities.  Our programs for people with developmental disabilities have 
well-established… and, as you probably know folks with mental retardation and 
developmental disabilities have had very, very active and mature advocacy community 
out there for a long, long time that have driven services in advance of other HCBS 
programs, which frankly was the basis of the Olmstead litigation.” 
 
When not to use: 
 “Groups like AARP, protection and advocacy for persons with disabilities, and various 
advocacy groups like for more persons with brain injuries or spinal cord injuries.  
Different provider associations that represent some of the home- and community-based 
providers like adult daycare and personal care.  Those are generally the major advocates 
that I would say we have in our state, that all actively work for home- and community-
based services.” 
 
69. Senior groups as active/vocal than other groups. 
Description: There seems to be no difference between groups advocating for HCBS. 
 
When to use: 
“Groups like AARP, protection and advocacy for persons with disabilities, and various 
advocacy groups like for more persons with brain injuries or spinal cord injuries.  
Different provider associations that represent some of the home- and community-based 
providers like adult daycare and personal care.  Those are generally the major advocates 
that I would say we have in our state, that all actively work for home- and community-
based services.” 
 
When not to use: 
“There’s kind of two lobbies.  Interestingly, the seniors are less vocal than individuals 
with physical disabilities.  Our programs for people with developmental disabilities have 
well-established… and, as you probably know folks with mental retardation and 
developmental disabilities have had very, very active and mature advocacy community 
out there for a long, long time that have driven services in advance of other HCBS 
programs, which frankly was the basis of the Olmstead litigation.” 
 
 
70. Recipients/families have different attitudes towards different settings of LTC. 
Description:  Describes when the respondent says there are different attitudes about the 
different setting of long-term care.   
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When to use: 
 
“Yes, there has been, and we’ve noticed this I guess with Money Follows the Person.  
And we’re noting it now as we are focused on closing a couple of state-operated facilities 
for people with developmental disabilities.  But the parents’ groups, for instance, are 
very… many of them are very afraid of closures.  They’re afraid of changes.  They’re 
afraid of their loved ones going to the community and not receiving what they believe are 
adequate services.  So, yeah, we noted that in Money Follows the Person, when we had 
our stakeholder groups back in 2008 and 2007 to create our program, the parents’ groups 
were among the hardest to work with.” 
 
When not to use: N/A  
 
 
71. Recipients/families unaware of HCBS options.  
Description: When recipients or families are not aware of HCBS options. 
 
When to use: 
“Groups like AARP, protection and advocacy for persons with disabilities, and various 
advocacy groups like for more persons with brain injuries or spinal cord injuries.  
Different provider associations that represent some of the home- and community-based 
providers like adult daycare and personal care.  Those are generally the major advocates 
that I would say we have in our state, that all actively work for home- and community-
based services.” 
 
When not to use: 
“I’m not sure that I can really speak to that.  I do think there has been some heightened 
awareness, so I can definitely say that.” 
 
72. Recipients/families are aware of HCBS options.  
Description: Recipients/families are aware of HCBS options. 
 
When to use: 
“I’m not sure that I can really speak to that.  I do think there has been some heightened 
awareness, so I can definitely say that.” 
 
When not to use: 
“Groups like AARP, protection and advocacy for persons with disabilities, and various 
advocacy groups like for more persons with brain injuries or spinal cord injuries.  
Different provider associations that represent some of the home- and community-based 
providers like adult daycare and personal care.  Those are generally the major advocates 
that I would say we have in our state, that all actively work for home- and community-
based services.” 
 
73. Certificate of Need impacts HCBS 
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Description: When Certificate of Need (CON) affects HCBS spending or utilization. 
 
When to use: 
“It has in some regards.  Like, for example, we don’t have a certificate of need for 
hospice.  And we have an abundance of hospice agencies.  We do have a certificate of 
need for home health, and that industry tends to be not as developed or over-developed.  
So, yes, I think certificate of need and regulation can have an impact on the development 
in certain aspects of the continuum.” 
 
 
When not to use: 
“Actually not much, because they are not… there aren’t any requirements for… there 
aren’t any CON requirements that really hit on the home- and community-based services 
side.” 
 
74. Certificate of Need does not impact HCBS.  
Description: When (CON) does not affect HCBS spending or utilization.  
 
When to use:  
“Actually not much, because they are not… there aren’t any requirements for… there 
aren’t any CON requirements that really hit on the home- and community-based services 
side.” 
 
When not to use: 
“It has in some regards.  Like, for example, we don’t have a certificate of need for 
hospice.  And we have an abundance of hospice agencies.  We do have a certificate of 
need for home health, and that industry tends to be not as developed or over-developed.  
So, yes, I think certificate of need and regulation can have an impact on the development 
in certain aspects of the continuum.” 
 
 
75. Administrative practices create barriers to more HCBS.  
Description: When administrative practices or rules appear to be barriers of any kind to 
greater HCBS. 
 
When to use: 
“I think so.  I think that the diversity of the provider network and the number of different 
people involved in the process make communication more difficult and complex.  It 
seems like it’s not even just complicated.  It’s complex.  And so, as we look to modern 
technology to support easier flow of information between providers in various settings – 
whether it’s as simple as between the primary care provider and the long-term care 
provider, or if it’s during transitions of care when people are going between the hospital 
and their home situation – there’s a lot of work that needs to be done to figure out which 
data, which elements everybody needs.  A structured form for them to provide it to one 
another.  The permissions and the privacy concerns that go along with sharing that kind 
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of information.  And the bridges to tie existing, if they exist, electronic record 
information between the different kinds of providers, or to establish electronic 
transmission of the information.  I think of it sort of globally as long-term care health 
information technology.” 
 
When not to use: N/A 
  
MISC CODES 
76. Code: Urban/rural differences in access or provision of HCBS 
Description: Geographic barriers may prevent the access of HCBS by recipients of the 
provision of HCBS by providers 
 
When to use:  
“Well I think that would make it…you’re right.  I think the primary affect is access to 
service, and you know, the amount of driving that either providers or participants have to 
do to receive services or to come to a doctor’s appointment is just unbelievable, and the 
fact that our main metro area is in the North-Central part of the state makes it difficult for 
participants.  It also causes problems for caregivers when an individual is approved for 
less hours a day than it requires the attendant to drive to the home.  So you see what I’m 
saying?” 
 
When not to use: N/A 
 
77. Code: Dual eligibles are a concern for states 
Description: Dual eligibles are a concern for states. 
 
When to use:  
“There have various federal initiatives, like Money Follows the Person.  We are one of 
the 15 states, like North Carolina, that are engaged in the duals demonstration to combine 
Medicare and Medicaid funding and integrate Medicare and Medicaid services, including 
long-term care services, primary care, and behavioral health.  So, alternatives… options 
like that from the federal government, I think, also have helped encourage states to take 
advantage of expanding HCBS options.” 
 
When not to use: N/A 
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Appendix G-Selected Findings from Aim 3 
 
Theme Theme Category Theme Examples 
Theme 1: 
States Are 
Carrying Out 
The Olmstead 
Ruling 
States are 
Increasingly Using 
More HCBS 
“The only trend [for Medicaid LTC recipient 
placement] that exists is non-institutional.  
Now, our system has lots of options, and the 
choices are driven by the client.  Not us.  So we 
try and educate them on where the best place is 
for them to get their needs met and then really 
try and advocate for non-institutional settings.” 
 
Theme 2: 
Seniors Are 
Increasingly 
Using HCBS 
States are 
Increasingly Using 
More HCBS 
“We have a large chunk of elderly people, very 
old people, which is really cool, who are still 
saying, ‘You know what?  I don’t want to die in 
a nursing home and yeah, I’ll take advantage of 
this opportunity and try and make it work in the 
community.’  So we have a surprising amount 
of older people in community settings.” 
Theme 3: 
Decreased 
Funding by 
State and 
Federal 
Governments 
Reduce HCBS 
Barriers to HCBS 
Expansion 
 
“Primarily I would say that the challenges are 
related to funding for the state match.  At this 
point, our state is still struggling economically, 
and any challenges that arise, for the most part, 
are based on simply the state match funding 
available.” 
Theme 4: 
HCBS Affected 
by Bureaucratic 
Requirements 
of Federal 
Government  
 
Barriers to HCBS 
Expansion 
 
“They’re [the federal government] just kind of 
like this big brother, always looking over you 
and kind of not having… you’re always having 
to comply with them.  And then, I think if I was 
employed by the feds, I think I would see it 
differently because the feds are paying 63 cents 
of every dollar and it just happens to be that 
these programs are administered out in the 
states.  So, I think, it just feels like the big 
brother looking over you, telling you what you 
can and cannot do, and I think we prefer more 
freedom.” 
 
Theme 5: The 
Expansion of 
HCBS 
Influenced by 
Non-Monetary 
Resources 
Barriers to HCBS 
Expansion 
 
“Probably not enough housing options for 
people that want to live in a community, and I 
don’t think we have done enough to provide 
options for dementia care.  You know, if you 
have dementia and need around the clock 
supervision to keep you safe, chances are 
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you’re going to get that in a nursing home if 
your family can’t provide it…” 
Theme 6: State 
HCBS 
Programs 
Enjoy Political 
Support 
Catalysts to HCBS 
Expansion 
 
 
“…basically, it’s [HCBS expansion] not a 
partisan issue because both Republicans and 
Democrats want to see people outside of 
nursing facilities and it saves money” 
Theme 7: 
Increased 
Funding Helps 
Expand HCBS 
Catalysts to HCBS 
Expansion 
 
“…in our state the federal match rate is roughly 
two-thirds of the cost of these services.  So we 
would either serve a much smaller population 
or provide a much lower level of services if we 
didn’t have the federal dollars to bring to bear 
in the provision of these services.“ 
Theme 8: 
Outside Groups 
Affect HCBS 
Catalysts and 
Barriers to HCBS 
Expansion 
 
“They have, and I think surprisingly, not been 
anti home- and community-based services at 
all. While they are trying to, I think, maintain 
their share of the market, their share of the 
spending, and not see a lot of their members 
going out of business, they participate in our 
MFP stakeholders group.  They are on the 
Older Adults services advisory committee.  So 
you don’t see active negativity on their part. 
Yeah.  I think that they realize that the future is 
going to be home- and community-based 
services at some level for a large segment of 
the population, and so they found it in their best 
interest not to be negative.  But that said, like I 
mentioned earlier, they are very politically 
astute and powerful, and they’re working to, I 
think, maintain what they have. But they’re not 
throwing HCBS under the bus.”  
 
“You know, always there’s an interesting dance 
with the nursing home industry when it comes 
to these [HCBS] services, and we continue to 
engage with them in that regard.  Right now, 
for example, there’s legislation pending to try 
to undo some of the things that were 
accomplished[for rebalancing] in [year 
redacted to protect anonymity].  That was 
introduced by the nursing home industry.” 
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